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MODERNIZATION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
IN POLAND

by



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A THESIS

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
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ABSTRACT

The particular style of modernization in Poland during the postwar era has tended to demonstrate its diminishing degree of utility over time, if economic development and the reduction of the conflict level in society are considered as desiderata. The ruling party in Poland, the Polish United Workers' Party, consolidated its hegemonic position after the war by means of a rigid application of the Stalinist control model and sought to induce revolutionary social and economic changes by politicizing society and making it responsive, thereby, to a command political center. Although this strategy seemed to produce both economic and political benefits for the Party in the short-run, the organizational mold through which these changes were carried out appears to become progressively less suited to solving the problems arising in the course of modernization. Particularly at later stages of growth, sustained economic development and social tranquility seem to be contingent on political development.

Poland's party system underwent a degree of modification under the impact of the social tensions which surfaced in the polity in 1956. Following the "Polish October", a modicum of autonomy was introduced for the minor parties, the activities of the various parties was better synchronized and communication between the parties and the populace appears to have improved. However, the structural principles of the

party system (P.U.W.P. hegemony and inter-party cooperation) were not altered. Under these conditions, policy alternatives reside within each party (more specifically, within the ruling party) in the form of factions rather than among the various parties, as is common in competitive party systems.

The importance of factional activity in the P.U.W.P. is apparently related to the inability of the political system to develop specialized institutions for resolving social conflicts. Party factions bear a certain correspondence to salient role-types which seem to accompany the modernization of society and, in competition with their counterparts, tend to exploit social tensions for their own ends. These considerations point up a number of difficulties which confront the P.U.W.P., such as the maintenance of a unity of command, membership internalization of organizational goals and the need for recognizable channels for resolving intra-party disputes.

In a similar manner, the relationships society and the political system tend to betray a certain strain as evinced by the student revolt in 1968 and the working class uprising in 1970. The prime factor behind these outbursts seems to be the absence of autonomy for specialized agencies which might act as a buffer between socioeconomic conflicts and the sphere of the political. The economic inertia and the social tensions which have plagued postwar Poland appear largely the result of the congruence between the command economy and the command political system, and the reluctance or the inability of the ruling party to alter this state of affairs.

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INTRODUCTION

The intention of this study is to treat the party system in postwar Poland in terms of the changing social and economic context within which this party system operates. Implicit in this approach is a concern for the dynamics of a modernizing society and the significance of these for both the structure and function of the party system. The accent, then, is upon modernization within the framework of a nation-state, and the manner in which the party system has adapted in order to meet the challenges of a changing environment.

Given this, only secondary attention is afforded to other factors which have had a profound effect upon the nature of the party system in Poland and the particular style of modernization in that country. Foremost among these, of course, are the international configuration in Eastern Europe (particularly the relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union) and the historical or traditional roots of contemporary Polish society. These factors are dealt with, but only insofar as they bear upon the central theme.

With respect to format, each chapter sets out to examine a particular aspect of socioeconomic development in terms of its political significance. Chapter I contains the major theoretical framework of the study. In it, the salient features of modernization, both as a concept and as a social process, are outlined. The attempt at this stage is to

situate the role of a political party within a radically changing social milieu and explore the ways in which modernization tends to induce political development.

Chapter II takes up the topic of the structural relations among Poland's political parties. Here too, the emphasis is upon change, but more precisely, such change as is essential to political stability. In this respect, attention is focused on the manner in which, and the degree to which, social forces have been institutionalized by the party system and by the individual parties themselves.

In Chapter III, the postwar development of Poland's economy is sketched. The importance of this topic lies not only in the fact that economic development is one of the key political goals of the system, but also in the notion that sustained economic development seems to require a corresponding modification of political relationships. In this sense, economic reforms, which have been instituted in an attempt to promote economic performance, have a direct bearing upon the role of the ruling party in society.

This role of the ruling party in society is elaborated upon in Chapter IV. Important in this regard are the social tensions arising out of the particular style of modernization in Poland and the response of the Party to strains within the social environment. That such response has been inadequate is evinced by the student riots in March 1968 and the working class uprising in December 1970. These events are briefly analyzed from the point of view of social modernization and the flux of factional activity within the dominant party.

The final chapter deals with parliamentary elections in Poland. Elections are one of the modes of interface between

polity and society. An analysis of electoral results should, therefore, shed some light upon the character of sociopolitical relationships in Poland, and the changing structure of support for the party system in Poland's modernizing society.

CHAPTER I

MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Social theorists concerned with the processes of modernization and political development have long noted the interrelation between the two.¹ David Apter defines modernization itself as "a process of increasing complexity in human affairs within which the polity must act,"² while C. E. Black goes so far as to say that we can perhaps best approach the topic of modernization by focusing on the political.³ It is assumed here, however, that the converse is also true, i.e., that modernization spells a number of implications for the political order; and a study of a political system, avowedly modernizing and midway along the road to modernity, would be most fruitful if one first comes to grips with modernization itself.

¹See, for instance, David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1965); C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row, 1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966); and with special reference to Communist systems, Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations", in his Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp.3-32.

²Apter, op.cit., p.3.

³Black, op.cit., p.58.

Conceptual Dimensions of Modernization

The term "modernization" (or modernity) represents an analytical clustering of characteristics. It is, in this sense, an "ideal-type" with which we can compare developing systems. In explicating the meaning of the concept, however, it appears advantageous to begin by examining its components and elaborate the concept along its sociological, psychological and economic dimensions.

Social systems are composed of units which are commonly referred to as "roles". Roles can be defined as "organized patterns of behavior, that is, behavior expected from actors in specific situations which are socially defined. Roles partake of two components: action, or behavior, and some normative aspect."⁴ Roles, as such, are intrinsically social and, when, related in sets to one another, form "institutions" or "structures".⁵ Under the impact of modernization, the role-clusters, characteristic of traditional society give way to a specialization of roles, such that functionally specific roles tend to supplant functionally diffuse, traditional roles. Roles and structures tend to proliferate and society becomes more complex in the process.

⁴William H. Friedland, "A Sociological Approach to Modernization" in Modernization by Design, Chadler Morse, et. al. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 42.

⁵Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 21.

"Proliferation represents a process of differentiation, whereby roles and institutions undergo continual specialization and govern more limited aspects of activity."⁶ The significance of role and structural proliferation is bound up with social modernization as an adaptive process, the adaptation of society to challenges which may originate from "internal social dynamics, from external social contact, from the impact of natural forces, or from other sources."⁷ As such, "the primary mechanism through which adaptiveness takes place is the proliferation of roles, institutions, and norms. . . ."⁸

Moreover, role proliferation, if confined to a limited institutional sector of society, is not likely to facilitate social adaptation. Rather, the fanning-out of functionally differentiated roles must be broadly based, for "it is the existence of a broad variety of role sectors - for example, institutional structures which have undergone proliferation and become institutionalized - that permits a society to deal with changes."⁹

In a similar manner, as functions become specialized in society, and associated with differentiated role patterns, a parallel need arises for structural integration. From the standpoint of the individual as social actor, integration refers to the process by which "the individual's ties with local, regional and other immediate structures are reduced

⁶ Friedland, op.cit., p.37.

⁷ Ibid., p.36.

⁸ Ibid., p.41.

⁹ Ibid.

at the same time his ties with the larger and more diffuse urban and industrial network are strengthened."¹⁰ This network involves the manifold set of "functionally specific institutions", each of which relates to a special purpose or a definite set of purposes. In order to insure coordination among these and cohesion in the social system, some form of linkage mechanism is essential.¹¹

Social Cohesion and Communications

One mechanism for promoting coordination among social institutions is "formalization", whereby the behavior and norms of individual role patterns are formally specified.

"As complexity increases," writes William H. Friedland,

traditional practices can no longer be depended upon to provide guides to action. Other means of administration must be utilized. This is accomplished by increased formalization, which involves the continual encompassing of large areas of behavior within the framework of formal organizations, social units whose base rests upon a written charter and similar instrumentalities. Furthermore, in the realm of social control, increasing quantities of behavior are regulated by formal mechanisms which more narrowly specify the acceptable range and limitations of behavior. This increasing formalism . . . is empirically exigent; it is not possible for actors to internalize all of the rules necessary to sustain a society whose role inventory and institutional network are continually proliferating.¹²

¹⁰Black, op. cit., p. 81.

¹¹See Apter, op. cit., p. 131.

¹²Friedland, op. cit., p. 38.

Cast in this milieu, the process of decision-making becomes increasingly complex and formalized, making requisite a communication system capable of supplying information and feedback at various levels of the social hierarchy. Implicit in the term "capable" is the notion that the communications system is suited to the task of transmitting information both vertically, along the ladder of the social hierarchy, and laterally, across various social strata, thereby integrating social units along two dimensions. Communications structures which rely excessively on a hierarchical pattern of information transmission and do not provide for intervening lateral structures of communication, are prone to both inhibit and distort information flows.¹³

A crucial component of the expanding communications system attendant on the modernizing process is the development of the mass media. By means of the mass media, individuals are confronted with and enculturated into the behavioral patterns and norms of modernity. To the geographical mobility made possible by modern means of transportation, and the social mobility arising out of functionally specific and differentiated roles with achievement-based status, the mass media add a dimension of "psychic mobility" or empathy. The psychically mobile person, in Daniel Lerner's words, "is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment; he comes equipped with the

¹²Friedland, op.cit., p. 38.

¹³This point is made by Almond and Powell, op.cit., p. 173.

mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside of his habitual experience . . . [and to] . . . rearrange the self-system on short notice."¹⁴ Lerner detects as well a profound difference between an individual's physical experience of a new cultural environment through direct contact and vicarious experience induced by the mass media. The former:

affronts the sensibility with new perceptions in their complex "natural" setting. The traveler in a strange land perceives simultaneously . . . the ensemble of manners and morals that make a "way of life". A usual consequence for the traveler is that the "pattern of culture" among the strangers becomes confused diverging from his prior stereotype of it and from his preferred model of reality.

Vicarious experience occurs in quite different conditions. Instead of the complexities that attend a "natural" environment, mediated experience exhibits the simplicity of "artificial" settings contrived by the creative communicator . . . [the] receiver of communications . . . has the benefit of more facile perception of the new experience as a "whole", with the concomitant advantage (which is sometimes illusory) of facile comprehension.¹⁵

Although perceptions are simplified via the mass media, responses become more complicated. Since direct contact is absent, direct physical response is impossible. Reaction to the stimuli of the mass media is confined to one's own psychic interior and takes the form of Lerner's

¹⁴ Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), pp.49,51.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.53.

"rearranging of the self-system". In this way "the mass media . . . have been great teachers of interior manipulation. They discipline Western man in those empathetic skills which spell modernity. They also portrayed for him the role he might confront and elucidated the opinions he might need."¹⁶

Not only have mass media made an impact upon cultural norms by increasing the quantity and diversity of information to which individuals are exposed, but they have likewise altered radically the style and content of the information transmitted. Whereas in traditional oral systems of communication, messages tend to be prescriptive and are delivered in face-to-face contact by individuals whose authority rests on ascriptive status, information in mass media systems has a descriptive content and is disseminated on a mass impersonal scale by professionals whose status is anchored in skill or achievement.¹⁷ The professional norms of the communicators will be dealt with in more detail below; what is of significance here, however, is the effects of mass media exposure on the individual in a modernizing society. By cultivating empathy and expanding the individual's frame of reference, the media contribute directly to a personal trait peculiar to modern society: the formation of opinions on public matters. This feature is depicted by Lerner as one of the underlying aspects of modernization, common to all modern societies regardless of cultural or doctrinal variations.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 55.

The quantitative expansion of the information which is communicated, and the qualitative change from prescriptive to descriptive communications, together enlarge the area in which one is likely to have opinions and make possible the transition from simply having opinions, to acting upon them, or "participating". The individual in this transitional stage is perhaps best defined by what he wants to become, and, as such "the transition to participant society hinges upon the desire among individuals to participate."¹⁸

Modernization and Political Participation

As urbanization and the development of mass media communications systems proceed in the course of modernization, the frequency with which an individual comes in contact with information about public matters is multiplied. Lester W. Milbrath, on the basis of numerous studies on the relation between political activity and environmental stimuli, has postulated that "the more stimuli about politics a person receives, the greater the depth of his participation."¹⁹ Likewise, the increasing measure of sophistication in the transmission of information brought on by the transition from an oral to mass media system of information would tend to provide a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for increasing participation in public affairs.²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid., p.60-61, 72.

¹⁹ Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), p. 39.

²⁰ Ibid., p.65.

Studies in Western countries have revealed that individuals who feel efficacious in their occupations are more likely than non-efficacious persons to become involved in politics.²¹ We might surmise then, that as modernization proceeds in a given country and roles become functionally specific, that individuals will tend to participate in political matters as they acquire the skills required by their respective roles and come to look upon themselves as efficacious in their respective occupations. Moreover, modernization entails the transformation of occupational roles into career roles. The latter can be depicted as an "occupation or cluster of occupations, and professionalism,"²² whose norms and status tend to be associated more with the structure of which the career role is a part, than with the role per se. However, the extension of professional norms (Apter's "professionalism") to career roles should tend to raise society's level of participation, as professionals are the group most likely to engage in political activity.²³

In addition to the formalization of both institutions and the communication links among them, modernization also entails the problem of conflict resolution. Through the expansion of the communication network and the central coordination of social sectors, contact among social units increases.

²¹ Ibid. p. 59, 60.

²² Apter, op. cit., p. 159.

²³ Milbrath, op. cit. p. 126.

S. N. Eisestadt has noted that both the political and cultural processes attendant on modernization, i.e. the drawing of broad and diverse groups to the center, have

increased the mutual interdependence and impingement of major groups and strata; hence, also the possibility of conflicts among them Different groups become more dependent on each other and more aware of one another, which serves not only to broaden the areas of conflicts between them and multiply their number, but to enhance their perception and intensity.²⁴

Concomitantly, individuals situated at nodular points in the communications network are more likely to send communications to (as well as to receive them from) others near the center of the system. "They have a higher rate of social interaction, and they are more active in more groups than persons on the periphery. This central position increases the likelihood that they will develop personal traits, beliefs and attitudes which facilitate participation in politics."²⁵

Political Culture and Modernizing Roles

The style of political participation is closely related to the norms attached to the specific roles of the participants, as well as the political culture within which

²⁴ Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 21, 22.

²⁵ Milbrath, op. cit., p. 113.

participation takes place. These two facets of participation are themselves intertwined in a given political system. It would be quite unimaginable to think of the political culture of a society without reference to the manifold set of roles and institutions which comprise it. Likewise, political culture tends to condition the political expression of the various norms within a society's role inventory. "For the individual the political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behavior, and for the collectivity it gives a systematic structure of values and rational consideration which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organizations."²⁶ It should therefore be borne in mind when discussing each of these two notions separately, that we are, in a sense, simply looking at opposite sides of the same conceptual coin.

The role profiles offered by David Apter provide a valuable insight into the effects of role norms on the style of political participation. Apter singles out four roles which are of crucial importance in the modernizing process: the civil servant, the manager, the political entrepreneur and the political broker.²⁷ The functions related to each of these roles ensure patterns of contact and interaction among the roles themselves. However, the normative

²⁶ Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction", Political Culture and Political Development, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 7.

²⁷ Apter, op. cit., pp. 166-172.

orientations of the various roles diverge, and patterns of competition are also discernible. As Apter puts it:

The civil servant is likely to be a theorist [being highly educated] he wants to use his knowledge to effect highly generalized actions according to a particular set of principles. The political entrepreneur, in contrast, is an ideologist. He exhorts people to action. The manager tends to be a pragmatist. He works out practical solutions to problems on the basis of his immediate experience and expertise. ²⁸ The political broker tends to be a compromiser.

Although these four role profiles can be viewed as constants in a modernizing setting, it is perhaps significant to note that the relative importance of each of these tends to be specified by the phase of modernization which a modernizing society reflects at a given time. During the early stages of modernization when resources are being marshalled for the tasks of industrialization, the political entrepreneur plays a key role in goal specification. After the "great breakthrough to modernity" (to use Eisenstadt's phrase²⁹) has been achieved, and professional and career roles proliferate in correspondence with the expanding technological-industrial sector of the economy, goal setting and the coordination of proliferating social and economic structures become increasingly more complex functions, dependent on technical expertise. As such, "politics becomes the preserve of the of the career expert, who is himself a technician. The old

²⁸ Ibid., p.170.

²⁹ Eisenstadt, op. cit., p.42.

amateur and non-career characteristics of the political entrepreneur are replaced by the scientific planner."³⁰ Politics, as a goal setting enterprise, becomes progressively more "technical"; and conversely, technical career roles become more "political".

The process is not without significance for the style of political participation involved. Endemic to the technical career role are the normative requisites which insure the functional proficiency upon which achievement-based status depends. The role of communicator, mentioned above, provides us with a case in point. As we shall see below, with specific reference to journalists in Poland, communicators tend to have a positive attitude toward social controversy.³¹ Implicit here are the normative requisites to gather information on a controversial matter and present the information in a professional, i.e. "objective", manner. Similarly the normative requirements of the scientific role place a high premium on accurate information. In succeeding stages of modernization when the functional inversion of scientific and political roles is apparent and persons in the possession of technical expertise occupy the roles of civil servants and political brokers, we might expect the demand for information to increase. "It is not a big step from a demand for free access to information to a demand for liberty as a right."³² Such demands should signal a change within a society's political culture in the course of modernization.

³⁰ Apter, op.cit., p. 30.

³¹ See below, p. 140.

³² Apter, op.cit., p. 175.

The term "political culture" is defined by Sidney Verba as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place." In addition to empirical beliefs, adds Verba, "they can be beliefs as to the goals and values that ought to be pursued in political life; and these beliefs may have an important expressive or emotional dimension."³³

A central challenge to a modernizing political system is the issue which Eisenstadt refers to as "sustained development ,i.e., the ability of developing an institutional structure capable of absorbing continually changing problems and demands."³⁴ Such an institutional structure would find its cultural counterpart in secularity, or "the predominance of universalistic, specific and achievement norms."³⁵ The trend toward cultural secularization is the product of many, mutually interrelated factors; the transition from an oral to a mass media system of communications as noted above, the formalization of roles and structures, the change from ascriptive to achievement based status and the concomitant shift from "consummatory" to "instrumental" values. Apter situates these value types within a paradigm of political systems, ranging between what he calls the "sacred-collectivity" and the

³³ Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture", Pye and Verba, op.cit., pp.513,516.

³⁴ Eisenstadt, op.cit., p.43.

³⁵ F.X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics", Comparative Politics: A Reader, ed. by Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1963), p.71.

"secular-libertarian" models. Superimposed upon this continuum is another which stretches between the poles of high-coercion-low-information and high-information-low-coercion. The secular-libertarian system, in Apter's words "is the perfect information model. Its opposite . . . is the sacred collectivity, a perfect coercion model."³⁶ We might hypothesize that as the importance of accurate information in the decision-making process grows, a modernizing society's political culture will tend more to resemble Apter's secular-libertarian model.

Communism as a Modernizing Variant

Between the traditional and the modern, there often emerges another style of political culture which would fit Apter's category of "sacred-collectivity". Almond and Powell refer to it as an "ideological political culture", of which Communism is one particular form or variant. "Such cultures seem to emerge either from a traditional heritage, where the cultural style makes a direct transition from traditionalism to ideology, or from the politics of uncertainty and immobilism."³⁷ As an ideological political culture, Communism shares some aspects in common with traditional political culture; consummatory values are emphasized over instrumental values, and individual norms or morality are bound up with a conception of society as a moral unit. However, the conception of morality in a Communist system

³⁶ Apter, op.cit., pp.22-25, passim.

³⁷ Almond and Powell, op.cit., p.61.

differs radically from the same conception in a traditional society. For the latter, morality is equated with being, the traditional order. The status quo is in itself moral. For the former, morality is associated with a particular ideological vision: society is becoming moral.

The Marxian vision of human emancipation within a classless society is the kernel of what Chalmers Johnson refers to as Communism's "goal culture". It can be compared to a set of myths and symbols which function as mobilizing agents for revolutionary social change.³⁸ In addition to the vision of future utopia, Communism also has the characteristics of what Johnson calls a "transfer culture, which . . . provides the norms that guide policy formation [and] . . . specifies what steps the revolutionary leadership must take to move toward the goal culture."³⁹ These "steps" would include a wrenching of society from what may be termed its "natural" or "spontaneous" path of development, and the imposition "from above" of mobilization and control mechanisms designed to both propel society along a course of rapid industrialization and eradicate those social institutions perceived by the political leadership as obstacles to its program of revolutionary change. As such, Communism is a form of social mobilization, directed at primarily economic objectives,

³⁸For a discussion of the role of myth in revolutionary social change see Leszek Kolakowski, Towards a Marxist Humanism (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp.143,144.

³⁹Johnson, op.cit., p.7.

which places a high priority on conscious political action.⁴⁰

This particular style of social mobilization, however, is beset by difficulties which stem from both the traditional culture which Communism seeks to replace and the modern or "transfer culture" which develops alongside the process of social transformation. As John W. Lewis points out, modernization which is set in motion by conscious design is in effect "inverse modernization"; that is, rather than conforming to the unguided, gradual process of creating new institutions as was characteristic of early modernizing systems, inverse modernization "endeavors to bring about the rapid multiplication of industrial organizations according to preconceived plans."⁴¹ Not only is gradualism rejected, but along with it all manifestations or vestiges of the traditional order. "While the older states retained a degree of social cohesion which helped cushion some of the worst shocks in the industrialization process, many revolutionary elites have not only undertaken to modernize in a rapid and disruptive manner, but have consciously repudiated the premodern social relationships which might help sustain minimal social cohesion."⁴² Social cleavages, reflected in the respective orientations of traditional and revolutionary elites, become magnified and multiply in number. In their most severe forms, they expose the sociopolitical

⁴⁰ See Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (revised edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p.28.

⁴¹ John W. Lewis, "Social Limits of Politically Induced Change", Modernization by Design, op.cit., p.7.

⁴² Ibid., p.9.

system to a continual "situation of breakdown".⁴³

The antipathy of the revolutionary elite, however, extends beyond its opposition to tradition. As monopolizers of political power, the revolutionary elite tends to protect its privileged position by obstructing "the rising power of the more technically trained successor sub-elite."⁴⁴ There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon. The status of the revolutionary elite is ascriptive in the sense that it is bound up with the myths and symbols of the ideology in whose name revolution is made. Achievement-based status, on the other hand, is incorporated in the roles of what Lewis refers to as the successor sub-elites. We might add that while the norms of the revolutionary elite are particularistic, i.e., derived from a particular ideology, those of the successor sub-elite tend to reflect the norms of science, which cross-cut nation states and social systems. Likewise, the suppression of social elements perceived as hostile by the political leadership may become dysfunctional with respect to the role proficiency of sub-elites. Coercion obtrudes information; and the latter is necessarily attendant on the performance of the scientific or technical role. Finally, the revolutionary elite assumes "that the essence of modernization is technical development. But, for the successor sub-elites, technological advancement signifies the broadening of social wealth and the increased opportunities for acquiring power."⁴⁵

⁴³ Eisenstadt, op.cit., pp.133-138.

⁴⁴ Lewis, op.cit., p.11.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Modernization, as is hopefully clear from the foregoing, is a multi-faceted process. It is an interwoven set of economic, social, cultural and political processes which either grow together or become stunted.⁴⁶ Communism, however, as a mobilization system, seeks to channel all social energies in the direction of economic progress and simultaneously suppress or manipulate development in the social, political and cultural spheres. This uni-directional orientation results in conspicuous developmental imbalances, and the very success of the system in the economic sector tends to generate internal pressures for a restoration of balance.⁴⁷ Such pressure might include demands for subsystem autonomy⁴⁸ to accommodate functionally differentiated roles and structures which are proliferating in the course of modernization. Related to this are cultural secularization and the change from a "subject-participant"⁴⁹ political culture to one which emphasizes widespread, authentic participation. In this respect, Johnson makes reference to the economic success of a Communist system as a "built in boomerang" effect. As a result of mounting specialization and complexity "the regime is forced to relax some of its clearly dysfunctional controls (such as the use of terror), thereby opening the door to the possibility of rising demands that the basic developmental imbalances be corrected."⁵⁰

⁴⁶This point is made by Lerner, op.cit., p.55.

⁴⁷Johnson, op.cit., pp.12,13.

⁴⁸This term is taken from Almond and Powell, op.cit., p.299.

⁴⁹Ibid., p.59.

⁵⁰Johnson, op.cit., pp.22,23.

The Role of the Party and Some Problems of Development

The political party in a Communist system is the key mechanism for both the setting and the achievement of goals. By means of the party, the political decisions of the leadership are translated into social mobilization and economic action. This is, however, by no means the extent of its role. Modernization, as discussed above, involves a social change from a parochial culture in which personal identity and social stratification are family-based to a mass culture where personal identity tends to center on functionally specific occupations or special purpose organizations. During the early stages of modernization, when the impact of the shift is most pronounced, the norms by which organizations obtain their relative ranks tend to be blurred. Moreover, elites at the forefront of the modernizing sectors most often attach little importance to traditional norms of social stratification. "This combination of uncertainty in the society at large about the new norms of stratification and relatively weak commitment to any defined set of norms governing interorganizational stratification among the powerful men of modernizing societies tends to lead to unlimited means of interorganizational competition."⁵¹ As such, the need for integration becomes paramount and, in addition to the process of formalization

⁵¹Arthur Stinchcombe, "Social Structure and Organizations", Handbook of Organizations, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), p. 144.

mentioned earlier, integration can be affected by a single organization, the party, which penetrates all other institutions, coordinates their activities and checks, thereby, centrifugal tendencies in the social system."⁵²

The implications of party penetration vis-a-vis political participation are of singular importance. Participation is controlled. Would it not be better then to simply drop the term "participation" and concentrate instead on the notion of social mobilization? I think not, and for a number of reasons. First, mobilization is a form of participation, and in a modernizing situation where all else is changing it does not seem unwarranted to suspect that it too will be transformed. Second, the party's official ideology carries strong populist overtones which are quite incompatible with its role as coercer. As modernization progresses we can perhaps expect this antagonism to become intensified, the role of coercer to decline,⁵³ and the populist strain to be reflected in either increased participation or an

⁵²Friedland, op.cit., p.58, n.13, refers to this arrangement as "focal institutional", i.e. " . . . a society having a pluralistic network of institutions but where all institutions are dominated or inter-penetrated by a single institution." Stinchcombe, op.cit., p.189, discusses much the same phenomenon in terms of "cultural penetration", supra-local socialization, and the creation of common social symbols.

⁵³Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy", in Chalmers Johnson, op.cit., pp.33-116, passim.

increasing demand for it.⁵⁴ Third, succesful mobilization, especially in the absence of widespread coercion, implies the need for a certain amount of popular support. One device for obtaining this would be mass recruitment into the party's ranks. But by opening its doors to mass membership the party runs the risk of diluting both its ideological purity and the long-range goals (for immediate or short-range benefits) which the ideology inspires. "Thus periods of mass recruitment and free discussion are often followed by purges and ideological tightening as the party elite fears - paradoxically - that mass participation threatens to destroy the revolution."⁵⁵ The likelihood of major purges, however, seems to diminish over time due to this very "focal institutional" role of the party which inhibits participation during the early phases of modernization. By assuming the role of a linkage mechanism, the party becomes increasingly populated by what Apter calls "party technicians" whose job is "the fitting and adjusting

⁵⁴ For a general discussion of the demand for participation, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of a One-Party System", Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, ed. Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p.32,33. A discussion of this same phenomenon with reference to a particular Communist system is offered by Otto Ulc, "Political Participation in Czechoslovakia," The Journal of Politics, XXIII (No.5, May, 1971), pp.423-442.

⁵⁵ Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Wiener, "The Impact of Parties on Political Development", Political Parties and Political Development, ed. by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Wiener (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), p.404.

of roles to each other."⁵⁶ Purges, especially those inspired by ideological fundamentalism, can clearly weaken the party's capacity as a focal institution by depriving it of the skill attendant on functional proficiency.

In its role as a linkage mechanism or focal institution, the party informally performs the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation. The particular style of the former, however, would tend to be "latent" rather than "manifest" and "general" rather than "particular".⁵⁷ Both are subtle ways for transmitting the demands of individuals, groups and strata in a system which suppresses diversity, encourages uniformity and reserves the goal-setting function for the political elite. As such, they are channels for communication, tailored to the political-ideological milieu, which provide the policy makers with the information incumbent upon the setting of a particular goal and its attainment. Latent articulation "takes the form of behavioral or mood cues which may be read and transmitted into the political system . . . [and] . . . is quite difficult for the elites accurately to gauge and to respond to the demands."⁵⁸ It is certainly a less-than-optimal means of articulation and as such may well effect not only the information level of decision-making but also the carrying out of the decisions themselves.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Apter, op.cit., p.365.

⁵⁷ These terms are suggested by Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.86,87.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ This point will be taken up subsequently with regard to collectivization.

In a related fashion, what may well be particular interests often are articulated in general terms. In the Soviet context, Jerry Hough describes the process by which local interests are transmitted to central policy makers couched in terms of "the national interest", and the profound difficulty involved with separating what is local from what is of national benefit due to the absence of a rational price structure.⁶⁰ Moreover, the entanglement of particular with general interests portends a situation of system vulnerability, for individual demands take on a system-wide significance. As Herbert Marcuse observes:

Such translation changes significantly the meaning of the actual proposition . . . [it] . . . formulates a general condition in its generality ("wages are too low"). It goes beyond the particular factory and beyond the workers' particular situation. In this generality, and only in this generality, the statement expresses a sweeping indictment which takes the particular case as a manifestation of a universal state of affairs, and insinuates that the latter might⁶¹ not be changed by the improvement of the former.

With regard to interest aggregation and its style, a

⁶⁰ Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 266.

⁶¹ Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 111. Marcuse is discussing in the context the transformation of general into particular demands and the emasculation thereby of anti-system sentiment. His remarks, however, appear equally applicable to communist system where the process appears to be reversed.

Communist party might be placed in the category of "absolute-value oriented".⁶² An ideological framework is imposed upon the demands stemming from particular groups or strata and the demands are filtered through a screen of orthodoxy, thus excluding in many cases the interests of major segments of the population. However, the indefinite continuation of this process incurs the risk of wide-spread alienation from the political system and, if the party is to maintain its capabilities as a modernizing force, it appears that it must somehow avoid this pitfall. Cooptation has been one means utilized to include members or representatives of given groups within the upper echelons of the party hierarchy.⁶³ This technique provides the decision makers with a channel of communications to a given group and quite often a source of expert information on decisions involving the group itself. Such tendencies toward cooptation, as well as the acquiring of technical skills by career politicians themselves, would indicate the party's adaptation in the course of social and economic change.⁶⁴

This issue of adaptation is central to both the notion of modernization and the topic at hand, the Polish party

⁶² Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp. 108, 109.

⁶³ See, for instance, Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis", American Political Science Review, LXII (No.4, December, 1968).

⁶⁴ These aspects of adaptation are treated by Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "Toward a Reconceptualization of Political Change in the Soviet Union", Comparative Politics (No.2, January, 1969), pp.238-242.

system. As modernization proceeds and individuals develop the occupational skills required by their respective roles as well as the "psychic mobility" which enables them to operate in the modern setting, "it is probable that the increasing competence of mass publics in industrial societies will lead to changes in the leadership styles or at least the need for such changes."⁶⁵ The increasing complexity brought on by modernization would seem to require a specialization of those structures which aggregate interests in the same manner as interests tend to become more specialized themselves.⁶⁶ The specialization of interest aggregating structures would in turn be accompanied by a more responsive style of political leadership. "Industrial research suggests that more complex work, work that requires more initiative, and so on, is better performed with a democratic style of leadership. Other research suggests that participation, regardless of leadership style, leads to increased political competence and hence the potential of a more democratic style."⁶⁷ It is, therefore, the major proposition of this study that the modernization of Poland should increase the access to the political elite which is accordingly becoming

⁶⁵ Samuel H. Barnes, "Leadership Style and Political Competence", Political Leadership in Industrial Countries, ed. Lewis J. Edinger (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1967), p.81.

⁶⁶ This argument is made by Almond and Powell, op.cit., p.105.

⁶⁷ Barnes, op.cit., p.66.

progressively more responsive and less coercive. In short, modernization is a stimulus to political development and cannot be sustained without it. Furthermore, should it be the case that political development is not keeping pace with socioeconomic development, the result should be either economic stagnation or anomic mass outbursts or both.

An investigation of this matter should shed some light upon the extent of political development within the Polish party system. Modernization suggests a number of consequences for the political system; through education, urbanization and the expansion of the mass media, it generates the requisites for at least a potentially participatory population. By specializing roles and functions, introducing scientific norms, enlarging society's technological capacity and sharpening the importance of information, it tends to involve the specialized sub-elites more directly in the political process. Finally, social restratification and ensuing uncertainty of social status provides the setting for role conflict, which in a "politicized" society such as Poland, may well take on a political character.

The precise form of political development, although optimal forms have been suggested,⁶⁸ is, of course, uncertain. The notion of political development, is, however, sufficiently general to encompass a number of phenomena. It is the opinion here that access to centers of decision making and increased autonomy for political, as well as social institutions, are the key indices for the Polish party system.

⁶⁸ Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp. 330, 331.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURE OF POLAND'S PARTY SYSTEM

Conceptualizing the Party System in Poland

The concept "party system" represents a notion of political parties which goes beyond the simple enumeration of the individual parties or "party units" within a given polity. As Harry Eckstein points out, party units partake of certain characteristics or attributes which cannot be fully stated by a description of the units themselves.⁶⁹ In order to account for these attributes, we must place political parties within the context of the governmental machinery which they control or seek to control, and examine the patterns of interaction between and among the various parties involved. In doing so, we are, in effect, dealing with a "system".

Eckstein further stipulates that interaction patterns among parties must be "competitive", if the term party system is to have any meaning. The opinion here, however, is that interaction is the essential feature, while the style of interaction is a secondary quality bearing upon the type of party system under consideration. In this way, we can

⁶⁹ Harry Eckstein, "Party Systems", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by David L. Sills, (The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, XI, 1968), pp. 436-437.

speak of party systems in which the dominant mode of interaction is competitive as opposed to others where the theme is cooperation. Poland would clearly fall within the second category, and yet our understanding of the Polish case can be amplified by means of the concept "party system", denoting patterned interaction of a cooperative type. Each party unit in Poland tends to define itself in terms of its counterparts, and the role and functions of one can neither be fully specified nor comprehended without reference to the role and functions of the others.

Poland's party system is most commonly, and perhaps best, described as "hegemonic".⁷⁰ By this is meant a situation in which all political parties are in formal coalition and act in concert; yet one party exercises a "leading role" and is acknowledged as the ruling party by the others. Within the bounds of this relationship, there is a certain limited sharing of political power with the minor parties which tends to resemble the delegation of authority and responsibility. In principle what is delegated can also be withdrawn, but in practice, as we shall subsequently see, the matter does not seem to quite so simple.

The term "hegemonic party system" was introduced by Jerzy J. Wiatr. It appears in his recent works: "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland", The American Political Science Review, LXIV (No.4, December, 1970), pp.1239-1245; "The Hegemonic Party System in Poland", Mass Politics, ed. by Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp.312-321. The concept is also employed by Giovanni Sartori, "The Typology of Party Systems - Proposals for Improvement", Mass Politics, op.cit., pp.324-352, passim; Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Parties", Political Parties and Political Development, op.cit., pp.35-37.

Origins

The Party system which emerged in postwar Poland can be usefully summarized by a set of dominance relations⁷¹ extending from the Soviet Union to the Polish Worker's Party and from the latter to the minor parties in the system. Poland was subjected to the "sovietization" which occurred throughout Eastern Europe in the wake of the advancing Soviet armies, and Soviet control was operationalized through such practices as direct consultation between Soviet and Polish leadership, the supervision of Polish internal affairs by the Soviet ambassador, the penetration of the Polish government by Soviet personnel,⁷² and the presence of the Polish Worker's Party in the Comintern. The logic of Poland's geo-political situation seemed to make the political survival of non-Communist groups contingent upon cooperation with the Communists. The degree of cooperation, however, appears to be an issue which

⁷¹This concept is suggested by Martin C. Needler in his essay "Stability and Instability", Issues in Comparative Politics, ed. by Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), pp.212-221.

⁷²For instance, Soviet General I. Serov was instrumental in the organization of Security Ministry, Soviet officers acted as body-guards for S. Radiewicz, the head of the security apparatus, and in 1949, Soviet Marshall K. Rokossovsky was named Minister of Defense. Shortly thereafter, Marshall Rokossovsky was elevated to the Politburo of the Polish Party. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, revised ed.; Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1967), pp.116-124.

was not resolved until the Cominform took a position against "nationalist deviation" in September-October, 1947.

During the early postwar years, two factions were operating within the leadership of the Polish Worker's Party. One of these, later to be accused of "nationalist deviation" and expelled from the Party, was headed by Wladyslaw Gomulka. Until his fall from the post of General Secretary and expulsion from the Party in 1948, Gomulka spoke of a "Polish road to socialism" which departed fundamentally from the Soviet model of socialist construction. The "Polish road" involved restructuring Polish institutions along socialist lines rather than full scale transformation of the political, social and economic sectors. Gomulka denied the necessity of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the organizational form of socialist construction, as well as the utility of the collectivization of agriculture. In January 1947, he wrote in the Party's ideological organ, Nowe Drogi:

There is absolutely no need to imitate the Soviet farm policy. We rejected collectivization because in Polish conditions it would be economically and politically harmful We have chosen our own Polish road by development, which we have named the people's democracy In the existing circumstances, a dictatorship of the working class, let alone that of⁷³ a single party, is neither necessary nor expedient.

⁷³Quoted in Andrzej Korbonski, The Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), pp.139-140.

For these reasons, Gomulka's program for the modernization of Poland provided a substantial role for non-Communist political forces acting in conjunction with the Polish Workers' Party. "It appears that Gomulka was even ready to make far reaching concessions [to these groups] so that Communists might broaden their political basis, that they might not remain isolated."⁷⁴

The leadership of the second faction within the party consisted of a veteran corp of prewar members of the Polish Communist Party who had spent the war years in the U.S.S.R. James F. Morrison sums up the outlook and motivation of this group as those "who out of some combination of faith, opportunism and necessity were willing to follow Moscow's lead on virtually all issues."⁷⁵ When, in light of the Soviet-Yugoslav rift, Gomulka's "Polish road" became a heresy within the World Communist movement, this faction was able, with the full confidence and support of the Soviets, to oust Gomulka from power in the summer of 1948, and secure the leadership of the Party in the person of Boleslaw Bierut. The subsequent purge of "Gomulkaists" affected about one-fourth of the Party's membership.⁷⁶ In terms of the relationship among the political parties on the Polish scene, however, the triumph

⁷⁴ M.K. Dziewanowski, The Communist Party of Poland (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p.173.

⁷⁵ The Polish People's Republic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p.41.

⁷⁶ See Adam Bromke, Poland's Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp.63,64.

of the Soviet-oriented faction seems to signal the replacement of one sort of instability by another.

As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Polish Communists had formed an alliance with antifascists groups during World War II which subsequently evolved into the Front of National Unity, an organization designed to attract non-Communist elements into the government framework and elicit their support.⁷⁷ The issue of whether or not to join the Front of National Unity and cooperate thereby with the Communists had the effect of splitting all of the major political groups in postwar Poland.⁷⁸ The choice was perhaps compounded by the uncertainty as to the relationship between the Polish Workers' Party and the Soviet Communists. Was the "Polish road" a reality, or simply a subterfuge to conceal the long-range intentions of remaking Poland along Soviet lines? This situation (in addition to the Communist tactics of setting up front organizations or "boring from within" the established parties) perhaps explains the bewildering number of splits and mergers which took place among the non-Communist parties during the postwar years. Although the decision to follow the Soviet lead certainly cleared the air on this score, it nonetheless failed to produce a stable arrangement within the party system as, we shall see, the events of the "Polish October" so dramatically demonstrated.

⁷⁷ On the subject of the National Front, see H. Gordon Skilling, The Governments of Communist East Europe (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., 1966), pp. 65-67.

⁷⁸ Korbonski, op. cit., pp. 108-130, passim.


The Party System in the Stalinist Period

With the accession of Bierut to the post of General Secretary of the Party, Poland embarked on a course of socialist transformation commonly referred to as "Stalinism". In sum, this term stands for the rigid application of Soviet methods of socioeconomic transformation and their corresponding forms of political organization. The former is dealt with in the next chapter, while we now turn to a discussion of the latter.

In a purely formal sense the units in Poland's party system which congealed in 1948-49, resemble the cleavage lines sketched by Seymore M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their analysis of the social basis of party systems in Western European countries.⁷⁹ Although parties of territorial or ethnic "defense", drawing support from a specified geographical region or ethnic group, did not exist in postwar Poland, we can nevertheless employ a modified version of Lipset and Rokkan's format and depict the constellation of parties as arrayed along urban-rural, secular-religious and occupational cleavage structures. Figure 1 represents this graphically. We should perhaps underline the "formal" nature of this arrangement, for rather than carrying on independent or quasi-independent policies, the minor parties served as "transmission belts" for executing

⁷⁹ "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignment" in their Party Systems and Voter Alignment (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp.1-53.

Figure 1.



the programs of the Polish communists; much as the latter, in its turn, performed the same function vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, at least until Stalin's death. The utility of this scheme rests upon the proposition that one of the by-products of the "Polish October" was the imbuing of these "formal" relationships with some degree of substance.

The rural pole on the cleavage axis is occupied by the United Peasant Party (U.P.P.), ostensibly articulating the interests of the peasant masses. The U.P.P. was formed of a merger between the Communist sponsored Peasant Party and remnants of the only significant opposition group which the Communists have faced in Poland, the Polish Peasant Party. After the war the Polish Peasant Party cooperated to a minimal degree with the Communists (its leader Stanislaw Mikolaczuk, for example, held a post in the government as Minister of Agriculture) yet insisted upon maintaining its independent character as a political alternative to the Polish Workers' Party. As such, it was subjected to systematic repression and

defeated in an election referred to as "civil war". As an active organization it ceased to exist by November 1947, when Mikolajczyk himself fled the country.⁸⁰

In the upper right-hand quadrant of Figure 1. is the Democratic Party (D.P.), formed in September, 1944. The Democratic Party claimed to be the direct successor to a small prewar party of radical intelligentsia and counted a number of former members of this prewar group among its leadership.⁸¹ The Democratic Party purportedly articulates the interest of artisans, small proprietors and, to some extent, the liberal intelligentsia. As such, it shared in common with the U.P.P. the unenviable task of "representing" those strata of society which the ruling party had earmarked for history's scrapeheap.

Although not a political party per se, the Pax group was constituted as the spokesman for Catholic interests in Poland. As such, it is situated at the religious pole in Figure 1. Pax was formed in the early postwar years by Boleslaw Piasecki, an individual whose rather compromised background (he founded the prewar semi-fascist "Falanga" in Poland, had connections with the Axis powers during the

⁸⁰ On the demise and fall of the Polish Peasant Party, see inter alia, Richard F. Staar, Poland, 1944-1962 (New Orleans: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), pp.46-56. A first hand account is also provided by Mikolajczyk in his book The Pattern of Soviet Domination (London: Simpson Low, Marston and Co., Ltd., 1948), passim.

⁸¹ Bromke, op.cit., p.79.

war, and lead the "Konfederacja Narody" which took up resistance to the Soviet "liberators") and financial abilities commended him for leadership of the Communists' Trojan Horse in the Catholic camp.⁸²

The linchpin of the party system is, of course, the Polish United Workers' Party, the successor to both the Polish Workers' Party and the Polish Socialist Party, which after the eradication of "rightist-nationalist deviation" from the ranks of each, merged at the Unity Congress of December, 1948. The P.U.W.P. is structured on the principle of "democratic centralism" and organized along the familiar pattern of Communist parties: "primary cells" at the lowest level, district committees and, at the apex, the Central Committee, Politburo and Party Secretariat.⁸³ Its network of organizational units in all sectors of Polish society (possibly excepting the Catholic Church, but here too it has a liaison in Pax) lends it to the focal institutional role described in the preceding chapter.⁸⁴ In turn, this focal position permits it the manifold, often extra-legal, functions of directly supervising and controlling the social and economic sectors, as Jerry Hough notes with reference to its Soviet counterpart.⁸⁵

⁸²On the subject of Piasecki and Pax see inter alia Hansjakob Stehle, The Independent Satellite (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), pp.108-112; Bromke, op.cit., pp.85-228, passim.

⁸³On the organizational form of the P.U.W.P., see Dziewanowski, op.cit., pp.220-222. The minor parties share the same organizational mold.

⁸⁴See above, p.24.

⁸⁵See Hough, op.cit.

During the Stalinist period, the set of dominance relations among Polish parties was most conspicuous, and consequently, the hegemony of the P.U.W.P. reached its zenith. We have already indicated that this particular situation, was, in terms of the party system, an unstable one. At this point we can address ourselves to the question of why stability does not seem to result from a maximization of P.U.W.P. hegemony.

To begin with, stability, as Samuel P. Huntington points out, depends in large part upon the "creation of political institutions involving and reflecting the moral consensus and mutual interests . . . in a complex society,"⁸⁶ and requires some sort of specialization among institutions in order to insure the integration of diverse strata. As mentioned above, this specialization among Poland's parties during the Stalinist era existed only on paper. In actuality, as Adam Bromke observes, the two minor parties

were for all practical purposes eliminated from the government. Their separate traditions were played down and their programs reduced to virtual replicas of that of the Polish United Workers' Party. Their activities were also dramatically curtailed. Indeed, at the climax of the Stalinist period, the United Peasant Party, and especially, the Democratic Party, were threatened with outright suppression, seemingly to follow in the footsteps of the anti-Communist opposition.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), p.10.

⁸⁷ Bromke, op.cit., p.80.

The drive to collectivize agriculture during the Stalinist era points up the serious shortcomings of the structured relations between the P.U.W.P. and its rural counterpart, the U.P.P., as well as between the P.U.W.P. leadership and the rural Party activ. With reference to the latter, the rural activ was confronted with a double message from the P.U.W.P. leadership. On the one hand, any slowdown in the "antikulak" collectivization drive was labeled "gomulkovshchina" or "right-wing deviation". On the other, the leadership, mindful of the economic consequences of collectivization via naked force, tended to stress the use of economic incentives as an inducement for the peasants to enter the cooperatives. As a result, "the rural party organizers were as confused as ever as to what they were supposed to do, but they knew that their standing within the apparatus was determined both by the number of cooperatives formed in their county and by the amount of foodstuffs collected through the system of compulsory deliverance."⁸⁸ The situation appeared to maximize the need for coercion and minimize the possibilities for communication, except perhaps the transmission of directives from the leadership to the activ, and as we have seen, even these were inconsistent. Peasant membership in the P.U.W.P., as might be expected, declined sharply during the collectivization drive. Whereas in 1947, peasant membership numbered 23,000, this figure was reduced to 13,000 by 1953. Moreover, the

⁸⁸ Korbonski, op. cit., p.169.

drop in membership was particularly severe in certain provinces in which peasant enrollment fell from 50 per cent of the total party membership to 8 or 9 per cent during the early 1950's.⁸⁹

During collectivization, the U.P.P. acted as the faithful agent of the P.U.W.P. in the countryside and participated in coercing into the cooperative farms those same peasants whom it was alledgedly supposed to "represent". Indeed, local U.P.P. activists actually competed with their opposite numbers in the P.U.W.P. as to who could institute more collective farms, secure greater quotas of agricultural produce and "unmask" a larger number of kulaks.⁹⁰ The U.P.P. was, to all intents and purposes, simply digging its own grave; a fact reflected in the attitude of both the P.U.W.P. leadership which ceased to consult the U.P.P. on agricultural matters, even in a perfunctory way which had hitherto been the case, and the P.U.W.P. activ which viewed the fate of the U.P.P. as linked with collectivization; i.e., once the process was complete, the U.P.P. would disappear along with its social base, the independent farmer.⁹¹ This consensus

⁸⁹ Figures quoted Ibid., pp.194,195,197.

⁹⁰ See Tadeusz N. Cieplak, "The Role and Function of Non-Communist Parties in the Polish People's Republic: The Case of the United Peasant Party" (unpublished paper presented at the Northeastern Slavic Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 3-8, 1971), p.8.

⁹¹ See Korbonski, op.cit., p.198.

within the activ militated against cooperation, or even synchronization of activities, with U.P.P. activists, and the growing neglect of the latter was endorsed by directives from the P.U.W.P. Politburo.⁹²

An offshoot of the deterioration of interparty relations was a widening communication gap between the U.P.P. and the P.U.W.P., not to mention the hiatus between the regime and the peasantry. The implications of this situation vis-a-vis the constraints placed upon the roles of the U.P.P. activists are evident in the subsequent remarks of two of these individuals concerning their activities during the collectivization drive:

During the classification of peasant land in 1950 [taxation rates, a device used to make continued private ownership impossible, and hence collectivization inevitable, were calculated according to specific, albeit often arbitrary, classifications of the value of the land], I worked in the Agricultural Department of the Supreme Committee of the United Peasant Party. Together with the other activists, I had protested against such classifications. We tried to point out its possible repercussions in national politics as well as in the economy. The chief of the Department was unwilling to take this matter before the Central Committee [of the P.U.W.P.] because he was afraid to even mention the matter. As a party we did little or nothing at all to counteract this harmful action. At the beginning of 1951, there came a difficult period in the collection of the delivery quotas. Some of our activists, instead of pointing out the absurdity of the allocated amounts

⁹² Ibid.

of deliveries in some extreme cases, started to compete with the Polish United Workers' Party's activists in destroying the so-called kulaks, thus damaging our production.

Another U.P.P. activist comments in a similar vein:

As a member of an inter-party commission to examine certain abuses in the village of Giffice, district of Stargard, I learned of the methods by which the producers' cooperatives [collective farms] were founded and how people were forced to leave their newly apportioned homesteads and join the State Farms. All these facts were known to our party members from the District Committee as well as to the members of the Supreme Committee. However, they did not prevent a repetition of such abuses. Similar cases occurred in other areas without one word of protest.⁹³

These remarks from U.P.P. activists shed some light upon the gulf which existed between the peasantry and the regime, as well as the absence of communications between the P.U.W.P. and the U.P.P., and within the parties themselves. The implications for policy formulation in this information vacuum are perhaps most apparent in the mass exodus from the collectives in 1956 when farm policy was reversed and accession to the collective farms was put on a voluntary basis. The fact that the peasants "voted with their feet" speaks for the widespread estrangement from

⁹³ Quoted in Cieplak, op.cit., pp.6,7.

the regime and its policies present in the countryside. The fact that the policy was reversed, however, perhaps reveals a more serious difficulty in the structure of the party system. Andrzej Korbonski makes the point that the reversal of agricultural policy was most certainly undertaken on the basis of inadequate or misleading information transmitted to the P.U.W.P. leadership by the Party activ.⁹⁴ The local and middle-level apparatus was surely aware of the discontent among the forcibly collectivized peasants, yet failed to relay this information to the decision-making circles for fear of incurring the wrath of the leadership and suffering the consequences accruing to those guilty of "inefficiency, loss of socialist perspective and opportunism". Instead the local party organs continued to paint the rural picture in rosy hues and continued to speak of the possibility, if not the desirability of forming still more collectives. Consequently the Party leadership, probably favoring the dissolution of economically unsound farms from the standpoint of efficiency, was out of touch with the rural situation and undertook a policy reformation, the results of which it neither foresaw nor was able to control. The official directives to strengthen existing cooperatives, which occurred simultaneously with the introduction of the introduction of the voluntary membership principle, suggests further that the leadership was basing policy decisions on a cumulative backlog of misinformation.

⁹⁴Op.cit., p.250.

Structural Changes in the Party System

A detailed analysis of the "Polish October" (a name given to the interplay of social, economic and political factors in Poland in 1956 which substantially transformed the framework of political activity) is beyond the scope of the present study.⁹⁵ While confining ourselves to an account of the structural changes in the party system, we can, however, take note of the situational variables which appear to have had an impact upon Poland's parties and the set of relations among them.

Returning to the concept of dominance relations, we might begin by making reference to what appears to have been an evolution of the relations between the Soviet Union and the ruling party in Poland following the death of Stalin. To start with, the P.U.W.P. leadership appears to have been rather disinclined to follow the early Soviet lead; the "New Course", initiated shortly after Stalin's death. As Brzezinski observes, the P.U.W.P. was the last among the ruling Communist parties of Eastern Europe to formally adopt the New Course⁹⁶ and probably the most timid (or reluctant) in implementing new policies designed to raise the living standard by reducing the rate of accumulation.⁹⁷ The rigidity

⁹⁵ An excellent account of the Polish situation in 1956 is provided by Konrad Syrop, Spring in October (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957).

⁹⁶ Formal adoption came at the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, 1956.

⁹⁷ Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., pp.165,166.

of the leadership might possibly be one factor which militated against adequate incremental change and thereby opened the door to change of a more radical nature (or at least the threat of it), when social and political dynamics gathered momentum a few years later.

Secondly, Polish-Soviet relations were altered by the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (May 1955), Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. (February 1956) and the dissolution of the Cominform (April 1956). Taking these events in chronological order, the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement carried with it the implicit sanction of the "separate roads to socialism" idea espoused by the Yugoslavs. As such, Gomulka's notion of a "Polish road" no longer constituted a heresy per se. Moreover, by calling for "fraternal solidarity" with the independently minded Yugoslavs, the Soviet move hinted at a relaxation of Soviet authority (or an altering of the dominance relations) within the Communist Bloc.⁹⁸ The subsequent denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress and the dissolution of the Cominform, seem to confirm this interpretation; particularly the latter, as the formal structure of Soviet control was dismantled.

The "secret speech" had a variety of important political consequences for the P.U.W.P.. First, the matter of the

⁹⁸ This point is made by Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.45.

rehabilitations. Richard Lowenthal points out that the condemnation of Stalin's prewar purges at the Twentieth Congress and the ensuing rehabilitation of many prewar Communist leaders involved for the Poles a de facto condemnation of the structure of Polish-Soviet party relations under the Stalinist system.⁹⁹ This is so be reason of the total dissolution by the Comintern in 1938 of the Communist Party of Poland.¹⁰⁰ If the action itself was now censured, it might be reasonable to assume that some serious doubts were raised in the minds of Polish Communists about the organizational arrangement which made such an opprobrious action possible. The rehabilitation in this sense, served to strengthen the hand of those within the P.U.W.P. who were favorably inclined toward a "Polish road".

Second, the attack on Stalin and the "cult of the personality" could hardly be interpreted within the Polish party as an endorsement of the "little Stalin" who had guided the P.U.W.P. since the fall of Gomulka, Boleslaw Bierut. The fact that Khrushchev himself flew to Warsaw to instruct the Polish Politburo on the choice of a successor for Bierut, who

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.48.

¹⁰⁰ Dziewanowski, op.cit., pp.149-154, puts forward the idea that the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland was a Soviet foreign policy strategem (designed by Stalin), which was undertaken as a step toward rapprochement with Hitler's Germany. Whether the dissolution was ordered for this reason or not, the fact remains that the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in the following year, and Polish Communists had ample ground for at least suspecting that their party had been sacrificed on the altar of Soviet national interest.

died unexpectedly in March of 1956, is perhaps also significant. Khrushchev, in effect, vetoed the decision of the Poles to elevate Roman Zambrowski (who according to Brzezinski was "an apparatchik of essentially Stalinist orientation") to the post of First Secretary and instead successfully sponsored the candidacy of Edward Ochab. Although Ochab's career had been largely tied to the Stalinist past, his installation by the Soviets ensured the P.U.W.P. acceptance of the new Soviet line on "separate road to socialism", albeit as interpreted by Moscow.¹⁰¹ With the accession of Ochab to the leading position in the Party, a personality variable seems to enter the equation. That is, Ochab was able to throw the weight of his position behind Gomulka some months later and, in effect, peacefully hand over the reins of power to the figure who symbolized the "Polish road".

Finally, with reference to the changing structure of Polish-Soviet relations, we might mention the areas of Soviet personnel in Poland and the matter of inter-state relations. By November 1956, the Soviet apparatus of direct personal control in Poland was dismantled. Marshall Rokossovsky was relieved of his post in the Polish Politburo, the role of the Soviet ambassador was curtailed and limited to diplomatic functions, and, with the exception of a few (essentially technical) posts, Soviet personnel were removed from the Polish administration.¹⁰² With respect to the matter of

¹⁰¹ Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., pp.245,246.

¹⁰² See Bromke, op.cit., p.123.

inter-state relations, a communique released after a conference in Moscow (November 18, 1956) between a Soviet Party and Government Delegation (headed by Khrushchev) and its Polish counterpart (headed by Gomulka) listed the following points:

(1) . . . the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic . . . will widen and consolidate, developing on the basis of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty, and noninterference in internal affairs. The Soviet-Polish alliance, in which both the Soviet and Polish peoples are equally interested, is a reliable guarantee of their security. This alliance is a most important factor for the strengthening of the independence of the Polish People's Republic and the inviolability of her frontier on the Oder and Neisse, the frontier of peace.

(2) Both sides, on the basis of mutual interests, agree to regard as settled as of November 1, 1956, the Polish debts arising out of the use of credits granted by the Soviet Government to Poland in payment of the full value of coal delivered by Poland to the Soviet Union in 1946-53 on the basis of the agreement of August 16, 1945.

The Soviet Government is ready to deliver to the Polish People's Republic 1,400,000 tons of grain in 1957 . . . on credit.

(3) It was settled that both sides would, in accordance with the developments of the international situation, consult on problems connected with the stay of Soviet military units in Polish territory, their number and their composition.

The temporary presence of Soviet troops in Poland can in no way affect the sovereignty of the Polish state and cannot lead to their interference in the internal affairs of the Polish People's Republic.

The disposition and number of Soviet troops is to be determined by special agreement of the Government of the Polish People's Republic or other competent Polish authorities.

The Soviet military units located in the territory of the Polish People's Republic and their personnel, together with their families, are obligated to respect and adhere to the provisions of Polish law.¹⁰³

Following Huntington,¹⁰⁴ we can perhaps interpret this extension of Poland's sovereignty as a form of political development. The factor of autonomy tends to reduce the vulnerability of the system to influences arising from without, and, perhaps more importantly in the Polish case, permits the political leadership more maneuverability on domestic issues, as policy formulation and decision-making are no longer pre-empted by the dictates of a foreign power which, more often than not, has neither the information about, nor the sensitivity to, the local situation. We might go one step further and suggest that the reduction, if not elimination of Soviet control over the Polish domestic scene constitutes a necessary condition for the formation of stable political institutions (identified as

¹⁰³For the full text of the communique, see Paul E. Zinner (ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp.306-314.

¹⁰⁴Political Order in Changing Societies, op.cit., pp.20-22.

"Polish as opposed to "Russian") which are capable of eliciting to some degree the loyalties of the citizenry. In this respect, H. Gordon Skilling's discussion of the tendency toward persuasion and away from coercion, or the gradual replacement of terror by law in Eastern Europe, is appropriate.¹⁰⁵ The process of securing popular acceptance of political decisions is in part a process of building loyalties and replacing coercion by persuasion. As noted in the preceding chapter, there seem to be definite pay-offs here for decision-makers in terms of maximizing the information involved in decision-making , and, if our hypothesis concerning the increasing need for information in a modernizing society is correct, we can perhaps speak in terms of mutually reinforcing relationships among autonomy, institutionalization, persuasion and information. Taken together these relationship are summarized by the term "political development". However, this is to indicate the conditions for, rather than to overstate the degree of, political development in Poland. Although Polish autonomy was expanded as a result of the alteration of relations with the U.S.S.R., we should bear in mind, as Andrew Gyorgy points out, that the very proximity of the Soviet Union constitutes a form of "remote control" or "psychological

¹⁰⁵ The Governments of Communist East Europe (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., 1966), pp.172,173.

deterrence".¹⁰⁶ Nor is the situation quite so one-sided. As we have seen, events in the Soviet Union can be considered as one of the stimuli for change from the Stalinist pattern and subsequent developments in the Soviet Union (especially with respect to decentralization in the late 1950's and early 1960's) can perhaps be interpreted in a similar fashion.

As Brzezinski notes, Polish-Soviet relations since the "Polish October" exhibit an element of the paradoxical.¹⁰⁷ On the one hand, "Gomulkaist Poland was a Communist state which could not be maintained without the support of the U.S.S.R."; while on the other, the internal stability of the Gomulka regime was based upon noninterference in Polish domestic affairs. As Brzezinski goes on to mention, this arrangement was inherently weak in the long-run. The alliance with the Soviet Union suited the Party from the standpoint of maintaining political power in the face of domestic discontent. The Soviet Union, as in the early postwar period, continued to be the Party's trump card; and, as mentioned

¹⁰⁶ Gyorgy also makes the point that the potential rather than the actual character of police readiness in de-Stalinized Eastern Europe has a similar "prophylactic . . . purpose of preventing social and economic disturbances . . . " His comments seem to fit into our scheme of dominance relations and would indicate that a certain continuity is present, as the reduction of overt coercion appears to have taken place on two parallel levels: inter-state and intra-state. See his essay "The Internal Political Order" in Eastern Europe in the Sixties, ed. by Stephen Fischer-Galati (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 159-194, esp. 188, 190.

¹⁰⁷ See The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., pp. 361, 362.

in the Polish-Soviet communique quoted above, the security of Poland's western frontier and the areas acquired from Germany after the war form a cornerstone of the alliance. For Polish domestic consumption, the line is relatively straight-forward: The alliance with the Soviet Union is essential to the security of Polish state, and the Soviets will only support a Communist regime in Poland. The difficulty with this arrangement, however, comes to the surface when the threat of German "revanchism" recedes, and the cornerstone is thereby removed.¹⁰⁸

Institutionalizing Social Changes

In view of the set of dominance relations which we have sketched, the alteration of relations between the ruling party in Poland and the Soviet Union can perhaps be taken as a necessary condition for practical development within the Polish party system. On the domestic scene in Poland, the strains developing within the socioeconomic order as a consequence of the essentially Stalinist style of rapid industrialization, induced a growing disaffection with the

¹⁰⁸ The Polish-West German Treaty of December 1970 can perhaps be interpreted as dispelling the "revanchist" threat, and with it, the logic of the alliance. Its implications for the internal political order are examined in Chapter IV.

regime and its policies. Ferment in Poland seemed to reach every sector of social life by 1956, and confronted the ruling party with what we referred to earlier as a "situation of breakdown". Nor was the ruling party immune to the conflicts which were spontaneously surfacing in society. Increasing factional activity within the P.U.W.P. (and within the minor parties as well) suggests to some extent the political reflections of deep-seated social and economic problems.

As to the emergence of factions within the P.U.W.P. during the Stalinist period, Korbonski traces the process to the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee which was held in November, 1954.¹⁰⁹ Although factional activity of some nature may have previously been present, the Fourth Plenum appears to be the decisive juncture. It was at this time that a certain friction developed with respect to the goals of the system. The initial burst of rapid industrialization had already spent itself and, as we shall see in the following chapter, the economic system had reached the point of diminishing returns. The Party leadership, however, seemed disinclined toward any substantial policy alterations. It appears to have been unprepared to sacrifice either the first-order goals stemming from the official ideology (such as the collectivization of agriculture), or second-order

¹⁰⁹ Korbonski, op.cit., pp.234,235.

goals (such as productivity and efficiency) which are more closely associated with pragmatism. As such, it is small wonder that conflicting methods were espoused for the attainment of these goals, and (as mentioned above) double-message directives ensued. Within the Party apparatus (which is responsible for translating policy into action and attaining the goals set by the leadership) it may be safe to assume that the points of inconsistency between the ideologically and pragmatically oriented goals provided foci around which factional groupings tended to crystallize. The Swiatlo affair,¹¹⁰ may have accelerated the process. It clearly tended to deepen divisions within the Party, as was evident in the heated discussion which took place shortly after the Fourth Plenum at a meeting of the Warsaw central Party activ in December, 1954. For the first time since the fall of Gomulka, sharp criticism was voiced against members of the Politburo, and the dictatorial methods of that

¹¹⁰ Lt. Col. Jozef Swiatlo, a highly placed official in Poland's secret police, defected to the West in December, 1953. His subsequent revelations (made public in Poland over Radio Free Europe and Voice of America, as well by pamphlets dropped into Poland by the Free Europe Committee) concerning the terroristic methods employed by the security organs contributed substantially to restrictions on the scope of police activity and the dismissal of many high-ranking officers in the security apparatus. See Richard F. Staar, "De-Stalinization in Eastern Europe: The Polish Model", in Issues of World Communism, ed. by Andrew Gyorgy (Princeton, Toronto, New York and London: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p.69.

body were condemned.¹¹¹

The high-water mark of social and political turmoil in Poland during the mid-1950's, the uprising of the workers in Poznan (July, 1956), coincided with the convocation of the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the P.U.W.P.. Although the Resolution adopted by the Plenum ascribed the Poznan revolt to the work of "demagogues and hostile rabble-rousing elements", it nevertheless admitted that the Poznan workers were dissatisfied, the their "serious grievances and justified demands" were the end product of Party intransigence, and that the Party must take stock of itself and evaluate the "sources and causes" of the widespread discontent in the country, high-lighted by the Poznan events. The Resolution went on to call for a "new course" which would raise living standards and enhance economic efficiency by eliminating the "excessive centralization of the planning and administration of the economy . . .", as well as "the excessive growth of the state apparatus . . . and the bureaucratization of the methods of leadership". Economic reforms were to insure a "further widening of the prerogatives of socialist enterprises, creating foundations for wide social initiative", and the Party was to play the role of promoting a democratization of social life. Of at least equal importance was the call to "put an end to the harmful practice of commanding social organizations" and using them as "transmission

¹¹¹ See Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., pp.240, 241.

belts of the Party to the masses in a one-sided manner". The Resolution in this respect seemed to place the Party on the side institutionalizing differentiated social organizations and promoting their autonomy. In the words of the Seventh Plenum: "A rise in the independence of these organizations will help to enhance the prestige and confidence they enjoy among the masses." The fact that the Resolution' directed Party members to continue their "leading role" should not obscure the Party's definite (albeit limited) commitment to widening the autonomy of specialized institutions.¹¹²

The Resolution adopted by the Seventh Plenum, however, in no way reflected the unanimous sentiments of the Party. If anything, its rather inconsistent line of discourse¹¹³ points up an aspect of compromise among different factions within the Party. We might at this point place the emergence of Party factions within the context of modernization and perhaps thereby shed some light upon the origins and implications of this phenomenon. Quite often, forces in the

¹¹²For a full text of the Resolution of the Seventh Plenum, see Zinner, op.cit., pp.145-186.

¹¹³The explanation given for the Poznan uprising is perhaps the best example. The implications of the Resolution on this score are that the workers had legitimate grievances which were not, and perhaps could not, be met by the then existing structure of authority; yet, when the workers took to the street, the "legitimate grievances" became somehow "criminal provocation . . . [which] . . . found no support on the part of the working class in Poznan"

political arena are conceptually situated on a spectrum, and commentators or analysts speak in terms of "right-wing", "left-wing" and "center" parties. It is also common to apply these terms to factions or groups within a party, especially when that party is either broadly based or claims to represent all of society as do the ruling parties in Communist states. In the case of Poland, we can perhaps make an association between the elite groupings in a modernizing society and their counterparts in the political sphere. However, in order to do so, we should bear in mind the social and political situation obtaining in Poland and interpret any general taxonomy accordingly. For instance, David Apter speaks of the "substance of modernizing politics" as being in large part a function of the incompatibilities among three types of roles: traditional, accommodationist and new roles.¹¹⁴ If we were to examine a modernizing political system based on parliamentary democracy, we might expect this role conflict to find expression among political parties, and the party system in this case would encompass right-wing parties (representing the traditional group), left-wing parties (roughly coinciding with the new roles or the successor sub-elites) and a center party (essentially accommodationist). But what of Poland where the party system

¹¹⁴ Apter, op.cit., pp.213,214. The thrust of what Apter has in mind by "new roles", seems to be captured by Lewis's term "successor sub-elites". Lewis's role typology is discussed above on pp.21,22.

is non-competitive? The hegemonic character of the system would seem to prevent the formation of independent parties which articulate the interests of these three conflicting role types; but at the same time it would invite the formation of factions within the parties which to some degree would resemble these role divisions in society. To avoid confusion over labels, it might be advantageous at this point to relate faction to role type in terms of the Polish system circa 1956.

Within the P.U.W.P. (and the minor parties) three broad factional groupings are identifiable. The first would be the "hard liners" or "Stalinists" who may just as well be labeled "revolutionary" as "traditional" depending upon one's point of view. In terms of the role structure of a modernizing Communist system, however, this faction could be classified as traditionally oriented. It favored the continuation of, if not the return to, methods of political activity and forms of sociopolitical organization which had become enshrined in Party dogma during the Stalinist era. It tended to stress consummatory values over instrumental values, and looked upon status in more or less ascriptive terms, i.e., one's position in the social hierarchy is more closely related to one's devotion to the consummatory ends of society (symbolized by membership in the Party) than to rational standards of competence and achievement. During the intra-Party turmoil of 1956, the Natolin group (named after a locale in the vicinity of Warsaw where the group frequently assembled) represented this orientation toward the traditional.

Its Stalinist predilections largely account for its hostility toward the social movement within Poland which, however unorganized, aimed at a democratization and liberalization of public life.¹¹⁵ During the late 1950's and early 1960's, a group known as "the Partisans" joined (and ultimately supplanted) the Natolin faction on the right-wing of the political spectrum. The Partisans evince an even stronger orientation toward the traditional, making political capital out of anti-Semitic feelings rooted in Poland's history, and reacting to the modernization of society with anti-intellectual protestations.¹¹⁶

The flux of political groupings on the "center" and "left-wing" portions of the spectrum, makes it difficult to identify, much less label, these factions with any degree of precision. The Pulawska group (deriving its name from an avenue in Warsaw where the groups met for discussion in an apartment of one of the members) was united in its opposition to the Natolin program. After securing the reinstallation of Gomulka as First Secretary at the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee (October, 1956), however, the group tended to split. Gomulka and his followers thereafter came to occupy an "accommodationist" position within

¹¹⁵ For the main points of the Natolin group's program, see Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., pp.249,250.

¹¹⁶ See Jan Nowak, "The Stalinist Underground in Poland", East Europe, XIV (No.2, February, 1965), pp.2-8.

the Party while those pressing for further democratization and liberalization of the political structure took up a position on the Party's left-wing.¹¹⁷

Within the U.P.P. and the D.P., similar factional groupings were present. Dissidents among the rank and file called for the establishment of independent party programs and, as such, looked forward to the formation of opposition parties and the end of the hegemonic system. On the other hand, "hard liners" who had for years acted as the tool of the P.U.W.P. were clearly out of step with the Gomulkaist leadership in the ruling party. The outcome of the factional conflict was the accession of those individuals to positions of leadership who favored Gomulka and his essentially accommodationist program.¹¹⁸ This meant that although the hegemony of the P.U.W.P. was to continue, the structure of the relationships among the parties in the system was to be substantially altered.¹¹⁹ The alteration itself can perhaps

¹¹⁷ See Bromke op.cit., p.179; Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, op.cit., pp.250, 251.

¹¹⁸ This is most evident in the case of the U.P.P. in which Gomulka's understudy, Stefan Ignar, replaced Wladyslaw Kowalski as Party leader. See Cieplak, op.cit., p.10.

¹¹⁹ It is also of interest to note that the three-fold factional divisions within the parties bears a resemblance to the three-fold division in the Catholic movement. When in 1956 Piasecki took up a Stalinist position on the issue of liberalization, a group of dissidents, led by Jan Frankowski, formed the Christian Social Association. At the same time, the Znak group, which seems to direct its appeal

be viewed as one of the factors which enabled the Party to weather the political storm of 1956 and retain its dominant position within the party system.¹²⁰

With the return of Gomulka, two parallel tendencies

toward the rational or pragmatic elements in the Catholic intelligentsia, was founded. The Znak group, unlike the other Catholic organizations does not benefit from governmental subsidy and/or tax exemptions, but it is the only Catholic political organization endorsed by the Church hierarchy. Although Znak recognizes the hegemony of the P.U.W.P. as the conditio sine qua non for Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union and the security of the Western borders, it is nevertheless distinguished among Polish political organizations by its own political and economic programs and its manifest opposition to Marxism- Leninism. See Jan Szczepanski, Polish Society (New York: Random House, 1970), pp.55,56.

¹²⁰ At least two additional factors contributed to the success of the P.U.W.P. First, Gomulka and his associates constituted a reserve team of Party leaders who were not tarnished by the harshness and the excesses of the Stalinist era. Moreover, Gomulka, was popularly known as an opponent of the former Stalinist leadership and came to symbolize the hope for democratization and improvement in the living standard. Second, as Jiri Kolaja observed during his study of a Polish factory, the Party was instrumental in diverting discontent into relatively "safe" channels. For example, Party members at the factory level organized meetings of protest against the present state of affairs. Since the Party itself was ultimately responsible for the situation against which the protests were directed, this seems rather paradoxical. However, by calling together such meeting, the Party in effect "institutionalized" the discontent. That is, violent feelings could be spent in verbal forays against the established order, while the Party could pose as the champion of the cause of free expression and reform. On the first point, see Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to

became apparent within the party system. On the one hand, the minor parties were granted more of an autonomous role regarding their internal matters and a greater voice in matters of policy. The "Declaration of Cooperation" (December 10, 1956), a joint statement on inter-party relations signed by the leadership of the P.U.W.P. and the U.P.P., condemned past practices of U.P.P. subjugation to the P.U.W.P. and seemed to promise a broader political role for the U.P.P. in the future.¹²¹ However, the limits of this role were certainly apparent when the U.P.P. failed to obtain the Ministry of Agriculture after the January 1957 parliamentary elections.

On the other hand, cooperation among the parties in the Front of National Unity seems to have acquired some substance. Coordinating Committees, containing representatives from each of the parties, were established at all levels of party and government organization.¹²² These committees constitute a horizontal linkage among vertically structured parties, and, as the name suggests, function as

to Khrushchev (New York and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp.372,373. Kolaja's experience is recounted in his book, A Polish Factory (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960), pp.43,44.

¹²¹ See Dziewanowski, op.cit., p.205.

¹²² See Stefan Rozmaryn, The Sejm and Peoples' Councils in Poland, (Warsaw: Polonia Publishing House, 1958), p.18

foci of coordination in which possible differences may be hashed out in privacy, while the "monolithic" image of the Front remains unimpaired. These Coordinating Committees represent a step forward in terms of increasing communication among the parties and orchestrating their activities. They also provide an institutionalized basis through which the minor parties can exert some influence on (1) candidate selection at election time, (2) recruitment to positions in the state bureaucracy and (3) the policies and procedures pursued by the Front.¹²³

The role of the minor parties since the "Polish October" is difficult to specify. It seems to oscillate between two poles which might be described as "transmission belt" vs. "junior partner".¹²⁴ Each party has been known to endorse P.U.W.P. policies which are at loggerheads with the interests of its respective strata;¹²⁵ yet on occasion (such as the case of restriction on private agriculture in 1966) the minor parties have decisively sounded a note of opposition.¹²⁶ Moreover, although programmatic

¹²³ Cieplak, op.cit., pp.36-38.

¹²⁴ In the case of the U.P.P., Ignar seems to have viewed his party as junior partner, while the contrary can be said of his successor, Czeslaw Wychech who served as leader from 1964-1971. The present leader of the U.P.P., Stanislaw Gucwa, appears to share the view of Ignar. Ibid., pp.18,19.

¹²⁵ Bromke, op.cit., p.211.

¹²⁶ Cieplak, op.cit., p.39.

differences among the parties are marginal. the minor parties do offer an ideological alternative to Marxism-Leninism. As a result, each tends to view socioeconomic development from a different perspective.¹²⁷ Admittedly small, these differences should, however, not be overlooked. In time of crisis, they have a tendency to come to the fore as we have mentioned with respect to those forces within the minor parties which aimed at the establishment of independent party programs during 1956. More recently, in the aftermath of the "Prague Spring", the Czechoslovakian party system (where minor parties had long been on the brink of total ossification) experienced similar and perhaps amplified trends.¹²⁸

Rather than unbridled domination, so characteristic of the Stalinist era, the hegemony of the P.U.W.P. since the return of Gomulka seems to be conditioned by certain restraints. As Hansjakob Stehle points out:

The stability of the ruling party in Poland rests upon a certain renunciation of power, upon compromises, upon a degree of tolerance which is involuntary but deliberately exploited as an aid to government.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ For example, the Democratic Party tends to adopt a gradualistic position vis-a-vis the pace and shape of economic development and stresses private enterprise's "reserve of energy" which, in its view, should be fully tapped prior to the complete transition to a socialist economy. See Staar, Poland, 1944-1962, op.cit., p.237.

¹²⁸ On the Czechoslovakian situation in 1968, see Otto Ulc, op.cit.

¹²⁹ Stehle, op.cit., p.12.

This view is also espoused by the Polish sociologists, Jerzy Wiatr and Adam Przeworski, although their formulation is slightly more emphatic or extreme. Wiatr and Przeworski feel that the P.U.W.P.'s formal claim to represent the interests of society, the pressure of the party rank and file upon the leadership and the operation of interest groups, both within and outside of the Party itself, tend to circumscribe the Party's range of action and alternatives.¹³⁰ This view, however, seems to overstate the case. The usage of the term "interest group" seems to connote an institutionalized collection of individuals who articulate demands on the basis of a commonly perceived "interest", and, as such, has little in common with the "dictatorship of the proletariat". Be this as it may, there is perhaps some utility in the notion of social pressures which operated so as to modify, if not substantially alter, the role of the P.U.W.P. in Polish society.


Wiatr has recently given a more explicit expression to his views on the structure of the Polish party system.¹³¹ His diagram, depicting the interaction of the government,

¹³⁰ Jerzy J. Wiatr and Adam Przeworski, "Control Without Opposition", Government and Opposition, I (No.2, January, 1966), pp.227-239.

¹³¹ See his article "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development in Poland", in The American Political Science Review, op.cit., pp.1242,1243.

the P.U.W.P., the U.P.P. and an interest group (in this case the peasantry) is reproduced below in Figure 2.

Figure 2.




Presumably, the broken lines in the diagram represent influence of some sort, while the unbroken lines signify a transmission of directives or policies based upon political power. If this is so, Wiatr has drastically understated the role of the ruling party in a system which he himself describes as "hegemonic". To begin with, the diagram implies a sort of equality among all of the groups depicted (as evinced by the broken lines and two-directional arrows) with the exception of the government. Secondly, this representation neglects the "output" side of the political process. It is important to remember, in this respect, that the administration of given policies gives

a concrete character to the decisions made by the party elites, and that the implementation of certain measures may well be affected by the way in which policies are administered. In Poland, a "neutral", career civil service does not exist; but rather, a politicized administration composed of members of the various parties. Administrative positions are distributed among the three parties on the basis of a klucz ("key"), which designates the proportion of positions to be awarded to each party.¹³² As such, parties administer policies through the governmental administrative apparatus, but more importantly through their members in this apparatus. Finally Wiatr's illustration gives the impression that the peasantry is in fact an interest group with some sort of organization which is influenced by, yet independent of, the political parties. A more accurate representation of these relationships might be that given in Figure 3. The set of relationship illustrated by Figure 3. , is based upon the set of dominance relations within the political system as developed in the discussion above. As such, this illustration does

¹³² Joseph R. Fiszman, "Poland - Continuity and Change", in The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe, ed. by Peter A. Toma (Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1970), p.65.

Figure 3.



nothing more than represent graphically the concept which we have been using in relation to the structure of the Polish Party system, and, perhaps call attention to the apparent flaws in Wiatr's diagram. It will be noticed that most relationships in Figure 3. are depicted by two arrows, one broken and one unbroken. The former represents communications (either general policy or specific directives) which are backed by political power. The latter stand for communications of a different type: those which articulate some interest (either directly by the peasantry or indirectly through a political party as intermediary) which may or may not influence the policy of the P.U.W.P. In this respect, the distinction is crucial, as public policy is ultimately the prerogative of the ruling party and, while the

success of a given policy in some sense is dependent upon the amount of information available and the influence which communication from various strata or organizations brings to bear upon policy makers, it should nevertheless be made clear that the consent of the P.U.W.P. is both necessary and sufficient condition for translating social inputs into political outputs.

To sum up, the structure of the party system has undergone a rather substantial evolution in the postwar period. The set of dominance relations among the parties has been mollified in a manner somewhat homologous to the changing relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, especially since 1956. A larger role for the minor parties has favored organizational specialization in the articulation of societal interests and has lent a degree of credibility to these parties as "junior partners" in government. The limits on their roles, however, raise the question of the degree of development within the party system; viz., have the structural features of the system been sufficiently adapted to the changing socioeconomic environment in such a way as to insure integration, communication and stability in the polity? As we shall see in more detail below, the existence of serious factional rivalry within the P.U.W.P. and the eruption of violence in society precludes an affirmative answer to these related questions.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION

The Political Character of Socioeconomic Development

Society and the economy are commonly considered by political analysts to be part of the "environment" within which the political system operates. With respect to Soviet-type polities, however, the distinction between political system and environment is a very difficult one to make.¹³³ To begin with, the accession of a Communist party to political power has typically involved a "politicization" of society. As Jan Szczepanski puts it: "This means that political criteria are primary in the evaluation of every aspect of social life, public or private . . . the primacy of politics is expressed in the submission of every socially relevant decision to political criteria."¹³⁴ What is more, adds Szczepanski, although this early politicization springs from the ideological impulse to remake the social order it in effect becomes institutionalized. This is so because the new social order is built upon state ownership of the means of production within a planned economy. As such, the level of needs-satisfaction in society

¹³³ This situation might be referred to as poor "boundary maintenance". See Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.19-21.

¹³⁴ Szczepanski, op.cit., p.43.

is a direct result of political decisions.¹³⁵ Moreover, as John P. Hardt observes, there is "a certain stability, unity and consistency in the Leninist Party, the Stalinist control system and the Stalinist economic system of planning and management."¹³⁶ The point here is that social and economic problems which arise in the course of modernization are in the first instance political problems, requiring political solutions. An investigation of socio-economic development should therefore shed some light not only upon the "outputs" of the political system, but also upon some of the political dynamics at play in Poland. If the syndrome which Hardt sketches in fact obtains, then we should discover a certain tension developing between the dominant position of the P.U.W.P., which is buttressed by a certain type of socioeconomic order, and the social and economic changes needed to sustain modernization. When such changes (and I have in mind here the general notion of subsystem autonomy, the need for which grows out of role differentiation and specialization of function as discussed in the first chapter) are either lacking or are inadequate the result should be a tapering off of economic performance and sharpening conflicts within the social system. This chapter focuses on the economic aspects, while changes in the

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ "East European Economic Development: Two Decades of Interrelationships and Interaction with the Soviet Union" in Economic Development in Countries of Eastern Europe, U.S. 91st Cong., 2nd sess., Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy (Washington: U.S. Govt., Printing Office, 1970), p.40.

the social system are taken up in the chapter which follows.

The Prewar Situation

Before proceeding to an examination of socioeconomic development in Poland, however, we should put the matter of postwar modernization in perspective. Poland, during the interwar period, could not be classified as an underdeveloped country. Industrialization had already made a good deal of headway prior to the re-emergence of Polish statehood in 1918, and continued until the opening of the Second World War, largely under the aegis of the state which spurred the growth of industry by direct investments. On the other hand, however, the state "hampered a more powerful economic upsurge by implementing vexatious 'nostrification' measures, a xenophobic policy in respect to foreign investments and discriminatory measures which limited the opportunities for private industries."¹³⁷ We might describe pre-Communist Poland as a society which exhibited the impulse toward modernity, but at the same time, one in which the inertia of the traditional order was paramount. With respect to the latter, Zygmunt Bauman has called attention to a number of characteristics of interwar Poland which are typically found in a "under-developed society". Bauman¹³⁶ would

¹³⁷ Nicolas Spulber, The State and Economic Development in Eastern Europe (New York: Random House, 1966), p.42.

¹³⁸ See his "Economic Growth, Social Structure, Elite Formation: The Case of Poland" in Class, Status and Power, ed. by R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset, (2nd ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp.535-536.

include:

- (1) a primarily rural wconomy
- (2) a high proportion of family enterprise
- (3) traditionalism
- (4) ascriptive status
- (5) low social mobility
- (6) scorn for "hard work"
- (7) a surplus of "irrelevant intellectuals and professionals "
- (8) "petty-bourgeois" mentality

Finally, the effects of wartime destruction and pillage were particularly devastating in Poland, accounting for industrial losses estimated at 5,700 million U.S. dollars.¹³⁹ Following the war, therefore, the immediate economic goal of the Party was to repair the damages; beyond this, the intention was, and remains, the creation of a modern, industrial economy.

Industrialization on the Soviet Model

The emphasis of this chapter falls upon three aspects of economic development in Poland, and attempts to answer three related questions. First, what has been the extent of economic growth in the postwar years and what style of economic organization has been implemented to accomplish this? Second, what are the salient problems encountered in the course of development? Third, what measures has the political leadership

¹³⁹ On the economic setbacks which resulted from the Second World War, see Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp.232,233.

introduced to deal with the emerging problems? In sum, the intention is to examine how economic growth was initiated and how it has been sustained. This latter aspect implies, of course, a question of degree, as well as possible alternatives to Party policy in the economic sphere. These considerations will be taken up in the following section while it remains here to look at the performance of the Polish economy.

Economic development, Soviet-style, is centered around two complementary features: central planning and the nationalization of industry. The nationalization law passed in Poland (January, 1946) brought the major portion of the industrial plant and labor force within the public sector. Although private industry remained, and for some time was encouraged in some areas due to the emphasis on recovery, it was nevertheless progressively taxed out of existence as can be seen in Table 1.¹⁴⁰ Along with nationalization, an industrial reorganization was carried out and completed by late 1950. A three-tiered structure took shape, composed of base plants, which were grouped into national corporations and directed by central management under the appropriate Ministry. The effect was to centralize the industrial machine, thus making it responsible to, and dependent upon, "the commanding political center."¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ "Cooperatives" refer to state-sponsored associations of artisans engaged in handicrafts.

¹⁴¹ See Spulber, The Economics of Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.55.

TABLE 1. - - Employment in the "Three Sectors" of Polish Industry, 1947-1949

	1947	<u>Employment</u> 1948	1949
1. Public Sector	1,349,297	1,305,880	1,436,880
2. Cooperatives	64,028	82,880	98,058
3. Private	<u>141,308</u>	<u>105,942</u>	<u>73,765</u>
Total	1,554,633	1,494,409	1,608,703

	1947	<u>Percentage</u> 1948	1949
1. Public Sector	86.8	87.4	89.3
2. Cooperatives	4.2	5.5	6.1
3. Private	<u>9.1</u>	<u>7.1</u>	<u>4.6</u>
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Nicolas Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (New York: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), p.65.

It might be advantageous at this point to outline some of the important features of central planning as they bear strongly upon not only the style of economic development, but also upon many of the problems encountered in the course of economic growth. In the context of Soviet-type economies, Nicolas Spulber defines a plan "as a comprehensive set of accounts linking a series of output, investment and consumption targets with the projected factor commodity and money

flows required to assure their attainments"; and adds that Soviet-type planning resembles a "definite set of tasks" which are forecasted by the planner and made into law by the political leadership.¹⁴² The role of the political leadership, in this regard, is of paramount importance. As the Polish economist Oskar Lange puts it, the political component of planning is an essential feature of socialism, expressing "the fact that the socialist economy does not develop in an elemental way, but that its development is guided and directed by the conscious will of organized society . . . subjecting the operation of economic laws . . . to the direction of human will."¹⁴³ The plan, therefore, is an instrument designed to determine; (1) the rate of economic growth by its division of the national income between accumulation and consumption and (2) the direction of development itself by the distribution of investment among the various sectors of the economy.¹⁴⁴ It is important to note at this point that "the direction of development" in Poland, as was the case throughout Eastern Europe during the early postwar years, was toward economic autarky. That is, regardless of national economic endowments or level of development, Poland set about the task of duplicating the

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 282.

¹⁴³ "The Role of Planning in Socialist Economy", in New Currents in Soviet-Type Economies: A Reader, ed. by George R. Feiwel (Scranton, Penn.: International Textbook Company, 1968), p. 14.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 19

Soviet experience of rapid industrialization, financed through domestic accumulation and focused on the expansion of the producer's goods sector or industry, with the ultimate aim of economic self-sufficiency, rather than specialization.

Central Planning in a Command Economy

The structure of economic planning designed to achieve this end involves a hierarchy of plans, each with a relatively specific function or purpose. At the top of the hierarchy is the perspective plan which deals with long-range trends in the economy and serves primarily as a rather inexact roadmap for development and, possibly, future reform. The long-term plan (which varies from five to six years in Poland) likewise deals with development and reform, but does so within a more specified or limited context. It concentrates on the economy's primary objectives and provides a framework, subject to modification, for the more detailed short-term or annual plans, which, as mentioned above, are a direct output of the political system in the forms of laws.

Long-term planning proceeds on the basis of what is called "material balancing", a rather imprecise method of calculation and recalculation by successive approximation, aimed at coordinating growth by matching proposed outputs with proposed uses. Material balancing provides the political leadership with an ample number of access points to the planning process, due to the flexibility which this method

affords in terms of altering the factors proportions within the economy. As such, economic targets which are high on the list of the regime's priorities can be met in most cases by simply readjusting the material balance and resources to key areas. However, low priority areas in the economy would (and do) suffer in the process, since resources originally scheduled for these are frequently diverted to high priority sectors. This diversion of planned resources often leads to slow-downs and work stoppages, and the resulting inefficiency, as we shall see below, is further compounded by the time factor involved in planning, along with the guesswork stemming from insufficient data.

The short-term or annual plan is formulated on the basis of "preliminary indicators" (referred to as "control figures" in the Soviet Union), which are a collection and summation of the data gathered by the planning commission from reports submitted by enterprises. The short-term plan, as well as forecasting development for the coming year, also outlines income generation and distribution, employment and investment. The preliminary indicators express "the production of commodities by product groups and give detailed schedules for major commodities. The magnitude of the most important investment projects is also indicated."¹⁴⁵ As in the case of long-term planning, the political factor is rather pronounced, and here perhaps doubly so. First, in the translation of draft plan

¹⁴⁵ Stanislaw Wellisz, The Economics of the Soviet Bloc (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p.139.

into law, political imperatives tend to assert themselves in the form of altering resource allocation (as mentioned above with respect to long-term plans) and also by way of upwardly revising plan targets, especially in priority areas. As a result, the preliminary indicators, the first and supposedly crudest step in the planning process, may better compare with the actual condition of the economy and the feasibility of production goals, given this condition, than the plan itself.

Second, checking on plan fulfillment is another function of the short-term plan. Implicit here is the possibility of alternative resource allocation and revised production goals during the course of the plan itself, effected via ad hoc governmental directives. Although this tactic may alleviate pressing difficulties in the short-run, it certainly has other, less salutary, consequences as well. To begin with, the central directives at best deal with approximations based on rather dated information, and as such may seek to remedy situations which have substantially changed during the interval elapsing between the compilation of the data and the implementation of the directive. Also, the use of such directives may result in a vicious circle which undermines any balance or coordination which the plan contained in the first place. Directives, even if they solve one set of problems, create in the process another set and lead, therefore, to more directives. This problem has been both chronic and acute in Poland, leading one observer to remark that the political leadership is "seemingly unable to evolve a clear-cut and consistent long-term

economic policy, with firmly established objectives The result is that when something goes wrong, as has happened many times in the past, economic decisions are usually made on a day-to-day basis and ad hoc measures are adopted to deal with a particular contingency. No regard is not paid to the likely side-effects of those measures in other sectors of the economy."¹⁴⁶

An important instrument for stimulating the type of economic development desired by the political leadership is the price structure in Poland's centrally planned economy. Prices, as a rule, are usually held constant over a number of annual plans, in order "to facilitate comparisons among different plans."¹⁴⁷ Although resource allocation is accomplished through the use of physical flows, a financial plan, paralleling the economic plan, outlines financial transactions in money values and attempts to coordinate such things as wage payments and consumer prices. Of crucial importance

¹⁴⁶ Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland, 1967" in The Prediction of Communist Economic Performance, ed. by Peter J.D. Wiles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp.226, 227. Gamarnikow follows these comments with an illustration of his point using the example of employment policies. He remarks: "The best example here is the periodic mass lay-offs of workers to boost the falling labor productivity indices and to keep wage fund expenditure within the limits prescribed by the plan. These measures usually bring some temporary relief in the endangered sectors, but the subsequent dislocation of production targets sooner or later forces the enterprise managers to rehire approximately the same number of workers he dismissed previously."

¹⁴⁷ Wellisz, loc.cit.

here is the system of "dual pricing" embodied in the financial plan. In order to secure the level of demand in priority sectors which the political leadership considers to be of overriding importance, prices in the producer's goods sector are fixed at artificially low levels, while prices for consumer durables, or foodstuffs not thought to be basic to consumption, are raised correspondingly. Aside from the consequences which this practice portends vis-a-vis the standard of living, we should take note at this point that "dual pricing" fails to tackle the problem of supply. While demand for resources going into the producer's goods sector is artificially stimulated, such demand often has the effect of exhausting raw material reserves (not to mention encouraging waste) and leads to work stoppages and "bottlenecks" in the economy.¹⁴⁸ We will pick up this subject below with respect to the pattern of performance during the course of a five-year plan.

In sum, the implementation of Soviet-style, central planning in Poland was designed to achieve rapid industrialization by cutting through "the vicious circle of low total income, low savings and slow growth, and to secure at the same time revolutionary technological changes in certain branches of the economy."¹⁴⁹ Given this objective, we

¹⁴⁸ For a concise description of the "dual price system" in Poland and the pros and cons involved, see George R. Feiwel, The Economics of a Socialist Enterprise (New York, Washington and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 57-64.

¹⁴⁹ Nicolas Spulber, Soviet Strategy for Economic Growth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 23.

can at least partially evaluate the success of this approach by having a look at the performance of the Polish economy, beginning with the period of recovery and reconstruction which followed the war.

Postwar Performance

Although the destruction of industry in Poland was particularly severe (as noted above) the postwar boundary settlement by which Poland expanded her western frontier at the expense of the defeated, and now divided, Germany, and the effect of appreciably increasing Poland's industrial base. For instance, the percentage of total population employed in industry rose from the prewar level of 2.4 per cent to the postwar figure of 3.9 per cent.¹⁵⁰ The target set for producers' goods industry (250 per cent of the 1938 level) by the recovery plan (covering the period from January, 1947 through December, 1949) does not appear to be excessively high when this territorial rearrangement is kept in mind. Moreover, Poland was the recipient of some 481 million dollars in U.N.R.R.A. aid which helped to defray the cost of this industrial expansion. Finally, the rather low projected figure for agricultural recovery (80 per cent of the 1938 level) does not seem to be exceptionally small if it is remembered that Poland's postwar population, as a result of war-time death, the

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Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.35.

cession of the eastern province to the Soviet Union and the forced evacuation of the large German minority, was only about two-thirds of the 1938 total. In November, 1949, the State Planning Commission announced that the Three-Year Plan for reconstruction had been completed two months ahead of schedule, and was exceeded in industrial growth by an estimated 10 per cent.¹⁵¹ With the relative success of economic recovery and the Stalinist leadership by now firmly in the saddle, Poland embarked upon the first long-term Plan in January, 1950.

As might be expected from the foregoing, the overriding emphasis of the First Six-Year Plan was the development of heavy industry. This can be seen in the structure of investments for the period as presented in Table 2. With

TABLE 2. - - Investment by Economic Sector 1950-1955

	<u>Percentage of Total Investment</u>
Industry and Building	42.9
Transport and Communications	14.9
Agriculture	11.9
Housing	8.3
Public Services	21.4
Others	0.6

Source: Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.291

¹⁵¹ Data on the Polish Three -Year recovery plan are taken from Seton-Watson, op.cit., pp.241-245.

the concentration of investment in this high priority area, Polish industry registered some remarkable gains. Table 3 outlines this for a number of key products, with comparisons of prewar and post plan levels for Poland. The figures for the world average in the Table put this growth in some perspective.

Keeping in mind the addition to Poland's industrial plant as a result of the postwar boundary change, performance within this sector of the economy, as depicted in Table 3 is nevertheless quite impressive. However, in assessing this performance, we should also mention some of the costs involved. Financing this development of producers' goods industries through domestic accumulation had the effect of freezing, if not further depressing, the average standard of living. Given the tendency to concentrate resources in the priority area of producers' goods, and the declining growth rate of labor productivity over the course of a long-term plan (which we will take up below), a rather steady rise in the rate of accumulation (percentage of national income allocated for reinvestment) during the First Six-Year Plan became one of the means of meeting Plan targets in key areas. Between the launching of the plan in 1950 and the inauguration of the New Course in 1953 (which scaled

Source: Andrzej Karpinski, Problems of Socialist Industrialization in Poland, trans., Irena Dobosz and Olgierd Wojtasiewicz (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1963), p.10.

down over-optimistic targets), accumulation as a percentage of the national income rose dramatically, as shown in Table 4.

TABLE 4. - - Accumulation as a Percentage of National Income, 1950-1953

<u>1950</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1953</u>
29.4	28.4	32	38

Source: Karpinski, op.cit., pp.15,16.

With accumulation reaching these proportions, it is small wonder that the 40 per cent increase in real wages, which was originally forecast by the Plan,¹⁵² failed to materialize. Finally, the neglect of consumer goods industries is apparent in the marked difference between the prewar and post-Plan ratio of producers' to consumers' goods. Prior to the war this ratio¹⁵³ stood at 52:48, while after completion of the Plan, it became 75.5:24.5.

The Problem of Consumption

The problem of consumption is, of course, tied up with the emphasis which the political leadership places

¹⁵² Karpinski, op.cit., p.13.

¹⁵³ This ratio appears in Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.303.

on accumulation, in order to finance industrial expansion. However, especially in later stages of industrial development, the problem tends to become more complex, in correspondence with the increasing complexity of the structure of consumption. For instance, Bogdan Mieczkowski has shown that although per capita income rose in Poland over the period 1960-1968 by approximately 1.5 per cent (if price changes are taken into consideration), per capita consumption over the same period in fact fell by about 1.5 per cent. Mieczkowski attributes this phenomenon to the influence of new assortments and the changing structure of consumer demands.¹⁵⁴ It is generally held that one indicator of socioeconomic development is a shift in the consumption pattern from foodstuffs to consumer durables. Studies in Poland have partially borne out this proposition. "Statistics on consumption patterns of different income groups show that the higher the educational background of the head of the household, the lower the proportion of expenditures on foodstuffs."¹⁵³ However, due to the irrational (or arbitrary) nature of the price structure and the differential form of turnover tax on manufacturing enterprises (arrived at by the difference between factory prices and sales prices), stimuli to the producers are largely separated from the actual conditions prevailing

¹⁵⁴ Bogdan Mieczkowski, "Recent Discussion of Consumption Planning in Poland", Soviet Studies, XXII (No.4, April, 1971), pp.610-612.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p.614.

in the consumer's market. As such, this situation may result in a product mix which does not correspond to consumer preferences, and the switch from foodstuffs to consumer durables is thereby impeded.¹⁵⁶ It is important to remember here that in order to increase the volume of consumption at a given stage of economic modernization, this shift to consumer durables is all-important. Consumption of foodstuffs, after all, has a natural ceiling. In Poland, however, the irrationalities of the price structure, the differential turnover tax, and the lack of market signals for the producers have resulted in a situation in which food prices are rising least among consumer goods while at the same time their social costs per unit of production are higher than those of most consumer durables.¹⁵⁷ As such, resource allocation for consumer goods industries within Poland's centrally planned economy all too often has the effect of simply adding to the inventories rather than increasing the level of popular consumption.¹⁵⁸ The difficulty which Poland is experiencing with respect to raising this consumption level is apparent in the data presented in Table 5. It will be noticed that among the Western European countries, there is a general trend toward increasing per capita consumption in relation to G.N.P. as economic expansion proceeds (with the exception of France and Norway over the years 1956-1960 and 1961-1964, respectively). In Poland, however, personal consumption has not

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 614, 615.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 611-613.

¹⁵⁸ See Hardt, op.cit., pp. 33, 34.

kept pace with economic growth.

Table 5.-- Growth of Personal Consumption in Relation to that of the G.N.P.: Polish and West European Comparisions

	<u>Ratios of Growth Rates (in percent)</u>		
	<u>1951-55</u>	<u>1956-60</u>	<u>1961-64</u>
Poland	85	84	76
Austria	100	100	112
Denmark	75	76	102
France	111	83	114
West Germany	88	105	106
Italy	75	76	133
Netherlands	62	98	142
Norway	67	94	80

Source: Maurice Ernst, "Postwar Economic Growth in Eastern Europe" in New Currents in Soviet-Type Economies, op.cit., p.88.

The Question of Efficiency

Consumption, however, is simply one of the problems associated with Poland's efforts to create a modern economy by means of central planning. A perhaps more immediate difficulty is noticeable with respect to the declining rate in the gross value of industrial output (for both producers' and consumers' goods) experienced during the course of a given plan. In this regard, the decline in the gross value of industrial output during the First Six-Year Plan is somewhat representative of a pattern in Polish

postwar economic development. Spulber, commenting on both the recovery and first long-term plans in Eastern Europe, observes that the initial economic upsurge was brought about by the

Employment of idle resources, human and material as well as the reallocation of the resources already in use Both processes can be considered as having reached their limit by 1950. After this date it became more apparent and more difficult to expand output at the same ratio even though there was considerable new capital construction as the stepped-up production of steel machinery and the intense activity in the building industry clearly indicate.¹⁵⁹

It seems that once idle resources are brought into the economy, economic growth tends to become contingent upon more effective use of existing resources. Poland's attempt at economic modernization during the First Six-Year Plan was in this sense, somewhat of a failure. The thrust of the Plan was to expand output by increasing the concentration of production (i.e., the establishment of large scale industrial enterprises, either amalgamation or new construction) and increase the level of specialization within the economy. As Karpinski points out, neither concentration nor specialization added much to the efficiency of the economy, due in the main to the "usually low standard of organization of the labor process in new plants . . . [and] the inability to properly organize interindustry

¹⁵⁹ The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, op.cit.,
p. 341.

coordination."¹⁶⁰ It seems that each of these deficiencies (organization and coordination) is traceable to the nature of the command system of central planning as sketched above. The organizational structure of the enterprise tends to conform more to the prescriptions of the political order, rather than what may be the optimal arrangement at the level of the enterprise itself. Likewise, the coordination of economic activity becomes more difficult to maintain as specialization proliferates the number of economic roles and functions within the system. Ad hoc political directives, as discussed above, further compound the problem. Before proceeding to a discussion of the regime's attempts to overcome some of these difficulties through economic reform, we might have a look at the relative efficiency of investments in Poland as compared with some Western European nations (Table 6).

TABLE 6.-- Changes in Investment Costs: Poland and Some Western European Nations, 1951-1964

Country	<u>Gross Fixed Investment per Unit of Increase in Output</u>					
	<u>Total Economy</u>			<u>Industry</u>		
	<u>1951-55</u>	<u>'56-60</u>	<u>'61-64</u>	<u>'51-55</u>	<u>'56-60</u>	<u>'61-64</u>
Poland	4.4	5.0	5.8	3.2	3.6	3.4
Austria	3.3	4.4	5.7	1.8	2.4	---
Belgium	---	7.4	4.4	---	6.7	2.8
Denmark	8.6	3.8	4.4	1.8	2.4	---
France	4.1	4.2	4.2	---	2.7	2.8
West Germany	2.3	3.9	5.5	1.3	2.5	3.4
Greece	2.3	3.4	3.3	2.2	1.5	---
Italy	3.3	3.8	4.6	1.7	1.8	2.4
Netherlands	3.8	5.9	5.7	2.8	3.2	3.6

Source: Ernst, op.cit., p.96.

¹⁶⁰ See Karpinski, op.cit., pp.220-228.

It should be noted that with respect to the issue of efficiency, the data in Table 6 give only part of the picture. They are output figures and, as such, say nothing about the utility of the output. For instance, unsold consumer durables, sitting on warehouse shelves (as is too frequently the case in Poland) are included, even though their non-use represents waste. Nevertheless, these data do give some indication of production efficiency, and on this basis it seems reasonable to conclude that investment costs tend to be somewhat higher in Poland than in Western Europe, perhaps reflecting the inadequacies on the Stalinist economic model with which Poland began industrialization, as well as the unwillingness or inability of the political leadership to undertake structural reforms in the economy which would better suit a later stage of modernization. This is perhaps illustrated by the data in Table 7.

TABLE 7.-- Indexes of Labor Productivity among Six Eastern European States, Selected Years, 1950-67

(1955=100)					
	<u>1950</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1967</u>
Bulgaria	----	100.0	----	190.5	----
Czechoslovakia	91.9	100.0	127.7	131.6	140.0
East Germany	79.6	100.0	127.2	146.5	158.8
Hungary	86.1	100.0	114.2	135.0	146.4
Poland	89.4	100.0	117.5	131.7	139.1
Rumania	78.9	100.0	121.9	160.2	181.5

Source: Thad P. Alton, "Economic Structure and Growth in Eastern Europe", Economic Development in Countries of Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.62.

It seems that in terms of labor productivity, a key indicator of economic development, the greatest strides among countries which essentially shared a common economic organization after the war has been made by Rumania and Bulgaria (the more economically backward) and by Hungary and East Germany (the two nations which by 1967 had made the most progress in reforming the organization of the economy).

First Attempts at Economic Reform:

Successes and Failures

The issue of economic reform in Poland is a question which has direct implications for the political order. Specifically, it involves the political position of the ruling party. As we have pointed out above, there seems to be a certain congruence between a centralized command economy and a centralized, authoritarian party which monopolizes political power and rules on the basis of "command". As an ideal type, this situation was most closely approximated in Poland during the period of Stalinism. As Karpniski observes, the difficulties which the economy experienced during the industrialization drive of the First Six-Year Plan, are, in the final analysis, traceable to the political factor. That is, economic decision-making was dominated by the political leadership, whose deficiency in terms of information and expertise lies at the root of

¹⁶¹Ibid., pp. 31, 32.

such problems as falling output levels, rising investment, wastage, and low personal consumption. What Karpinski neglects to mention in this regard, however, is that the economically deleterious role of the political leadership is made possible by the centralized structure of the Soviet-type economy, and that the Soviet model has its own deficiencies, regardless of who is at the controls.¹⁶² What is more, the problems with this type of economic structure tend to become more pronounced as the economy develops; such that increasing amounts of information, flowing from proliferating and increasingly more specialized sources, tend to overload the central decision-making apparatus and make coordination within the economy more difficult to maintain.

On the surface, the economic answer to flagging performance seems to be a simple one: if the organization of the economy is out of step with the demands of optimality in a modernizing economy,¹⁶³ then that organization should

¹⁶² Gregory Grossman has neatly summarized the problems on the Soviet-type, planned economy. See his article "Economic Reform: The Interplay of Economics and Politics", in The Future of Communism in Europe, ed. R.V. Burks (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968), p.110.

¹⁶³ On balance, this notion is not too distant from the contradiction which Marx saw in the capitalist system between "the forces of production" and "the relations of production". According to Marx, these relations gradually become "fetters" on the productive forces and, as such, lead to social revolution. See, for instance, his Preface to "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), pp.181-185; see also in Marx and Engels Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. Lewis Feuer (Garden City, New York; Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp.42-46.

be reformed. Reform, however, is also, and perhaps more importantly, a political question, and a multifarious one at that. First of all, the decision to reform ultimately rests with the political leadership. Secondly, if reforms are to be made, the question of what shape these will take, and how far they will go, becomes crucial. Under the Stalinist system, the party elite, "by concentrating in its hands total political power as well as all the essential economic prerogatives . . . was able to prevent the growth of a rival power group while at the same time enjoying a free hand in the economic sphere."¹⁶⁴ Should the party leadership decide to reform the system by delegating more responsibility to local decision-makers, would not the party's leading role in society be jeopardized? And further, would not the position of the leadership itself within the party be threatened if local party officials were to play a larger role in goal-setting rather than simply carrying out instructions from above? And what of the unity of the party in cases where locally established goals conflict? If more discretionary powers were afforded to non-apparatus decision makers (such as plant managers), would this diminish the influence of the local party organs and stimulate rebellion in the middle ranks of the party against the leadership? As it is, the centralized, bureaucratic structure allows the non-party expert¹⁶⁵ "to participate in decisions without inordinately

¹⁶⁴ Michael Gamarnikow, "Can They Decentralize?", in East Europe, XV (No. 7, July, 1966), p. 17.

¹⁶⁵ The term "non-party" should be understood here as referring to individuals whose main career pattern is outside the party apparatus, regardless of whether or not the given individual happens to be a party member.

increasing his power"; yet the security of the party's leadership is nevertheless at issue,¹⁶⁶ as the line between participation in decision-making and de facto usurpation of the decision-making function (due to superior knowledge, information, etc.) is a difficult one to draw, much less to maintain. Finally, there is the international situation to consider. Would a reformed economy upset trading patterns within COMECON ? Would it lead to strengthening economic ties with Western countries and an international reorientation ?¹⁶⁷ And what of the Soviet Union's strategic position and the need for military hardware ?¹⁶⁸ Certainly the possibility of reform is conditioned by Poland's position within the Eastern European bloc, as the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia demonstrated all too well.

In summary then, the question of reform is centered in the tension between economic optimality and the system of party control.¹⁶⁹ We can perhaps add some weight to

¹⁶⁶ Carl Beck, "Bureaucracy and Political Development in Eastern Europe" in Bureaucracy and Political Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.281.

¹⁶⁷ This possibility is mentioned by Grossman, op.cit., pp.113.

¹⁶⁸ See Hardt, op.cit., p.6.

¹⁶⁹ This point is made by Beck, op.cit., p.281.

this notion by examining the attempts at economic reform in Poland and the courses which they appeared to have followed. From our brief analysis of economic performance in postwar Poland it seems that reforms to date have been none too successful. It remains here to at least provide a partial answer to why this has been so.

The movement for economic reform in Poland, perhaps latent during the Stalinist period due to the suppression of those ideas which did not conform to party orthodoxy, seemed to have surfaced and to have gathered momentum during the political and intellectual ferment which swept Poland in 1956. A group of economists headed by Professor Oskar Lange, were constituted as an "Economic Council" and encharged with the task of preparing a "new economic model" for the Polish economy. This they did, and presented their ideas to the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers in May, 1957. The Economic Committee adopted the proposals in the following July. The "new economic model" was for the most part the product of Lange's thinking and his name came to be identified with the plan for reform. Lange's idea of the role of central planning in a socialist economy had already been mentioned. However, while maintaining that a rigid command system is essential for economic growth under socialism during the early stages of development (Lange called this a "war economy"), he felt that the scope of planning and the methods employed to ensure plan fulfillment must radically change at a later stage, if

economic growth is to be sustained.¹⁷⁰ The "new economic model" embodied this thinking and called for a substantial departure from the system of central planning, a devolution of decision-making power to the enterprise level and an emphasis on the profit motive in order to promote efficiency and technical innovation.¹⁷¹

An important principle which Lange voiced as a corollary to his theory of the economic stages of socialist development was the change he saw in the role of the working class. The "war economy" period was inevitable, according to Lange, because the working class was a relatively weak force in society during the transformation of a backward country into an industrial, socialist state. However, once a certain measure of industrialization had been achieved, and the working class has grown "in numbers as well as in consciousness and political maturity", the situation has arrived in which working class participation in economic decisions becomes a matter of paramount importance.¹⁷² The spontaneous emergence

¹⁷⁰ See his essay cited above, pp.14-21.

¹⁷¹ See Brown, op.cit., p.54; Michaël Gamarnikow, "Economic Reform in Poland" in East Europe, XIV (No.7, July 1965), p.14.

¹⁷² Lange, op.cit., pp.17-18. Lange in this passage also refers to the "growth of a new socialist intelligentsia" and adds that : "When it becomes clear that the highly centralized administrative and bureaucratic methods of management create obstacles to further progress also a part of the political and state apparatus becomes convinced that a change in methods of administration and management is needed. Thus new social forces mature which require and also make possible a change of these methods." It seems that these comments parallel

of workers' councils in some areas of Poland during 1956, seemed to signal the advent of a new, participatory role for the working class in the economy. Indeed, the P.U.W.P. was quick to extend the number of workers' councils and institutionalize the new system by law (November, 1956). In essence, the establishment of workers' councils was a return to the "shop committees" which had been active in industrial management from 1945 to 1949, at which time they were subordinated to the trade unions and deprived of any autonomous action. The new law envisaged substantial decision-making power for the councils,¹⁷³ including authority over what and how to produce, and the level of prices and wages in the firm. Although day-to-day decisions in the enterprise were still the responsibility of

quite closely those of Samuel H. Barnes as cited above in Chapter I. There appears to be little difference, if any, between what Barnes refers to as "changes of leadership style" and what Lange calls "change of methods of administration and management". Although Lange's analysis is based on a Marxian conception of dialectical change and intended exclusively for "socialist" countries, each of these authors postulates the need for, and the importance of, some sort of democratic leadership style within a participatory framework in order to promote maximum productivity, initiative and efficiency in a modern industrial economy.

¹⁷³ See Kolaja, op.cit., pp.4,5. At least two-thirds of the council was to be composed of workers' representatives, elected by the workers themselves.

the director (thus maintaining the principle of "one-man management") the director himself was responsible to the workers' council in that the council exercised a veto power over nominations to the post, which were made by the appropriate governmental agency.¹⁷⁴

This innovation in "workers' self-management", like that of the "new economic model" itself, was never fully carried out and in each case the direction of the reform was sharply reversed. In May, 1957, when the Economic Council of Ministers was considering the Lange group's proposal for a restructuring of relations within the economy, the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the P.U.W.P. was putting the damper on the self-management system. The Ninth Plenum re-defined the role of the workers' councils in such a way as to suspend their autonomous role, limit their function to that of studying the operation of the firm, offering suggestions for improvements and enforcing labor discipline.¹⁷⁵ Subsequently, any significant residual authority which the councils may have had was legislated out of existence, and in thousands of factories the councils ceased to exist altogether.¹⁷⁶

The fate of the "new economic model" was sealed in the

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., pp.6,7; see also Richard F. Staar, "New Course in Communist Poland" in The Journal of Politics, XX (No.1, February, 1958), p.72.

¹⁷⁵ Staar, "The New Course in Communist Poland", op.cit., p.73. Some of the social and political implications of this re-definition are examined in the following chapter.

¹⁷⁶ Stehle, op.cit., pp.166-169.

wake of the economic difficulties which began to mount in Poland during 1958, and which came to a head in the autumn of 1959. As Gamarnikow observes, any attempt to adapt a centrally directed economy to a market or quasi-market situation is likely to involve, at least in the short-run, some unsettling effects. This is perhaps especially important with respect to unemployment and the threat of price inflation.¹⁷⁷ An additional difficulty appears to have been the "basic disproportions" which the "new economic model" (if fully carried out) would have created between the Polish economic system and the other members of COMECON.¹⁷⁸ Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and the production of military hardware tends to make even simple resource re-allocation (not to mention restructuring the economy itself) an agonizing decision.¹⁷⁹ Finally, we should not neglect to mention anti-reform pressure within the state and party bureaucracies. In Poland, the influence of this group is perhaps especially strong as close to two-thirds of the P.U.W.P. membership are employed as state bureaucrats.¹⁸⁰ Even enterprise managers seem to betray an ambivalent attitude toward economic reforms and we can perhaps at least speculate that as economic conditions began to deteriorate in the late 1950's, their conservative side came to the fore. As Gregory Grossman observes, this group, while tending to favor minor adjustments or improvements in the system of central planning, is by and large negative in its attitude toward a radical restructuring

¹⁷⁷ See his article "The Costs of Reform" in East Europe, XV, (No.8, August, 1966), pp.15-21.

¹⁷⁸ Gamarnikow, "Economic Reform in Poland, op.cit., p.14

¹⁷⁹ See Hardt, op.cit., p.7. ¹⁸⁰ Fiszman, op.cit., p.79.

of the economy.¹⁸¹ This is perhaps the case not only because of the difficulty involved in breaking with old patterns of behavior and the uncertainty attendant on adapting to a new role within a new structure,¹⁸² but also because the standard education and training received by those occupying managerial positions in Soviet-type economies are strongly oriented toward engineering skills and task-execution, rather than the development of managerial talents per se, as is commonly associated with business administration in Western countries.¹⁸³

The apparent reversal in the direction of the reform (or the "retreat from October" as the larger process of de-liberalization is sometimes called) was given immediate effect by Gomulka in the advancement of former "Stalinists" to key administrative positions in 1959. For example, Eugeniusz Szyr and Julian Tokarski, two individuals who had occupied important economic positions¹⁸⁴ during the period of the

¹⁸¹Grossman, op.cit., p.131.

¹⁸²The "play it safe" attitude of Polish managers is well described by Alexander Matejko in his article "The Executive in Present Day Poland" in The Polish Review, XVI (No.3, Summer, 1971), pp.32-58, passim.

¹⁸³The education and training of managers in the Soviet Union, in comparison with their counterparts in the United States, is presented in great detail by Barry M. Richman, Management Development and Education in the Soviet Union (East Lansing, Mich.: M.S.U. International Business Studies, 1967).

¹⁸⁴Szyr had been a powerful figure in the central planning apparatus which was headed by Hilary Minc. In 1954, Szyr replaced Minc, and held the latter's post until 1956. Tokarski, Minister of Heavy Industry during the First Six-Year Plan, had been identified with not only past economic policies, but

First Six Year Plan, were reinstated as vice-premiers in the government.¹⁸⁵ At the same time, prominent "liberal" personalities in leading circles were demoted.¹⁸⁶

This re-shuffle of personnel in the Party appears to have signaled a return to the past, despite reform measures which were already on the books. The modicum of decentralization in economic decision-making which the reforms seemed to promise was , in this sense, largely illusory. The Polish economists Jerzy L. Toeplitz, writing in Zycie Gospodarcze (November 10, 1960) observed that:

Budgets are corrected and approved in all details by the ministries and this does not in the least give the impression that the associations [combinations of local industries] are their own economic accountants. Inspectors from the Supreme Chamber of Control often do not accept the explanations of the director concerning post-inspection observations on the activity of subordinated enterprises . . . associations do not have much authority in their work Does all this mean that the superior authorities¹⁸⁷ do not have confidence in the associations!

also with the repression of the Poznan workers. It was he who flatly rejected the demands of the Poznan workers in 1956. See Stelhe, op.cit., p.42.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.,; see also Gamarnikow, "Economic Reform in Poland", op.cit., p.14.

¹⁸⁶ Wladyslaw Matwin and Jerzy Albrecht are two cases in point. Also Jerzy Morawski, a member of the Politburo, resigned in April, 1960. See Brown, op.cit., p.54.

¹⁸⁷ Quoted in Beck, op.cit., pp.286,287.

But the return of the "hard liners" to positions of power, reflected not only Gomulka's apparent balk in the face of difficulties or his "negative conservatism" as some have suggested,¹⁸⁸ but perhaps also a shortcoming within the P.U.W.P. itself; i.e., a rather modest inventory of talent and experience. As one leading P.U.W.P. member put it: "Our party never has been a party of the masses. This is why we lack cadres, why we have a shortage of intelligent men in the leadership class. That is why one always finds the same people being used in specific situations."¹⁸⁹

The influence of these "same people" is, no doubt, important for understanding the way in which the reform was jettisoned. It also appears to have been a salient feature in minimizing the success of the 1964 reform which we will take up shortly. However, before proceeding to a discussion of the Party's second attempt at restructuring the economy, we should perhaps take notice of those areas in which progress was made. First, as we have mentioned in the preceding chapter, the forced collectivization of agriculture was terminated. The gains which Polish agriculture made in succeeding years, can perhaps be interpreted as a result of the rapprochement between the Party and the private farmer. Table 8 gives an idea of this advancement in agricultural productivity by comparing Poland to other countries in Eastern Europe where collective

¹⁸⁸ Brown, op.cit.

¹⁸⁹ Quoted in Stehle, op.cit., p.44.

farming prevails. It is also interesting to compare the post-collectivization output levels in Poland with those prior to 1956. Although the figure for 1954-1956 shows marked improvement in production over the preceding period, we should remember that by 1954, the collectivization drive had largely tapered off,¹⁹⁰ thus indicating a measure of tranquility in the agriculture sector. The sharp increases in production during the periods which followed "de-collectivization", attest to the success of the new policy in agriculture.

TABLE 8.-- Growth in Total Crop and Agricultural Production for Selected Years, 1934-1968

	(Indexes 1934-38=100)	
	Poland	Eastern European Countries with Collectivized Agriculture
1934-38	100.0	100.0
1948-50	98.0	75.5
1954-56	110.2	96.1
1960-62	135.1	111.1
1965-67	158.7	133.2
1968	172.5	138.3

Source: Gregory Lazarcik, "Growth of Output, Expenses and Net Product in East European Agriculture" in Economic Developments in Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.475.

Second, the economic role of the People's Councils, the organs of local government in Poland, was considerably

¹⁹⁰ See Korbonski, op.cit., pp.22-27.

amplified. The People's Councils were granted more autonomy in drafting local plans¹⁹¹ and a larger share of the national budget in order to finance local industrial development as well as carry on various social and cultural services. Table 9 indicates the growth of local budgetary expenditures and compares these with the State budget.

TABLE 9. -- Budgetary Expenditures of the People's Councils, 1955-1968.

Year	Local Budget in millions of zloty	Percentage of National Budget
1955	18,276	14.8
1956	23,080	17.2
1957	33,986	22.0
1958	40,358	24.0
1959	45,980	25.2
1960	52,703	26.3
1961	57,973	24.3
1962	69,166	27.7
1963	71,424	28.4
1964	74,563	27.2
1965	79,959	27.6
1966	85,118	27.7
1967	87,607	27.2
1968	90,615	27.7

Source: Sylwester Zawałzki, "Study of Local Power in Poland" (paper presented at the VIII World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, August 31 -September 5, 1970), p.2.

¹⁹¹Staar, "New Course in Communist Poland", op.cit., p.75.

Third, official tolerance, and even encouragement, of private enterprise during the 1960's tended to mitigate some of the short comings of the centrally planned economy. This pragmatic approach to economic questions, (which seems to be in accordance with the outlook of the Democratic Party and which may reflect the influence of the D.P. on economic decision-making) undoubtedly had some salutary effects. In addition to providing new jobs, the takeover of unprofitable state enterprises (particularly in service industries) by private entrepreneurs upgraded both economic efficiency and the quality of the product.¹⁹²

Finally, we should mention the imponderable influence which reform-oriented economists may have had upon the P.U.W.P. itself. Although the measures which Lange and others had proposed were, for the most part, aborted by late 1959, the relative relaxation of censorship brought about by the "Polish October" permitted the debate over economic reform to be carried on. Economists continued to propound the merits of reform in their journals, and as such, kept alive the reform movement. They may well have impressed the younger "technocrats" in the P.U.W.P. and in this way assisted in bringing about Poland's second major attempt to reorganize the economy in 1964.¹⁹³

¹⁹² See Michael Gamarnikow, "The New Role of Private Enterprise" in East Europe, XVI (No.8, August, 1967), pp.2-9.

¹⁹³ This argument is made by Gamarnikow, "Economic Reform in Poland", op.cit., p.15.

Economic Reform: Round Two

Poland's second round of economic reform was initiated at the Fourth Party Congress of the P.U.W.P. in June of 1964. The decree of the Council of Ministers which followed (June 25, 1964) embodied the principles of rationality, economic effectiveness and profitability.¹⁹⁴ Enterprises were instructed to employ market analysis techniques in order to adjust production to anticipated demand. In order to increase the autonomy of the firm in establishing its own product mix and output levels, enterprises were presented with a number of variants of the draft plan, among which the enterprise was to select the one which most closely approximated its market analysis.¹⁹⁵ Individual enterprises were grouped into new Industrial Associations which were delegated more responsibility over planning, finance, wages and investments, thus permitting a larger degree of specialization in decision-making.¹⁹⁶ It appeared that the pragmatic reformist was yet to have his day.

On closer examination, however, the Party seems to have given somewhat less than an unqualified endorsement to those forces advocating fundamental reform.¹⁹⁷ To begin

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp.16,17.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ See Brown, op.cit., pp.112-113.

¹⁹⁷ R.V.Burks has divided reform programs in Eastern Europe into two types; "A" and "B". The former refers to an abandoning of central planning altogether, and implies a willingness on the part of the political leadership to run the risk of losing control over society by opting out of

with, the same Fourth Party Congress which called for a new direction in the economy also advanced Eugeniusz Szyr and Frantisek Waniolka, "two orthodox, conservative economic stalwarts", to full membership in the Politburo.¹⁹⁸ This may have been the "pound of flesh" which Gomulka had to pay in order to placate the conservative wing of the Party and secure its acquiescence in the new policy. The larger question, however, is just how "new" the policy was. Certainly the innovations in the organizational structure of the economy, and the system of enterprise selection of draft plans were departures from the previous state of affairs. So was the emphasis on profit. What was not changed, however, was the framework of the politically directed centralized economy, and it is here that the root of the difficulties appears to lie. Let us place the above three innovations within the context of this framework and examine what they came to mean in concrete terms.

its previous role in economic decision-making. The advantages of "Type A" reforms included a facility for technical innovations and the efficiency associated with a market economy. "Type B" reforms are essentially attempts at streamlining the central planning system by allowing for a modicum of decentralization in decision-making and simulating certain features of a market economy. Polish reforms would be classified as "Type B". See his essay, "Technological and Political Change in Eastern Europe" in Johnson, op.cit., pp.289-304.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p.60.

First, the organizational change and the draft plan variants had the effect of proliferating the number of planning and control agencies and of enormously complicating the coordination of economic branches and sectors. Not only was the setting of priorities to remain the prerogative of the Party, but the Party's role in the economy was, if anything, enlarged by the reorganization.¹⁹⁹ Second, the importance of profit as an indicator of economic success met with a similar fate. Although the use of this indicator should not be overlooked with respect to the prevention of intra-enterprise waste, profit, when prices are still centrally established, does not "reflect the relative scarcity value of goods so as to facilitate a much higher efficiency of resource use on the economy-wide scale."²⁰⁰ Nor does it operate as a signal for resource allocation on a larger scale at the level of the firm, as it does in market economies.²⁰¹ Rather, priorities, and the resources required to meet them, remain within the jurisdiction of the Party and on this score there has been very little change.²⁰²

Despite the organizational change and the concomitant emphasis which the reform seemed to place on enterprise

¹⁹⁹ See Gamarnikow, "Economic Reform in Poland", op.cit., pp.18-20.

²⁰⁰ Grossman, op.cit., p.119 ²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² The 1966-1970 long-term plan which was adopted during the course of the reform called for a 6.2 per cent increase in the producers' goods sector and a 3.1 per cent increase in consumer goods. Investments were to rise during the period by 8 per cent. See East Europe, XVI (No.1, January, 1967), p.44.

autonomy, previous "bureaucratic" patterns of behavior tended to persist. As one Polish journalist observed, "only the name of the institution on the door has been changed. The persons and their habits and attitudes remain the same."²⁰³ In order to illustrate the way which the centrally planned system and its adjunct, the "bureaucratic" mentality, have the effect of stifling the innovation, rationality and profitability which the reform proclaimed as desiderata, we might mention the case of the Zabrze-Zakrzow Metal Works, a firm which produces reffridgerators. The management of the enterprise noted during 1965 that

the demand for reffridgerators of 100 and 120 liters capacity was rapidly declining, while that for smaller reffridgerators was rising. Nevertheless they were forced to stick to their old production plan, and soon their warehouses were jammed with unsold products. The enterprise management . . . decided that in its 1966 production plan the output of the smaller models would be raised by 70 per cent at the expense of the larger ones.

. . . But the proposed production plan of the Zabrze-Zakrzow Metal Works was flatly rejected by the trust [Industrial Association]. In a detailed directive set down by the bureaucrats, the factory was ordered to increase its output of large-size reffridgerators above the 1965 level. The reason given was that the manufacture of small units takes relatively more labor, and in order to reach the target for value of total output the enterprise would have to hire more workers or pay more overtime to its present workers. This would conflict with the indices for wages and employment already worked out by the trust and approved by the ministry.²⁰⁴

²⁰³Quoted in Gamarnikow, "Can They Decentralize?", op. cit., p.19.

²⁰⁴Ibid., pp.19, 20.

Given this rigidity in the structure of Poland's centrally planned economy, failure in attaining the benefits which the reform seemed to have promised appears in retrospect to be an all-but-predictable result.

Economic performance over the course of the 1966-1970 long term plan perhaps illustrates the failure of the reform to tackle fundamental problems. Holding true to previously set patterns, the growth in labor productivity fell off sharply as the plan progressed and the gap between output levels for producers' and consumers' goods widened.²⁰⁵

The complications which the reform involved in the areas of planning and coordination were noticeable during the first year of the plan's operation. In 1966, "among 114 enterprises only 4 did not change their plans (!), 74 changed them 1-5 times, 24 changed them 6-10 times, 10 changed them 11-20 times and 2 managed to change their plans over 20 times!"²⁰⁶

Deadlock in Development: The Political Impasse

In addition to the structural problems of the centrally directed economy, and the bureaucratic inertia which seems to thrive in this climate, it appears that political factors, both domestic and international, combined to deliver the coup de grace to the reform movement. In line with the foreign policy imperatives dictated by Poland's position within the

²⁰⁵ See Bogan Mieczkowski, "Poland, 1968", in Wiles, op.cit., pp.235, 248, 249.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p.251.

Soviet-bloc, Gomulka delivered a violent, anti-Zionist address on June 19, 1967, shortly after the Israeli victory in the six-days' war. By castigating the "Zionist agents in our midst", he in effect gave the green light to conservative elements within the Party who sought to use anti-Semitic feelings as a political weapon against their opponents.²⁰⁷ After the student revolt in March, 1968 (of which more is said in the following chapter), the "anti-Zionist" campaign was stepped up. A number of university professors, most of whom are of Jewish origin, were accused of instigating the student uprising. As it happened, a number of these professors were prominent reform economists, and their dismissal not only deprived the reform movement of its "moving spirits", but also tended to discredit the reform itself.²⁰⁸ Thus the way was open for

an all-out attack on every single manifestation of economic pragmatism. And not only in the field of economic policies: the net result of this offensive of economic obscurantism has been a considerable roll-back and a significant strengthening of the prerogatives of central planners.²⁰⁹

The intrusion of the political into what remained of the autonomy in the economic sphere which the 1964 reform had

²⁰⁷ Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Pitfalls of Economic Prophecy in the Communist World", in Wiles, op.cit., p.259.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p.260.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

advocated bore its deleterious consequences. Indeed, when the Party reconvened for its Fifth Congress in November, 1968, Gomulka, in surveying the accomplishments of the economy over the years since the introduction of the reform at the Fourth Congress, was forced to acknowledge the "insufficient growth" in consumer goods, the insufficient increase in the productivity of labor and the inadequate efficiency of investment.²¹⁰

In summing up, it seems that economic development in Poland showed remarkable progress during the early postwar years, but that growth has tapered off considerably since that time. Sustained development appears to be hampered by the rigid nature of the command economy, and attempts at reforming this system have met with minimal success. As the command economy is a "politicized" economy which accommodates the interests of the command political system, so efforts at reforming this structure frequently encounter political resistance. With respect to political factors which favor a continuation of the economic status quo (or, what is the same thing, present obstacles to the reform movement) four general considerations come to mind. The first is Poland's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the other members of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. This situation, no doubt, provides the parameters or the acceptable scope of possible reforms. Moreover, there may be influences from the international sphere which strengthen the hand of anti-reform elements within the P.U.W.P., as seems to have been the case in

²¹⁰ For a synopsis of Gomulka's address to the Fifth Party Congress, see East Europe, XVII (No.12, December, 1968) p.55.

regard to the anti-Zionist campaign in 1967 and the return to economic orthodoxy which followed. Secondly, factional activity within the P.U.W.P. probably has a bearing on economic reform, in that sinecures are apparently employed to placate rival factions, and it is not uncommon to promote "conservative" party members to important post as "liberal" reforms are initiated. Further competing factions have made use of non-economic issues (e.g., "anti-Zionism") to promote their own economic policies. Thirdly, the immensely complicated administration of a centralized economy provides the Party with ample access to economic decision-making and ensures its "leading role" in society. To take this one step further, the party's role is secured by the confusion and disorganization which the command economy seems to breed. By reforming the structure of the economy, clarifying lines of command, etc. (not to mention providing autonomy at the enterprise level), the Party's direct role in the economy would, no doubt, recede.²¹¹ The party apparatus, then, seems to have a vested interest in the same confusion which, more

²¹¹As Grossman puts it, the job of the lower level party organs "essentially is to step in where the mechanism slips or fails, to compensate for inadequate incentives, imperfect signals, imbalances and shortages of all sorts, conflicting directives, and other functional defects. The party mobilizes, goads, resolves conflicts, asserts priorities, watches for malfeasance in office, uncovers waste, and safeguards the targets of the plan and the values of the regime . . . it has a positive role to play in the economy, if largely by default of other social mechanisms." Op.cit., p.132.

often than not, reform measures seek to remedy. Finally, it seems warranted to emphasize once again the congruence between the command economy and the command political system. Economic development, particularly in the later stages of growth, becomes highly contingent upon political development, particularly with respect to widening the base of effective participation, or "de-politicizing" areas of economic decision-making. It appears that each of these developmental alternatives might well be interpreted by the P.U.W.P. as a threat to its hegemonic position.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL MODERNIZATION

The primary focus in the preceding chapter was on the economic modernization of Poland and some of the political ramifications which this process seems to involve. It remains here to fill in some of the blank spots in the picture so far presented by sketching the major social changes which have accompanied the economic transformation, and examining the importance of these for the political system in general, and the ruling party in particular.

Social change implies friction. The transition from a traditional order to a modern mass society is fraught with social disequilibrium and individual dislocation. The particular style of social development in Poland has, as we shall see, added to the strains of the transitional period. What is more, social conflicts have found few outlets through formal political structures and, consequently, tend either to find expression in informal patterns of behavior within these structures or to erupt in outbursts of violence. At either turn, the stability of the political system is called into question.

The Pre-Communist Background

As noted above, interwar Poland exhibited many of the characteristics of a traditional or underdeveloped society.²¹² The "gentry culture" of historical Poland, with

²¹²See above, pp. 75, 76.

its romantic, nationalist tradition , its disdain for "hard work" and its elitarian disposition toward those who earned their livelihood through physical labor, was largely assimilated by the middle classes, and constituted the dominant cultural influence in society.²¹³ This gentry culture found expression through its principal exponents, the Polish intelligentsia,²¹⁴ of whom more is said below. Coexisting alongside the gentry culture, and having in common with it certain fundamental values, was the "folk" or "peasant culture", which encompassed the bulk of the population. The peasantry, like the gentry, was of course, rooted in the ways of "agraria",²¹⁵ and looked upon land as the most highly prized commodity in the cultural scheme of values.²¹⁶ This outlook could well be described as traditional, as the traditional frame of mind sees resources as fixed and the environment as unal-

²¹⁴Kazimierz Dobrowolski, "Studies in Occupational Ideologies", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.1,1965), pp.92,93. Dobrowolski uses the term "lord culture" to refer to what is here called "gentry culture". Since the latter term seems to have more currency, it is used in place of Dobrowolski's.

²¹⁴See Alexander Matejko, "Status Incongruence in the Polish Intelligentsia", Social Research, XXXIII (No.3, Winter, 1969), pp.611-613.

²¹⁵This term is used by Peter H. Merkl to denote a set of social characteristics which are found in agricultural societies, see his Modern Comparative Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,1970), pp.23-25.

²¹⁶Dobrowolski, op.cit.,pp.93,94.

terable. Placing a maximum value on land is therefore in consonance with this particular Weltanschauung.

Standing above these two cultural patterns and providing the unifying link between them has been the centuries-old identification of nationhood with the Roman Catholic religion. Surrounded, and eventually dismembered, by Protestant and Orthodox states, Poland kept alive its national identity through the medium of religion, which "came to be perceived as a collectivistic, sociopolitical category. . . ." ¹²⁷ Religion tended to perpetuate the concept of a Polish nation , long after the nation state had itself been dissolved. The concepts "Pole" and "Catholic" became largely equatable, ²¹⁸ and constituted somewhat of a bulwark against cultural secularization.

Postwar Transition: The First Steps

The impact of the Second World War and the subsequent accession of the Communists to political power wrought dramatic changes in the structure of social life in Poland. The effect of these events was such as to break down traditional norms and patterns of behavior and prepare the way for the transition to what might be called a modern society. To begin with, Poland's prewar social structure, in which the gentry and bourgeois classes were the dominant

²¹⁷ Fiszman, op.cit., p.72.

²¹⁸ See inter alia, Stehle, op.cit., pp.60,61.

strata, was revamped; these classes have been largely, if not entirely, eliminated, and their influence substantially reduced.²¹⁹ Along with the dispossession of these classes came the opening of avenues for upward social mobility.

The restructuring of society was, of course, carried out "from above" under the auspices of the state. Of crucial importance for this restructuring were the nationalization of large scale industry²²⁰ and the land reform.²²¹ Not only were the "class enemies" (gentry and bourgeoisie) thereby expropriated and abolished as classes, but the wielders of political power were enabled to carry out a policy of massive industrial expansion which (1) created new jobs, (2) opened up positions in the socioeconomic hierarchy, (3) and stimulated internal migration to urban areas. Let us look briefly at each of these three modernizing processes.

Prewar Poland shared with most of its Eastern European neighbors the economic plight of rural overpopulation. About three-fifths of the population were engaged in agriculture, and 67 per cent of the total number of agricultural holdings were too small to provide adequate living for the owners and their dependents.²²² Compounding the problem

²¹⁹ Szczepanski, op.cit., p.39. Some of the residual influences of gentry culture are dealt with below.

²²⁰ See above, pp.77-78.

²²¹ On the land reform in postwar Poland, see Korbonski, op.cit., pp.66-98.

²²² Alexander Matejko, "From Peasant into Worker in Poland", International Review of Sociology, VIII (No.3, December, 1971), p.27, 30.

was the rather high rate of natural increases in the population on the land.²²³ The postwar industrialization drive, however, opened up countless new jobs in the non-agricultural sector and radically altered the structure of employment in favor of industry. The number of industrial workers, for example, has increased from a 1946 figure of 870,000 to 3,076,000 in 1969. The majority of these workers have come from the village.²²⁴

The influx of peasants into urban areas in postwar Poland has assumed rather large proportions. The collectivization of agriculture in the early fifties, as might be expected, tended to accelerate the process. During the period 1946-1960, "the average annual rate of migration from rural to urban areas was 2.5 times the figure of 1921-1938".²²⁵ According to Fiszman, the rate has been stepped up even more since 1962.²²⁶ The adjustment to an urban life style is perhaps always an arduous transition for the newcomer from the countryside. Within the context of such a massive flow of population to urban areas, however, we might surmise that the difficulty is exacerbated. This point is based upon the proposition that acculturation into a new pattern of behavior is facilitated by the presence of role models (in this case, people who are already adept in the urban style of life) which provide the

²²³ In the early 1930's, the rate of natural increase in the country side was 16.7 per thousand as compared with 8.4 per thousand in the cities. Of the total increase in agricultural population during the years 1921-1938, 67 per cent remained in the villages, 22 per cent migrated to the cities, and 11 per cent emigrated from Poland to find work abroad. Ibid., p.31.

²²⁴ Ibid., p.28.

²²⁵ Ibid., p.32.

²²⁶ op.cit., p.45.

behavioral cues for those who are in the process of learning the skills and assimilating the norms of their new environment. In a situation, however, where a large percentage of the urban population consists of recent arrivals from the villages, role models are in relative scarcity and acculturation is impeded. In addition to this problem, urban migration in postwar Poland does not fit into the step-wise pattern of migration as noted, for instance, in Latin America, where migrants from rural areas first settle in smaller cities or towns before gravitating to major urban centers.²²⁷ This step-wise process tends to cushion the "culture shock" of the village-to-metropolis metamorphosis by exposing the migrant to a small dosage of urbanism before he makes his way to the big city, and providing him with some of the occupational skills which he will need when he gets there. In Poland, however, the tendency among peasants has been to bypass the smaller cities and go directly from the village to one of the major urban centers.²²⁸

Social Mobility:

Professional Qualifications vs. Political Mobility

The difficulties in this rural-urban transition were perhaps somewhat assuaged by the plethora of job opportunities

²²⁷ On the step-wise pattern of internal migration, see Joan Nelson, "The Urban Poor", World Politics, XXII (No.4, April, 1970), p.397.

²²⁸ Fiszman, loc.cit.

created by the drive for rapid industrialization as noted above. An accompanying factor was the opening of new channels for upward mobility and "the sky is the limit" atmosphere fostered by the regime. After the War, as Alexander Matejko puts it, "there was such a great demand for white collars . . . that all kinds of candidates were admitted to salaried posts, especially when it was in the interest of the Party to have loyal and reliable people socially advanced from lower ranks in industry."²²⁹ It appears that political loyalty outweighed professional qualifications as the major stepping stone to career advancements. Those who were upgraded, of course, owed all to the Party, and the very process of advancement tended to reinforce the loyalty sentiments of the upwardly mobile, and professionally deficient, careerists who were entering the hierarchy.²³⁰ Some idea of the extent of this expanded mobility can be inferred from the fact that presently about two-thirds of all executives in Polish industry are from working class or peasant backgrounds,²³¹ and only about half of these have received higher education.²³² This sort of politically induced and politically controlled advancement would seem to do wonders for the

²²⁹ "From Peasant into Worker", op.cit., p.53.

²³⁰ See Alexander Matejko, "The Executive in Poland", op.cit., pp.34-35, 41.

²³¹ Matejko, "From Peasant into Worker", op.cit., p.57.

²³² Matejko, "The Executive in Poland", op.cit., p.35, 36.

ruling party in terms of eliciting allegiance, building legitimacy and staffing positions of social and economic importance with politically reliable individuals. At the same time, however, certain costs appear to be involved as well. On the debit side we might mention the obvious matter of qualifications, or the lack of them, among the new professional and semi-professional strata. If the Party rewards the faithful with promotions to positions of power and influence, it also expects a certain amount of performance from them in their new roles. Having the formal status of an industrial executive, for example, without the skills required to adequately discharge the functions attendant on this role, results in a situation which is by no means conducive to occupational security, and often leads to sub rosa, informal arrangements which transgress the institutional parameters of the system and which in the long-run become dysfunctional. The bureaucratic inertia which we noted in the preceding chapter with respect to the attempts at economic reform in Poland can perhaps be largely attributed to the deficiency in expertise, the insecurity in status and the tendency to cling to familiar (however outmoded) patterns of behavior among industrial officials which this postwar "mobility-for-the-reliable" policy seems to induce. Finally, we might add a time dimension to this picture by mentioning the problem of succeeding generations; i.e., the difficulty which confronts the system when the aspirations of younger, better educated men are stifled because the upper slots in the hierarchy are already populated by political appointees

who often lack the educational qualifications of their younger subordinates, but who are, nevertheless, established in their positions.²³³ These points are dealt with in more detail below with respect to the problems of social change in Poland. Before proceeding to this topic, however, a general statement seems to be in order regarding the modernization of Polish society under the aegis of Communist political rule.

The Coexistence of Incompatibles

There is a certain difficulty involved in any attempt at formulating a concise, descriptive statement about Poland's contemporary social system. Poland is a society in transition and, as such, it evinces an anomalous situation which might be called "the coexistence of incompatibles": Roman Catholicism and Marxism-Leninism vie for popular support, each asserting its claim to being the protector of Polish independence and nationhood ; political criteria and apolitical norms of professionalism and modern science live in unhappy symbiosis, each reading like the other's epitaph; traditional romanticism and modern realism exchange epithets, yet neither has the final say.²³⁴

²³³ Matejko, "The Polish Intelligentsia", op.cit., p.623.

²³⁴ The notion of the transitional nature of Polish society in general, and the idea of romanticism vs. realism, in particular, is to found in Fiszman, op.cit., pp. 41,42.

Despite these apparent ambiguities in the social system, it goes without saying that a good part of the traditional order has broken down along with the introduction of new elements into the social milieu and the development of certain structures which are identifiable as "modern". A case in point is the expansion of the mass media communications system since the War. A study by Skorznski (for the year 1960) showed that in Polish cities and towns, every sixth inhabitant attended the theatre, every third - sporting events, and almost everybody went to the cinema.²³⁵ The trend, as reflected in the data presented in Table 10, seems to be the rather steady expansion of the mass media system of communications in general, with television (since the early sixties)

TABLE 10.-- Postwar Growth in Exposure to Mass Media in Poland" Cinema Radio and Television for Selected Years, 1946-1970

	<u>1946</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1970</u>
Cinema attendance (per 1,000 inhabitants)	3,030	4,791	7,485	6,693	5,196	4,195
Radio Listeners (per 1,000 inhabitants)	20	68	129	182	176	174
Television Viewers (per 1,000 inhabitants)	--	--	0.2	21.5	79.8	129.3

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny (Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1961), p.14,15.

²³⁵ Cited by Stefan Zolkiewski in his "Mass Culture in a Socialist Society" in Social and Political Transformation in Poland, ed. Stanislaw Ehrlich (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1964), p.306.

gradually replacing the cinema and the radio as a medium of information, cultural expression and entertainment.

Urbanization and industrialization and the development of the mass media which we have mentioned, as well as the expansion of education which we shall come to, have undeniably altered the structure of Polish society. This alteration is evident with respect to the role of the family as a social institution. Urban migration has tended to reduce the cohesiveness of the extended family as "contacts with relatives who have remained in the village, become considerably weaker."²³⁶ With the increased economic activity of women outside the home, the family unit has tended to shed its paternal character.²³⁷ What is more, the influence of the family upon the children's choice of occupation has been significantly eroded, while the influence of the peer group seems to be increasing,²³⁸ thus bringing about the type of "other directed" personality as described by David Riesman.²³⁹ Yet within the

²³⁶ Matejko, "From Peasant into Worker", op.cit., p.38.

²³⁷ Szczepanski, op.cit., p.183

²³⁸ See Matejko, "From Peasant into Worker", op.cit., p.36.

²³⁹ See The Lonely Crowd (3rd ed.; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1961), passim. In conversation with university students in Cracow, in July 1971, the present writer observed a certain "distance" between students and their parents and, at the same time, a strong sense of affinity within the student peer groups. It seemed that the common attitude among students toward their parents could be summed up in the words of a twenty-four year old engineering student who remarked: "Well, they have

transitional framework of Polish society, family ties persist and function in place of the impersonal mechanisms for social mobility associated with modernity. As Szczepanski points out:

Although the traditional economic functions of the household have been taken over by various service institutions, family solidarity is revived in the mutual help of family members employed in various fields of the economy or public activity. Thus, the members of peasant families employed in town help their relatives to obtain jobs and get access to schools in exchange for economic benefits from the peasants in the country It is, of course, a transitional phenomenon characteristic of periods of scarcity which disappears with growing prosperity but meanwhile has a significant influence on family ties.²⁴⁰

In sum, these same ambiguities in a transitional social system

good intentions, but they just don't understand us or our problems." Respect for one's parents among the students with whom I spoke appeared to be genuine enough, but such respect did not seem to carry over into the realm of behavior or mores when outside the home environment. The common pattern tended to be the maintenance of certain "appearances" which were calculated to impress the parents as being in accordance with their own moral preferences, and the cultivation of another code of behavior shared by various sub-groups within the student population. The deviance from paternal norms seemed particularly pronounced with respect to student attitudes towards the use of alcohol and pre-marital sex.

²⁴⁰ Op.cit., p.186.

which obviate the possibility for any type of categorical statement about Polish society, are symptomatic of the strains, the inconsistencies and the contradictions which have characterized Poland's social modernization in the postwar era.

Some Problems of Social Development

Social Stratification

In the opening chapter we briefly discussed the unsettling effect of social restratification, brought about by the process of modernization.²⁴¹ The point was made, with particular respect to organizations in society, that the relative absence of clear-cut norms governing social stratification is a situation conducive to social conflict. This state of affairs seems to obtain in postwar Poland. As Bauman observes, the foundations of the old system of social stratification have been undermined, but the construction of a new system has not kept pace "with the rapid metamorphosis in the composition of social classes and in the web of their mutual relations."²⁴² The clusters of status characteristics, previously enjoyed by certain strata, have decomposed in the postwar era, leaving rather fluid the norms of social stratification. The situation of the old gentry class typifies this phenomenon. Prior to World War II, the status of the gentry was marked by high income, high education and high prestige. Having

²⁴¹ See above, pp.23,24.

²⁴² Op.cit., p.538.

been eliminated as a class in the course of the social transformations carried out by the Communists, the former members of that class were denied their previous advantage in access to education, and saw their income substantially reduced. Nevertheless, traditional gentry prestige models have exercised considerable influence over the outlook and value systems of the new elites which have been springing up since the War. This persistence of gentry prestige models has meant that "leisure and the ability to 'enjoy oneself' - traditional gentry values - are socially more important than hard work, that knowledge of French and Latin and a humanistic education are still cherished more highly and pursued more avidly than the acquisition of economically more functional skills, and that the symbols of an aristocratically class-oriented society . . . are still prevalent despite adherence to a formal ideology of classlessness."²⁴³

It should be pointed out that the fluidity in social stratification, which is perhaps concurrent with any process of large scale social transformation, is in the case of Poland, reinforced, or in some sense perpetuated, by the ideological predisposition of the political order. We should remember that the social transformation undertaken in the postwar period have for the most part been the product of a political initiative which is guided, and possibly more importantly, legitimated, by the tenets of the official ideology. The proponents of the established belief system would argue to the effect that the modernization

¹⁴³ Fiszman, op.cit., p.44.

of Poland under Communism is preparing the way for the transition to a classless society. In this view, status decomposition is a desideratum, for it tends to equalize status characteristics among various social strata. Certain professionals, for example, may have higher prestige, but lower income, than skilled workers. Social stratification, therefore, loosens the significance which it held under the old system. Various status factors no longer occur in clusters which constitute invidious differentiae among groups, but rather are dispersed over a number of groups, thus lending an egalitarian character to the system of social stratification.²⁴⁴ The erosion of stratification lines will presumably culminate in the withering away of social differentiations, or to put it another way, a classless society.

If we focus our attention on the modernizing infrastructure of postwar Polish society, however, it is obvious that a Marxian "society of free producers" has not come about, but rather, a highly structured system of functionally differentiated roles, growing out of the exigencies of an industrial economy. The requisites of economic (and political) efficiency in this milieu tend to bring about social stratification.²⁴⁵ But such stratification is neither internally consistent (owing to status decomposition) nor formally sanctioned (due to the egalitarian principles of the official ideology). The upshot is that the stratification system is not only fluid, as we have noted, but also

²⁴⁴ See Włodzimierz Wesolowski, "Social Stratification in Socialist Society", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.1, 1967), pp.24-35; see also Szczepanski, op.cit., pp.140-146.

²⁴⁵ Szczepanski, op.cit., p.110.

rife with the seeds of social and political conflict. We might elaborate on this point by examining some of the factors in Polish society which seem to militate against stability.

Status Incongruence

One of the side-effects of the status decomposition which we have been discussing can be conceptualized in the notion of "status incongruence". The concept of status incongruence involves the complex set of stimuli (status factors) which an individual presents to others. "As a result of experience people learn that certain factors are linked to others, and respond with normative expectations; they expect a man who is a university professor, for instance, to be a man of learning and a company director to have a good education and presence and be of the proper age."²⁴⁶ If these normative expectations are not met, if there is a discrepancy among status factors, then we might say that the status of an individual is incongruent, and that the greater the degree of incongruence among status factors, the more insecure is the individual in his status. Following Malewski, status incongruence is, therefore a form of social punishment and its elimination a source of reward.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ Andrzej Malewski, "The Degree of Status Incongruence and Its Effects", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.1, 1963), p.10.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p.12.

The importance of status incongruence for the purposes of our discussion is not only its existence, but also its likely effects. These involved the reaction of the individual to the incongruence in his status and appear to be two-fold. First, there is the tendency to attempt to raise those status factors which are evaluated as lower in the incongruent situation. The individual would in this case be engaged in altering the way in which others perceive him by changing his behavior, increasing his skills, etc. An example might be an industrial executive, deficient in formal education, who attends evening classes. If the lower status factors cannot be raised, then the individual may compensate by avoiding the company of people who react to the incongruencies.²⁴⁸ The avoidance pattern among Polish white collars and professionals, however, seems to be rather uncommon. As Irene Nowak's study of social contact patterns in Polish society makes clear, the professional and white collar strata are characterized by a high frequency (and intensity) of personal associations among colleagues and co-workers in the after-work hours.²⁴⁹

A second manner in which the individual might react to an incongruence in his status (and this method would appear to predominate in those instances in which a given

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p.13.

²⁴⁹ See her "Some Differences in Social Contact Patterns Among Various Social Strata", The Polish Sociological Bulletin (No.2,1966), pp.136-141.

individual perceives his condition as chronic, i.e., he does not feel that he is able to raise his lower status factors, due to his perception of the social system which defines his status) would be to seek a change in the social system itself. As Malewski puts it, there is a tendency for the individual in this context to reject the system and to join its opponents; hence there is an association between status incongruence and a preference for altering the prevailing distribution of power in society, especially among those of the upper strata who face incongruencies in their income, education and occupational prestige.²⁵⁰ The pattern of frequent social contacts within the upper strata may amplify (through the mutually reinforcing effect of interpersonal relations in the peer group) this preference for changing the power distribution.

How is status incongruence manifested in contemporary Poland, and how might it play a dynamic role in the political system? With respect to the first part of this question, a general outline and a few illustrations may serve the purpose; from here we can proceed to an evaluation of its dynamic aspect in a political context.

Among the professional strata in Poland, there appears to be a good deal of incongruity in regards to the status factors of income and occupational prestige. "A study of the Warsaw population revealed that several pro-

²⁵⁰ Malewski also makes the point that status incongruence presumably in its "chronic" form, is associated with a favorable disposition toward radical, left-wing political programs. See his article, op.cit., pp.11,15,16.

fessions, belonging to the intelligentsia, enjoy much higher prestige than their real position in the hierarchy of financial remuneration would indicate."²⁵¹ The traditionally privileged position of the intelligentsia with respect to income finds expression today in a value-orientation which is anti-egalitarian, and perhaps most pronounced among aspiring professionals in the student population. The negative correlation which Wisniewski found in his student sample between attitudes toward tolerance and egalitarianism,²⁵² parallels some more recent findings by Phillip E. Jacob, in his cross-national study of values and community activeness in India, Poland, the United States and Yugoslavia. In each of these countries, Jacob found that the educational level of community leaders is associated with the "kind of change" which they want to see come about; that is, that "the more highly educated leaders tend to be more favorable to political democracy (i.e., open to broad public participation in decision-making) but are consistently much more opposed than the less educated to economic equality."²⁵³ Keeping in mind the fact that wages, salaries and prices are politically

²⁵¹Matejko, "The Polish Intelligentsia", op.cit., p.624.

²⁵²See Wielsow Wisniewski, "Tolerance and Egalitarianism", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.2, 1963), pp.23-31.

²⁵³See his "Values and Public Vitality: The Political Dynamics of Community Activeness" (paper presented at the VIII World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, August 31-September 5, 1970), p.16.

established in Poland's centrally planned economy, this anti-egalitarian disposition among the educated and the prestigious opens the way for a certain cleavage between the egalitarian principles of the official ideology of the ruling party, and the value-orientation of the emerging, "modern" elites. Szczepanski indirectly calls attention to this when he notes that the generation which was educated in the fifties and entered careers in the sixties is relatively unconcerned with ideological values and tends "to give the socialist order new meaning" by viewing the social system "in the perspective of the emerging technological civilization of Western high mass-consumption societies."²⁵⁴ Implicit here is a conflict between the achievement-based norms which develop as society modernizes and the "anti-modern" priorities of the regime, which stress the primacy of politics over all other considerations.²⁵⁵

The professional vs. political disparity in norms and priorities is evident to some degree in every aspect of social life in Poland. At the level of the enterprise, there is a tension between those, on the one hand, who have high professional qualifications but who are not in secure standing in the Party, and, on the other, Party activists who are "fully occupied by their political activities [and, hence] are often not able to establish some secure professional position."²⁵⁶ In the area of cultural

²⁵⁴ Op.cit., p.196.

²⁵⁵ Fiszman, op.cit., pp.64,65.

²⁵⁶ Matejko, "The Executive in Poland", op.cit., p.45.

activities, where the intelligentsia has a virtual monopoly, there is a conflict between the members of the creative intelligentsia and the bureaucrats sponsored by the state; compounded by the fact that "the intelligentsia's real participations and involvement . . . are not on a level with its position in the power structure, which is highly centralized, through tradition and to a certain extent because of the real needs of the planned social and economic system."²⁵⁷

A study conducted among newspaper staffs in Poland, for example, reveals rather strong social and professional ambitions among staff members. Newspapermen tend to associate and identify with members of the creative intelligentsia and are thus motivated in the direction of creative achievements. Controversy is perhaps the bread-and-butter of newspaper work, and, as might be expected, newspapermen tend to have a positive attitude toward it. There are, however, politically prescribed limits as to the range of ideas which are deemed permissible for printing, and here standards of professionalism and creative motivation conflict with the political demands of the Party. It is perhaps significant that newspapermen list as the chief drawback to their work: the constant tension involved (34 per cent of sample), misunderstanding of the character of newspaper work by the authorities and the public (20 per cent), poor salary (17 per cent), lack of professional specialization (14 per cent), lack of effect (11 per cent).²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ Matejko, "The Polish Intelligentsia", op.cit., pp.619, 620.

²⁵⁸ A. Matejko, "Newspaper Staff as a Social System", The Polish Sociological Bulletin (No.1,1967), pp.59-68.

Role Conflicts and "Crypto-Politics"

By employing the idea of "crypto-politics", put forward by T. H. Rigby, we can perhaps come to an understanding of how these role conflicts are acted out in the political arena. Rigby, in effect, collapses the conventional categories of "politics" and "administration", claiming that in the Soviet Union the two are, for all intents and purposes, indistinguishable. Although his remarks are addressed specifically to the Soviet Union, much the same could be said for Poland. Rigby goes on to hypothesize that "conflicts of interest and aspiration . . . denied a special sphere of operation, tend to give a political coloration to processes ostensibly executive and administrative in character, that is to generate a distinctive crypto-politics."²⁵⁹ This approach is in consonance with the concept of "politicization" which we have used to describe some of the features of the social and economic systems in Communist polities. Its utility, however, is that it focuses attention on that particular aspect of the system where social and economic conflicts have immediate, political consequence within a limited observable context, i.e., the sphere of administration.

"Crypto-politics" in Poland are carried on by informal

²⁵⁹ See his essay "Crypto-Politics" in Communist Studies and the Social Sciences, ed. Federic J. Fleron, Jr., (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.), pp.116-128; esp., pp.116,117.

groupings within the formal structure of a given organization. Indeed, the cumbersome complexity of the laws and rules which formally govern behavior within the organization has the effect of generating these informal sub-groups, simply in order to "get things going",²⁶⁰ while the sub-groups, in turn, tend to subordinate the interests of the formal organization to their own ends, and manipulate its structure to suit their own purposes.²⁶¹ The position of the Party vis-a-vis the bureaucracy provides the seminal tension which sets in motion this furtive, and often suborn, behavior. Caught in the cross-pressure of the Party, which is constantly insisting on performance and progress, and the bureaucracy, which resists innovation at every turn, individuals resort to informal activities as a way out of the impasse.²⁶² This activity may bring fourth positive results in the short-run; but it, nevertheless, contradicts standards, such as rationality and predictability, which are essential to a developed economy and a modern society. An individual executive, for example, may meet his production quotas by illegally stockpiling resources, for he fears that if he relies exclusively on the punctuality of his supplier, he may be disappointed and have to suspend production because certain parts or raw materials were not delivered on schedule. This

²⁶⁰ Szczepanski, op.cit., p.102.

²⁶¹ See Alexander Matejko, "Some Sociological Problems of Socialist Factories", Social Research, XXVI (No.2, Autumn, 1969), pp. 456,457.

²⁶² Matejko, "The Executive in Poland", op.cit., p.42-44.

perhaps makes sense in such a situation where a low level of predictability prevails. Viewed in a broader perspective, however, it is nonetheless, irrational and dysfunctional for the system as a whole, as the materials which are gathering dust in the warehouse could be elsewhere put to immediate use.

As we shall see below, the Party itself is not immune to this informal, cliquish style of behavior. After all, it is the key organization behind "getting things done", and as such, displays the same type of "crypto-politics" which premeate the formal structure of the administration. Before examining its significance, however, we might first have a look at the ways in which the Party system has institutionalized some of the social forces which are emerging in the course of modernization in Poland and guage, where possible, its responsiveness to the demands of a modernizing society.

Party Responses:

Access, Party Composition and Recruitment

The notion of access in the political system involves bringing to the attention of the political elite demands which are articulated by various groups in society²⁶³. Implicit here is the understanding that the political elite will respond to the demands, either by suppressing them

²⁶³ See Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.74-86.

through coercion or accomodating them by means of political policies. In the following chapter, we will discuss how the Polish parliament, the Sejm, has come to be utilized as an access channel. At this point, however, we might direct our attention to (1) some of the access channels which have been established at the micro level, and (2) Party, recruitment and composition (i.e., the degree to which various groups are represented within the decision-making structure of the dominant party).

Access

As to the first of the above concerns, it appears that despite a multitude of access channels which formally link decision-makers with the citizenry, these channels have proved to be of relatively scant utility. In the area of local government, studies in Poland have shown that the local governmental organs, the People's Councils, do not tend to observe the democratic, participatory elements of their formal, constitutional framework. Rather, the executive bodies (praesidia) of the People's Councils tend to informally usurp the decision-making function, and a certain gap develops between public officials and the populace.²⁶⁴ The extent to which this access channel has atrophied can be inferred from the evidence put forward by Jacob, which indicates that local leaders in Poland

²⁶⁴ Zawadzki, op.cit., pp.8,9.

are not favorably disposed toward political participation, and tend to identify public officials as their "support base".²⁶⁵ This finding appears to confirm Bauman's view that cultural secularization has made very little headway in contemporary Poland, and what we see in its place is largely the superimposition of bureaucratic norms on a traditionally-oriented value system.²⁶⁶ Yet this is only the top of the iceberg, as the student riots in March, 1968 and, perhaps, more importantly, the working class uprising in December, 1970, made abundantly clear. Denied institutional channels for participation in political decision-making, anomic outbursts appear to be the result.²⁶⁷ These events are discussed in more detail below, but it is perhaps important to add at this point that the Party leadership is itself cognizant of the retarded development of the political system vis-a-vis the pressures for participation emanating from a modernizing society. In an interview which was broadcast over radio and television in Poland shortly after the December 1970 events, Politburo member Stefan Olszowski made reference to this problem. Speaking on behalf of the Politburo and the Central Committee of the P.U.W.P., Olszowski singled out the gap between the increasing degree of education and the "underdevelopment of democracy" as one of the key political factors behind the December uprising.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ Op.cit., pp.7,13.

²⁶⁶ Op.cit., pp.538,539.

²⁶⁷ Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.74-80; esp., p.79.

²⁶⁸ Reported by Andreas Kohlschuetter, "Giereks Sieg in der Hoehle des Löwen", in Die Ziet, February 16, 1971.

Carrying over Olszowski's idea to the specific situation of the working class in Polish society, we find that this "underdevelopment of democracy" is largely borne out. Szczepanski, for instance, mentions that the emphasis on increasing general (as opposed to purely vocational) education among the workers has prepared them for a greater participatory role in society and politics.²⁶⁹ At the enterprise level, a number of organizations have been established to integrate the worker into his occupational setting²⁷⁰ and provide for him a participatory outlet. These organizations, it seems, have largely failed to fulfill their purposes. Rather than being integrated into the work setting, workers are the most isolated group in society with reference to social contacts,²⁷¹ and spend the largest portion of their leisure time watching television and listening to the radio.²⁷² Workers' councils, treated briefly in the preceding chapter, have likewise proven to be ineffectual as far as inducing or accommodating workers' participation in factory affairs is concerned. Kolaja, for instance, noted in his observations of a Polish firm that the councils are an attempt to stimulate

²⁶⁹ Op.cit., p.126.

²⁷⁰ See Matejko, "Some Sociological Problems of Socialist Factories", op.cit., pp.453-454.

²⁷¹ Nowak, op.cit., pp.136-138; see also A. Podgorecki, "The Prestige of the Law", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.2,1965), p.37.

²⁷² See Andrzej Sicinski, "Television and Radio in the Structure of Material and Cultural Needs in the Polish Society", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.2, 1966), pp.129-133.

communication and participation within a structure established "from above", but receive little response "from below", i.e., from among the workers themselves. During his experience, Kolaja found that workers tend to withdraw from the formal channels of participation and instead express their dissatisfaction in "sudden outbursts of normless behavior".²⁷³ Similarly, Matejko has noted that the technical intelligentsia seems to be much more interested than the workers in the activities of the councils, and that the workers commonly complain that the councils do not represent them in the management of the enterprise.²⁷⁴ Rather than an institution which responds to the demands of the workers, the councils seem to be little more than convenient tools which enterprise executives can utilize in bargaining with their superiors. Although the executive is appointed by higher-ups in the bureaucracy and owes his position to these people, the members of the workers' councils are elected by the enterprise personnel, and are, therefore, "able to show courage and initiative in defending vital interests of their enterprise."²⁷⁵ Since the councils

²⁷³ Op.cit., pp.111,136-138.

²⁷⁴ Alexander Matejko, "Worker's Aspirations", Polish Perspectives (October, 1967), pp.32-33. A survey conducted by the Polish Center of Public Opinion Polls revealed that only 5 per cent of machinery and metal workers and 19 per cent of workers in the leather industry felt that workers' councils represented blue collar interests. These results are quoted in Matejko, "From Peasant into Worker", op.cit., p.59.

²⁷⁵ Matejko, "The Executive in Poland", op.cit., p.48.

carry the formal prestige associated with direct workers' democracy in a socialist state, their resolutions cannot easily be ignored, and executives can legitimate their own proposals and demands by cloaking them in the symbolic authority of the workers' council. Somewhat paradoxically, workers' councils appear to function as an access channel for the technical specialist and the enterprise executive, rather than the industrial worker.

Party Composition and Recruitment

Our second dimension of political access, party recruitment and composition, shows the growing importance of achievement-based criteria as conditions for party membership. As Bauman puts it: "Political merit and ideological virtues are no longer a sufficient qualification for the performance of party functions: One must possess vocational education and professional skill to deal with technical and administrative problems at a table with specialists of the highest rank."²⁷⁶ Some data on party membership demonstrate this increasingly professional orientation within the ruling party.

To begin with, membership in all Poland's political parties has been growing at a rather steady pace. This is illustrated in Table 11 for the decade of the sixties.

²⁷⁶ In order to substantiate his argument, Buaman cites survey research in Poland which revealed that the ratio of party members to engineers and technicians was 1:5, while the same ratio for skilled and unskilled workers was 1:75 and 1:198, respectively. Op.cit., p.539.

TABLE 11.-- Membership in Poland's Political Parties:
1960, 1965, 1970 (in thousands)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>
P.U.W.P.	1154.7	1776.0	2320.0
U.P.P.	258.7	358.1	413.5
D.P.	---	69.0	88.4

Source: Rocznik Statystyczny, op.cit., p.60.

As might be expected, the P.U.W.P., tends to attract those with high educational qualifications more so than its major "partner" the U.P.P., as shown by the figures in Tables 12 and 13. One reason for the discrepancy between

TABLE 12.-- Educational Level of U.P.P. Members for the
Years 1960, 1964 and 1967 (percentages of total membership)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1967</u>
Primary Education	85.7	82.9	82.2
Secondary and Vocational Education	12.1	14.4	15.4
Higher Education	2.2	2.7	2.4

Source: Cieplak, op.cit., p.25.

TABLE 13.-- Educational Level of P.U.W.P. Members for Selected Years 1953-1970 (in percentages)

	<u>1953</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1970</u>
Primary incomplete	40.9	26.1	16.1	9.5
Primary	42.2	49.1	56.2	55.6
Secondary and Vocational	14.6	19.5	23.2	27.0
Higher	2.3	5.3	6.5	7.9

Sources: for 1953 data, Beck, op.cit., p.293; for 1960-1970, Rocznik Statystyczny, op.cit., p.61.

the P.U.W.P. and the U.P.P. in terms of the memberships' level of education is that given by Matejko; i.e., security in one's career and the opportunity for career advancement are largely contingent upon membership in the ruling party. As such, the P.U.W.P. attracts a number of people who join out of opportunistic reasons,²⁷⁷ but the influx of educated personnel into the ranks of the Party might, nonetheless, be interpreted as a form of political development. Not only is the P.U.W.P. raising its inventory of professional talent and improving its proficiency as a decision-making agency by increasing the expertise which it can bring to bear on given matters, but also, we might argue, it is raising its own prestige and enhancing its own legitimacy by recruiting among the high status strata in society.

²⁷⁷"The Executive in Poland", op.cit., p.40.

Recruitment into the upper echelons of the Party hierarchy is of paramount importance vis-a-vis this concept of access through "representation" as a dimension of political development, due to the centralized structure of decision-making in the P.U.W.P. We would expect that an increase in the educational qualifications of the Party leadership would be one way in which to measure the P.U.W.P.'s adaptibility to its governing role in a modernizing society. Another measure of Party adaptibility would be the career backgrounds of those in the decision-making circles at the top. As Carl Beck puts it, "shifts in the way in which system-related demands are perceived will be reflected in and reflective of shifts in the career characteristics of those who compose and those who are recruited into the elite."²⁷⁸ The degree of Party responsiveness to the exigencies of modernization can, therefore, be partially tapped by (1) examining the educational qualifications of the Party high command and (2) matching career characteristics of the decision-making elite against those roles which appear to be salient in a modernizing system.

As to the first of these concerns, a study by R. Barry Farrell,²⁷⁹ which compares Politburo members in Eastern European states and the Soviet Union on the variable

²⁷⁸"Career Characteristics of East European Leadership" in Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970), p.162.

"educational level of university graduation", reveals that higher education in the P.U.W.P. Politburo has been advancing (albeit, somewhat sporadically), especially since the Stalinist period, and that the ruling party in Poland compares rather favorably with its counterparts in Eastern Europe. According to Farrell's figures, the percentage of P.U.W.P. Politburo members with university level education rose from 33 per cent in 1949, to 55 per cent in 1967. This figure for 1967 ranks Poland as first among Eastern European states on this variable, with the exception of the Soviet Union.²⁸⁰ The P.U.W.P. Politburo, however, does not seem to be "keeping pace" with its Eastern European neighbors in terms of technical specialization and expertise. Farrell's data show that the percentage of members with technical specialization in fact has fallen from 27 per cent in 1949 to 20 per cent in 1967. As such, Poland trailed all other Eastern European states on this variable in 1967.²⁸¹ The relative deficiency in technical talent in the P.U.W.P. Politburo seems to conform to our previous discussion of the continuing influence of gentry prestige-models in society as well as the overriding importance of political reliability as a criterion for advancement. Neither of these factors would favor a recruitment pattern which places a premium on technical expertise. Beck's observation, as quoted above, is important in this regard: in that "the way in which system-related demands are perceived" in Poland is quite conceivably a function of the dominant cultural norms in society.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p.96.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p.99.

More specifically, the traditional value scheme of the intelligentsia, with its emphasis on the "cultivated", broadly educated individual rather than narrowly trained task-oriented specialist, seems to be reflected in the relatively high number of P.U.W.P. Politburo members with high education and, conversely, the relatively low percentage of Politburo members with technical expertise.

Beck's analysis of the importance of various career channels with respect to higher Party bodies over various periods of time is also interesting in this regard.²⁸² Beck identifies nine basic career channels to the political elite and scores each member of the Politburo, the Secretariat and the Central Committee on a 0-3 scale as to the relevance of each of the career channels to the individual's own background. In addition, a time-series operation is performed in order to measure the changing significance of the various career channels for recruitment into the political leadership. The results are listed below in Table 14. These data would tend to qualify our earlier remarks concerning the recruitment of technically trained personnel into the Party hierarchy. As the figure for the Secretariat in the right-hand column of Table 14 indicates, there has been a substantial number of techni-

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See his "Career Characteristics of Eastern European Leadership", op.cit., pp.157-194. Beck has collected an extensive amount of biographical information on Eastern European political elites which is contained in the Archive on Political Elites at the University of Pittsburgh's University Center for International Studies. Unfortunately, the data were not available at the time of this writing due to a re-programming of the entire data-set.

TABLE 14.-- Changes in Recruitment Patterns to the Politburo, Secretariat and Central Committee of the P.U.W.P. over Four Time Periods

<u>Career Type</u>	<u>POBu</u>	<u>t2-t1</u>		<u>POBu.</u>	<u>t3-t2</u>		<u>POBu.</u>	<u>t4-t3</u>	
		<u>Secr.</u>	<u>Cenc.</u>		<u>Secr.</u>	<u>Cenc.</u>		<u>Secr.</u>	<u>Cenc.</u>
Party Bureaucrat	-.36	1.36	.59	.43	-.17	2.02	.05	.54	.03
Party Ideologue	-.72	-.51	-.88	1.29	.42	2.16	-.56	-.30	-.38
Gov't. Bureaucrat	.69	.00	1.57	-.24	.06	-.32	1.19	.91	.86
Social Demo. Party	+	.00	+	-.62	.00	-.79	-1.00	.00	-1.00
Mass Organization	+	.00	.96	.14	+	-.21	.75	-1.00	.24
Military	+	+	.14	-1.00	-.45	-.55	+	1.75	.24
Technician	-1.00	1.00	1.94	+	+	-.21	1.63	10.07	.86
Trade Union	-.63	+	-.41	2.42	.09	.58	-.12	.38	-.28
Revolutionary	-.25	-.16	.84	.14	-.16	2.69	-.34	.43	-.51

Source: Ibid., p.191. The time periods employed in this table are: "The Revolutionary Situation" from the end of World War II until December 15, 1948 (t₁), "The Stalinist Period" (t₂) which ended with the proclamation of the New Course on October 29, 1953, "The New Course Period" (t₃) ending with the completion of data collection on January 1, 1966. The symbols employed are as follows: .00=no change; a zero indicates missing data; and a plus sign signifies a non-measurable increase.

cians recruited into this body, although the same cannot be said for either the Politburo or the Central Committee.

It is interesting to compare the overall recruitment patterns into the higher Party bodies with Apter's role profiles in a modernizing system, mentioned above in the first chapter.²⁸³ Although the direction of change is by no means clear-cut, Apter's contention that modernization induces a saliency in the political roles of the technical expert and the political broker, and a corresponding decline in those of the ideologist and the political entrepreneur, seems to be at least partially borne out by the data in Table 14. If we might assume that what Apter calls a "political broker" is roughly equivalent to Beck's "government bureaucrat", the general trend suggests that this role-type, and that of the technician, are the most important career channels to the political elite in latter stages of modernization.

Yet the data in Table 14 are a bit ambiguous as far as trends are concerned. The increase in the number of people entering the Party hierarchy in the middle column who have the career characteristics of "party ideologue" would certainly not be predicted by Apter's theory. The same can be said for those with a "revolutionary" background (Apter's "political entrepreneur") in regard to the Central Committee and the Secretariat in the middle and right-hand columns, respectively. Why has the Party hierarchy not absorbed more technicians and brokers, and why have the roles of the ideologue and revolutionary not

²⁸³ See above, pp.14-17.

been extinguished as career channels to the political elite ? Part of the answer might be the particular way in which Beck coded his data. That is, a given individual received a score on each of the career-types in order to reflect his particular "career-mix".²⁸⁴ As such, an individual who possess technical expertise, for example, but who also has the career characteristics of a revolutionary in his background, would receive a score on each of these categories, and his recruitment would be recorded as an increase in both the "technician" and the "revolutionary" career channels. The ambiguities which may be present in the coding procedure are not, however, the full explanation for the persistence of "non-modern" career channels to the political elite.

A concept put forward by Dennis Pirages provides a more complete explanation for this phenomenon. Pirages, with particular reference to the P.U.W.P., uses the term "access instability" to characterize a process by which the conservative leadership of the Party neutralizes pressures emanating from the more educated and technically sophisticated elements in the middle and lower ranks (who pose a threat not only to the members of the elite, but also to the centralized structure of decision-making), by creating "a constant turnover of personnel in the middle and higher levels and thus [creating] access instability among those who are most likely to pressure the top leadership for

²⁸⁴ See Beck, "Career Characteristics of East European Leadership", op.cit., pp.164-165.

decentralization of decision-making."²⁸⁵ This idea corresponds to our discussion of the factional rivalry in the P.U.W.P. in the second chapter, as well as the personnel shake-ups which were briefly recounted with respect to economic reforms in the preceding chapter. As Pirages notes, this solution represents a non-innovative response to the problems of modernization and, although it may have certain short-term advantages for the top leadership in terms of demand-suppression, "as long-term policy it is futile and economically bankrupt."²⁸⁶ Beyond the economic difficulties which this solution portends, however, there seem to be certain problems involved for the Party in terms of building and maintaining cohesion and consensus around the goals set by the leadership. Those who are psychologically insecure in their Party position are not likely to present a direct challenge to the ruling elite, but neither are they likely to internalize a deep commitment to the goals of the Party as established by the leadership.²⁸⁷ In crisis situations, as we shall see, the lack of internal consensus becomes a definite liability for the leadership.

²⁸⁵ See his article "Modernization: New Decisional Models in Soviet Society" in Farrell, op.cit., pp.249-275; esp., pp. 259,260.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., p.260.

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p.262. See also James D. Thompson and William F. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interactive Process," American Sociological Bulletin, XXIII (No.2, February, 1958), pp.22-30.

Social Upheaval and Party Response

A full discussion of the Polish student revolt in 1968 and the working class uprising in December 1970 are beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, each of these events is important to our understanding of the modernization of Polish society and the role of the Party in the modernizing process. They point to serious strains within the social system, and have had, of course, important implications for the ruling party in terms of both personnel and policy formulation. A brief account of these "situations of breakdown" therefore appears to be in order. This done, we might go on to examine what impact they have had, or are yet likely to have, on the P.U.W.P.

Some Factors Behind the Upheavals

There are some rather interesting parallels between these two uprisings. For instance, each was apparently presaged by increases in food prices immediately before the Christmas season. The price-hikes were apparently designed to reverse undesirable trends within the economy, but resulted in each case in arousing a good deal of animosity toward the regime.²⁸⁸ Price increases, were, however, only a precipitating factor. Students, as well as

²⁸⁸ On the December, 1967 price increases, see Jerzy Ptakowski, "Behind the Unrest in Poland", East Europe, XVII, (No.4, April, 1971), pp.5,6; see also, Kazimierz Zamorski, "A Chronicle of Events", Radio Free Europe Research, (Poland/16, June 15, 1971), p.1.

workers, in Poland, are exposed to and, in a sense, victimized by, the contradictions in social and political life. What is more, each seems to have lost confidence in the regime, to such an extent that either official explanations and promises, or the threat and the reality of armed repression, failed to prevent outbreaks of violence.²⁸⁹ There are also certain parallels in the conditions of both students and workers in Poland, which might be viewed as underlying factors which gave rise to the manifestations of discontent. In this respect, we might call attention to a widening gap between expectations and system capabilities, and the accompanying tension between the official norms of the system and the realities found in social practice.

Central to this topic is the inability of the system to maintain the opportunities for social mobility which we noted earlier. In the case of workers, negative attitudes toward manual work are most common, and workers in the main do not wish to see their children become manual

²⁸⁹On student demands for free expression and objective news reporting, see George Mond, "The Student Rebels in Poland", East Europe, XVIII (No.7, July, 1969), pp.2-7: on the low level of credibility of the government-controlled mass media in Poland, see Pirages, op.cit., pp.262-265. Zbigniew Byrski, a former P.U.W.P. member, who among other things, was actively involved in Polish radio and television during the fifties and sixties, has gone so far as to say that the December, 1970 uprising was the end product of the "government's deception and lies that exhausted people's patience". See his "Behind the Polish Upheavals", New Politics, IX (No.1, Spring, 1970), p.54.

laborers.²⁹⁰ Young workers are inclined toward increasing their education and feel that by doing so, they will gain both occupational advancement and social prestige.²⁹¹ However, as G. Pomian and K. Bursche point out, the "intentions [of workers] to continue education are practically not taken into account in personnel management either when engaging new workers, or when recommending workers for promotion and dismissing them from their posts."²⁹² The tapering off of social mobility which accompanied the falling industrial growth rate, and the compounding effect of stagnation in the standard of living, are factors in the condition of the working class which would induce frustration.

Moreover, these difficulties tend to become increasingly severe over time. For instance, the aspirations of the working class are stimulated by exposure to the mass media, but the number of attractive positions to which workers might be promoted has decreased in proportion to the numbers of workers who are qualified by education and training to fill these positions.²⁹³ It may not be going

²⁹⁰ See Alexander Matejko, "Steel Worker's Attitudes to Their Occupation", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.1, 1965), pp.98-102; and F. Adamski, "The Steel Worker's Occupation and Family", The Polish Sociological Bulletin, (No.1, 1965), pp.103-107.

²⁹¹ Alexander Matejko, "Worker's Aspirations", op.cit., p.31.

²⁹² Quoted, Ibid.

²⁹³ Matejko, "From Peasant into Worker", op. cit., p.52.

too far to suggest that workers feel themselves estranged from the same society which the official ideology tells them they have inherited. Workers generally have strong egalitarian feelings and would like to see social differences abolished,²⁹⁴ yet, after more than twenty-five years of Communist rule, privileged groups informally maintain a preferential status for their offspring with respect to education and career opportunities; well-to-do shops cater to the tastes of the economically more fortunate, while inferior goods are available to the masses.²⁹⁵ The position of the working class in contemporary Polish society could perhaps be summarized in the discrepancy between its official status as the leading stratum in society and the fact that the social prestige of unskilled workers is the lowest of all non-agricultural occupational groups.²⁹⁶

In the case of students, we find a similar pattern of expectations outdistancing opportunities. University

²⁹⁴ Ibid., pp. 39, 72-73.

²⁹⁵ See Zygmunt Bauman, "Twenty Years After: The Crisis of Soviet-Type Systems", Problems of Communism, XX (No. 6, November-December, 1971), pp. 47, 48. Bauman makes an excellent point in this passage when he notes that egalitarian ideals, as expounded by the regime, grate rather harshly on the ears of "The vast majority of disgruntled citizens [who] have experienced no other class system than the one they are living under . . . [and that this] . . . generates a potential for conflict that is not present to the same degree in systems of a different type."

²⁹⁶ Wesolowski, op.cit., p. 26.

enrollment, for instance, has been steadily on the increase in Poland, but the increase has not kept pace with the rising number of applications. During the academic year 1964-1965, the postwar "baby boom" made its first impact on the university system, and hiked the number of applicants for each available position from 1:3 to 2:3 in that year alone.²⁹⁷ What is more, although the student may have a difficult time in gaining admission to the university, and feels the pressure of inflated competition while he is there (due to higher ratio of applicants vis-a-vis available positions) he may well be aware of the possibility that when he completes his schooling, a still more frustrating situation is awaiting him on the job market; as "the demand for graduates is not growing in correspondence with the increasing university enrollment."²⁹⁸

The above discrepancy between the promise and the actual performance of the system appears to be one of the factors which induced student radicalism in 1968. Two other factors which we might mention are : (1) discontinuities in the socialization process, and (2) a perceived conflict between the norms acquired during socialization and those found to be operant in everyday political life.²⁹⁹ Concerning the first of these, it seems that Polish students

²⁹⁷ Henryk Golanski, "Planning for the Future", Polish Perspectives, (December, 1966), p.23.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ These three factors are cited in Barbara M. Kasinka in her study "Student Activism in Poland: 1968" (unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, October, 1970), p.163.

have been confronted with conflicting norms projected by various socializing agents: the family, the peer group, the Party,³⁰⁰ and the Catholic Church.³⁰¹ Under these circumstances, we might assume that, for students, internalization of the value and belief systems propagated by the Party has been somewhat minimal, if not entirely superficial. Moreover, to the extent that ideologically inspired values and beliefs have been internalized, they have most often not meshed with the informal norms which appear to govern so much of everyday behavior in Poland. This conflict can be seen in Party policy toward education itself. The formal ideological commitment to "classlessness" had not prevented children from white collar backgrounds from monopolizing more than 50 per cent of admissions to institutions of higher education prior to 1968, even though a point system (based on socioeconomic background) was designed to handicap this stratum in

³⁰⁰ A description of the Communist style of socialization and some of the problems involved, can be found in Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, (Viking Compass Edition: New York: The Viking Press, 1965), pp.76-90.

³⁰¹ On the conflict between the Party and the Church in relation to control of the school system and the subject of religious instruction, see Stehle, op.cit., pp.90-95.

relation to those from worker and peasant families.³⁰² It is interesting to note that the bulk of the leadership in the March 1968 revolt came from students who were the offspring of higher Party officials, many of whom were members of the prewar Communist elite.³⁰³ These students were heavily exposed, both in the home environment and in the school system, to the egalitarian shibboleths propagated by the Party. At the same time, these students were in the vortex of the contradiction between the official norms of classlessness and the de facto inequalities in the social system.³⁰⁴ In addition to the demands for democracy and the elimination of censorship, put forward

³⁰² Kasinka, op.cit., p.76,77. Since 1968, 25 per cent of available positions have been guaranteed to those from working class backgrounds and another 25 per cent to those from peasant families.

³⁰³ Ibid., pp.92,101.

³⁰⁴ An interesting side light to this discussion are the observations made by Keith Richard, a member of the well-known British rock and roll group, "The Rolling Stones", while performing at the Palace of Culture in Warsaw a few months before the student uprising. In recounting his experience, Richard remarked that while on stage, he noticed that "the best seats in the house . . . [were occupied by] . . . the sons and daughters of the hierarchy of the Communist Party. They're sitting there with their diamonds and their pearls . . . and their fingers in their ears. About three numbers and I say' . . . stop playing . . . you . . . get out and let those bahstads [sic] in the back down front.' So they went . About four rows just walked out . . . There were about 2,000 kids that couldn't get in because of the sons and daughters. They wouldn't have had a riot [which followed the performance] if they's let the kids in." See his interview with Robert Greenfield, "The Rolling Stone Interview: Keith Richard", Rolling Stone (No.89, August, 1971), p.31.

by the students, there were attempts (although success was marginal) to establish contact with workers (presumably on the issue of egalitarianism), and a few declarations of worker-student solidarity were forthcoming in Warsaw and Poznan.³⁰⁵

Party Resonse to Social Crises

As noted in passing in the preceding chapter, the student uprising of March 1968 was seized upon by the Party's conservative faction, the Partisans, as added ammunition in its campaign against the Jewish-liberal element in the P.U.W.P.³⁰⁶ It seems that the Partisan strategy involved discrediting and eliminating these people in hopes of filling the vacated positions in the hierarchy with their own candidates. As if to counter this

³⁰⁵ Mond, op.cit., p.6. Jerzy Ptakowski has also noted the tendency among young Party members and intellectuals to "take their Marxism seriously" and react negatively toward the regime on the basis of unfulfilled egalitarian promises. See his article, "Gomulka and His Party" in East Europe, XVI (No.5, 1967), pp.3,4; see also A. Ross Johnson, "Politics and the Intellectual", East Europe, XVI (No.7, July, 1967), pp.12-16; and, by the same author, "Intellectual Ferment in Poland - A Footnote", Radio Free Europe Research, (Poland/2, January 26, 1968).

³⁰⁶ It appears that the police, under Partisans influence, actually provoked the wave of student activism by forcibly closing the play Dziady ("Forefathers") due to its nationalistic, "anti-Russian" context. See Mond, loc. cit.

move, Gomulka in a speech on March 19, 1968 placed the blame for the student revolt on "reactionaries" in the Party; yet the purge campaign, after a brief pause, continued.³⁰⁷ Two things seem to be clear at this point: Gomulka was in a precarious position vis-a-vis the Partisan offensive; and, as a check to the threat which the hardliners presented, he chose to advance young "technocrats" within the Party to positions in the hierarchy which had been left vacant by the purge.³⁰⁸

The 1968 May Day celebrations in Warsaw were perhaps a major turning point in the intra-Party struggle. They were organized as a massive show of support for Gomulka, and, thereafter, the "anti-Zionist" press campaign substantially subsided.³⁰⁹ The partial return to normalcy which ensued can be seen in retrospect as conducive to the rise of Gomulka's eventual successor, Edward Gierek. Gierek, as Party Secretary in Katowice province, had built quite a reputation within the P.U.W.P. on the basis of his skills as a Party organizer and the relatively efficient economy, and comparatively high standard of living in Katowice. As such, he counted among his supporters a

³⁰⁷ A. Ross Johnson, "The P.U.W.P. Leadership Crisis: The Central Leadership", Radio Free Europe (Poland/12, May 7, 1968), p.3.

³⁰⁸ See Gamarnikow, "Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Pitfalls of Economic Prophecy", op.cit., p.264; see also A. Ross Johnson, "Polish Perspectives Past and Present", Problems of Communism, XX (No.4, July-August, 1972), pp.65,66.

³⁰⁹ A. Ross Johnson, "The P.U.W.P. Leadership Crises: The Top of the Iceberg", Radio Free Europe Research (Poland/15, May 27, 1968), pp.1,2.

number of technocrats "throughout the national provincial Party apparatus".³¹⁰ By late March of 1968, the Party press in Katowice was already countering the Partisan ploys by ignoring the "anti-Zionist" issue, focusing attention on economic problems and appealing for rational solutions to current problems on the basic scientific-technical principles and the value of "selfless, good work".³¹¹ The relative return to normalcy which followed the May Day celebrations tended to shift the issue-areas to the more practical considerations of stimulating economic performance and improving methods of management: terrain on which Gierek and the technocrats seemed to have had the upper hand. What is more, Gierek's support seems to have been essential to Gomulka's triumph over the Partisans at the Fifth P.U.W.P. Congress in November 1968; a Congress which also elected to the Politburo, two young technically-oriented Party members: Stanislaw Kociolek and Jozef Tejchma.³¹² On the eve of the December 1970 crisis, the factional situation within the Party remained volatile, and if anything, the Gomulka group seems to have reached the edge of the abyss. Not only had the policy of creating "access instability" widened the gulf between the rank and file and the leadership (and we will

³¹⁰ Kasinka, op.cit., p.54.

³¹¹ See Johnson, "The P.U.W.P. Leadership Crisis: The Central Leadership", op.cit., pp.9-11.

³¹² Adam Bromke, "Beyond the Gomulka Era", Foreign Affairs, XLIX (No.3, April, 1971), p.488.

see how important this factor became when deference to constituted authority in society at large began to crumble in the crisis), but it may well be that the Gomulka leadership had played its last trump at the Fifth Congress by strengthening Gierek's position in the hierarchy in return for his support against the Partisans.

Again in retrospect, we can locate the government measures which touched off the working class revolt in the scheme of politics of modernization in Poland. During the summer months of 1970, a press discussion among prominent journalists and academicians played on the theme of Poland's future as an international power.³¹³ In the wake of the Soviet-West German rapprochement, which would seem to destabilize the international configuration hitherto prevailing in Central and Eastern Europe, anxious voices were raised concerning (1) the competitive status of the Polish economy and (2) the ability of Poland to secure an independent position in a changing international arena. The discussion made clear that the above two considerations are inseparably related, a point with which Gomulka himself was, no doubt, familiar, and one which his policies came to reflect. On the diplomatic front, the Polish-West German

³¹³ The discussion was carried on primarily in Zycie Warszawy during July and August, 1970. See Michael Costello, "The Poles Look at Their Country and at Themselves", Radio Free Europe Research, (Poland/14, September 16, 1970), pp.1-13.

Treaty, which guaranteed the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse line, was concluded on December 7, 1970, after more than two years of diplomatic overtures.³¹⁴ In order to put the Polish economy on a more competitive footing, Gomulka, in March 1970, unveiled a new incentive system which was designed to reduce wastage and inferior products by substituting plan-fulfillment indices which emphasized efficiency and the quality of production.³¹⁵ Ironically, these measures proved to be his undoing.

The Treaty with West Germany went a long way toward changing the political climate in Poland. As we noted in the second chapter, the threat of "German revanchism" had long been held up by the Party elite as a justification for Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union, and the hegemony of the P.U.W.P. in Polish politics. Only the Soviet Union will safeguard Poland's western frontier and a Communist regime in Poland is the only political arrangement acceptable to the Soviets. Recognition of the Oder-Neisse line by the West Germans removed the linchpin from this argument and, along with it, one of the key props in the structure

³¹⁴ On the terms and significance of the Treaty, see Adam Bromke and Harald von Riekhoff, "The Polish-West German Treaty", East Europe, XX (No.2, February, 1971), pp.2-8.

³¹⁵ See Stanislaw Staron, "The Winds of Change in Poland", East Europe, XX (No.4, April, 1971), pp.6-8.

of the ruling party's claim to legitimacy."³¹⁶ The new incentive program likewise had adverse consequences for the regime in terms of popular support. Workers who had been accustomed to reaping bonuses from the old system now saw their economic welfare imperiled. An indication of the unpopularity of these measures is evident in the fact that when violence erupted in December 1970, it was primarily located in those industries where the new incentive system had already been put into effect as a pilot project.³¹⁷

That the deflation of the German "bogy" seems to have provided a backdrop for the working class revolt is plausible enough, given the previous use of the German "threat" in the regime's claim to legitimacy. But why did the introduction of a new incentive system (compounded by the price increases for foodstuffs) result in violence ? And, further, why did strikes, in response to economic grievances, become takeoff points for political demands ? Finally, how is it that a working class uprising, which left pretty much intact the hegemonic position of the P.U.W.P. in Poland, topple the Gomulka leadership ? The answer to each of these questions can be found in the structure of social and political relationships which characterized Gomulka's Poland.

³¹⁶ See Johnson, "Polish Perspectives, Past and Present", op.cit., pp. 71, 72.

³¹⁷ Staron, op.cit., pp. 8, 9.

With respect to the issue of violence, we have already seen how the formal instruments for demand-articulation, the workers' councils, had been emasculated, and how the workers themselves had come to regard these organs as anything but representative of workers' interests. "The same subservience to regime interests characterized the trade unions, which by and large neglected even the most rudimentary practical concerns of labor; serving as a classic 'transmission belt'.³¹⁸

In the absence of an institutionalized framework for registering demands, "latent" articulation and violence seem to be the alternatives.³¹⁹ In the Polish case, the two appear to be fused. As Bauman puts it:

The Poznan uprising [in 1956] was a spontaneous event; nevertheless it set in train an irreversible process whereby manifestations of worker discontent took on an institutionally patterned meaning in the context of evolving Polish political culture. In short, they became a recognized signal in the code of political communication, signifying the presence in the body politic of serious tensions requiring drastic political change.³²⁰

Bauman adds in this passage that not only did such mani-

³¹⁸ Johnson, "Polish Perspectives, Past and Present", op.cit., p.61.

³¹⁹ See above, pp.27,28; see also Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.81,82.

³²⁰ Bauman, "Twenty Years After", op.cit., p.46.

festations of discontent constitute a "signal", but also a sort of tool which could be used by ambitious Party members for their own purposes; i.e., by manipulating the situation, lower and middle-level apparatchiks could discredit, and possibly supplant their superiors. This, indeed, seems to have been what happened in December 1970. For instance, the local Party Secretary in Gdansk reported afterwards that the district Party Committee there had anticipated a strike before the decision of price increases for food stuffs was made.³²¹ In Warsaw, a good part of the party activ refused to participate in the "explanation campaign" which the Gomulka leadership initiated at the time of the price increases, and information regarding the explosive situation which was developing was for the most part not relayed to superiors in the Party hierarchy.³²²

When violence did erupt among the workers, the response of the Party was marked just as much by political intrigue in order to exploit the situation, as by efforts to mollify conditions and restore order. At the Sixth Plenum of the P.U.W.P. Central Committee, which was summoned on December 14, 1970 in order to inform the Party elite of the price changes, no official announcement was made concerning the disorders which were by now underway in Gdansk. However, informal groupings of Party leaders

³²¹"Rewolucja Palacowa" ("A Palace Revolution"), Na antenie, IX (No.102, September, 1972), p.4.

³²²Ibid., see also Byrski, op.cit., p.55.

were already gathering in the lobbies outside of the conference room and were discussing the matter there.³²³ It seems that at this Plenum, Gierek's group and the Partisan faction, led by Mieczyslaw Moczar, combined forces in order to oust Gomulka.³²⁴ Politburo members, Zenon Kliszko, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski and Stanislaw Kociolek were dispatched to the troubled spots, and it is at this point that the rifts and intrigues within the Party became most evident. Kliszko, Gomulka's lieutenant, appears to have attempted to assume command of the situation, but cooperation from local Party personnel was not forthcoming. Rather, alternative foci of command were springing up at the local level, apparently working at cross-purposes.³²⁵

With the fragmentation of Party command in the crisis, the Gomulka leadership proved unequal to the task of restoring order. At the Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee (December 20, 1970), Gomulka, along with a number of his close associates, was removed and Gierek was installed as the new Party leader. Gierek, however, has inherited a conflict-prone society and his success as Party leader, as well as the future stability of the hegemonic Party itself, will depend upon his ability as an innovator, or to put it another way,

³²³ See Zamorski, op.cit., pp.1,2.

³²⁴ "Rewolucja Palacowa", loc. cit.

³²⁵ Ibid., p.5; Zamorski, op.cit., pp.3,4.

³²⁶ For a list of the personnel changes made at the Seventh Plenum and the others which followed shortly, see Zamorski, op.cit., pp.26,56-59; see also his "Personnel Changes at State Council, Supreme Chamber of Control: Further Decline of Mieczyslaw Moczar", Radio Free Europe Research (Poland/19, June 28, 1971).

to what extent he is able to eliminate the very conditions which produced the crisis that resulted in his accession. The key factor here seems to be the politicization of Poland's social and economic systems. In this respect, we might call attention to the political nature of the December 1970 strikes. As Byrзки points out:

For a strike to have some chance of success, it cannot limit itself to factory or dock establishments because the strikers would soon be isolated since there are no genuine trade unions, the normally active instruments of economic struggle . . . To win a strike, workers must go into the streets or, if they are strong enough, force the authorities to come to the factory. Either is a political act.³²⁷

Moreover, the demands which the workers voiced during and after, the December events, went beyond the bounds of economic grievances and included proposals for a restructuring of the trade union apparatus along democratic lines.³²⁸ It

³²⁷ Op.cit., pp.56,57.

³²⁸ On this subject, and the spontaneous "workers' committees" which arose during the strikes, see Johnson, "Polish Perspectives, Past and Present", op.cit., pp69-71; on the demands for a broadening of democracy in both the Party and society in general and for increasing the autonomy of special purpose organizations, see Eva Celt, "The Demands and Grievances of the Polish Population", Radio Free Europe Research (Poland/10, April 24, 1971). Gierek has apparently gone part way in accommodating the democratic aspirations of Polish society by lifting a good deal of the censorship in the mass media and by ordering new elections to workers' councils and trade union committees. On this last point, see Staron, op.cit., p.9., A counter argument is made by Kohlschuetter, loc.cit., who feels that the emphasis of the new leadership has been upon the consolidation of political power rather than the introduction of social and

seems that the modernization of Polish society has tended to engender a population accustomed to an urban, industrial life style, and oriented toward participation in society's political institutions.³²⁹ We should not expect however, that expanded participation will be the panacea. Participation is, rather, a means for articulating interests and, hopefully, accommodating them through the political structure. As long as, and to the degree that, the socio-economic system remains "politicized" these interests take on a system-wide coloration, such that articulation is tantamount to a general indictment of the system per se, and accommodation is impossible without a fundamental restructuring of political relationships.³³⁰ If long term

economic reforms. On the economic front, Kohlschuetter's opinion seems to be largely borne out by the approach of the post-Gomulka leadership to the issue of economic development and reform. Piotr Jaroszewicz, the new Prime Minister, outlined the Party policy for the future in his report to the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the P.U.W.P. in June 1971. While emphasizing the need for efficiency, importance of technological innovation and the desirability of expanded foreign trade, Jaroszewicz, in addressing himself to the organization of the economy, did not go beyond promising a larger role for the People's Councils. See his report "Wzdlowe Problemy Spoeczno-gospodarczego rozwoju kraju w latach 1971-1975" ("Knotty Problems of the Country's Socio-economic Development in the Years, 1971-1975") in Nowe Drogi (No.7, July, 1971), pp.7-22.

³²⁹ This point is made specifically by Bauman, "Twenty Years After", op.cit., p.51.

³³⁰ The reader is referred to Marcuse's observation, quoted in the first chapter. See above, p.28.

political stability is to be maintained in the context of Poland's modernization, political participation will be increasingly important as a means of communication between society and polity; but such participation will, of necessity, involve certain preconditions. Foremost among these is the "de-politicization" of the social system, such that social and economic grievances can be handled by special purpose, non-political organizations. Failing this, representation of social interests may be possible within the political sphere of the party system on the basis of stable access channels which are open to "representatives" of the various social strata. Each of these alternatives would not only constitute a departure from previous arrangements, but would also raise the question of the possibility for the continued hegemony of the P.U.W.P. in Polish society.

CHAPTER V

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The Significance of the Elections in Poland

In Poland, as elsewhere among Communist states, elections are neither a contest for political power, nor viewed as such by the Participants. The Front of National Unity submits a single list of candidates who are drawn from the parties and groups which compose the Front. Although separate party labels adhere, it is the Front rather than the parties which "contests" elections. Moreover, as Zygmunt Gostkowski has noted in his study of local elections in Poland, the noncompetitive nature of elections is reflected in the attitudes of the electorate; voters do not tend to perceive their roles as that of selecting a government. From his sample of voters in the industrial city of Lodz, Gostkowski reports that "only a small number of respondents thought of themselves as voters in terms of the theory of political representation."³³¹ The P.U.W.P., in keeping with the principles of the hegemonic party system,

³³¹Zygmunt Gostkowski, "Popular Interest in the Municipal Elections of Lodz, Poland", The Public Opinion Quarterly, XXIII (No.1, Fall, 1959), p.381.

runs its candidates in cooperation with, rather than in competition against, the other parties in the Front. We must, therefore, seek the possible meaning of these elections in terms other than those of a contest for political power.

We might approach this question of meaning or significance by examining the functions which an election seems to perform in Poland. To begin with, there is the aspect of political participation. During the course of an electoral campaign, commencing with the nomination of candidates and terminating with the actual balloting itself, the voter is not only confronted with a mass of visual and auditory stimuli about the government, the candidates and the "patriotic act of voting", but he is also called on to participate in nomination meetings, to meet in face-to-face contact with the candidates or campaign "agitators", and to cast his all-important ballot for the joint-list of the Front of National Unity. Although the scope of an electoral campaign in Poland falls short of its counterpart in the Soviet Union,³³² it remains, nonetheless, a powerful motor of political mobilization making the access to voting so complete that absence at the polls on voting day is for the most part the result of either "design or sheer physical incapacitation."³³³

³³² A short description of a Polish electoral campaign can be found in Stehle, op.cit., pp.184-186.

³³³ Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent", American Political Science Review, LXII (No.3, September, 1968), p.819. The term political mobilization is used here in accordance with the concept of "subject-participant" political culture as outlined in the first chapter. As such, it does not refer to the idea of

Related to the idea of political participation is the legitimizing character of an election. In his study on Soviet elections, Max E. Mote observes that "the regime at election time is asking for a vote of confidence in the government and its achievements."³³⁴ Much the same is true for Poland. Casting one's ballot for the joint-list is an obvious display of endorsement; but so too is the simple act of voting, regardless of how one votes. Implicit in the act of casting a ballot is the recognition of duly constituted authority institutionalized in the voting process.

Finally, elections in Poland serve a communication function. Although assured of its ruling position despite a possibly unfavorable showing on election day, the P.U.W.P. has in an election a sort of index of popular support for its policies and accomplishments. Wiatr, for instance, feels

political mobilization commonly found in the literature on political development in non-Communist polities, which carries the notion of social groups being mobilized into the political system on an ongoing basis. Rather, the term is used here to denote a process by which social groups (or the population in general) are mobilized by the political system, in order to perform a certain political act, such as voting. As Gilison puts it in the article cited above, (p.817), at election time "the system demonstrates its great ability to mobilize large numbers of people to accomplish a short-term and clearly defined task." For the alternate usage of this term see Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, op.cit., pp.226,269-270; see also Richard A. Pride, "Origins of Democracy: A Cross National Study of Mobilization, Party Systems and Democratic Stability" in Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, ed. by Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, I (Series No.:C1-012, 1970), pp.673-747; esp.pp.673-674,686.

³³⁴ Max E. Mote, Soviet Local and Republic Elections (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1965), p.45.

that since 1956 (at which time the electoral law was changed), elections in Poland can best be described as "consent elections". A consent election permits the voter a certain degree of freedom to express either approval or disapproval of the government and its policies, assumes that such approval or disapproval will have a bearing on future policies, and allows the voter a modicum of choice as to which candidates on the joint-list will sit in the Sejm (parliament) as his elected representative.³³⁵ How much "consent" is involved in a given election, and how well an election actually "communicates" are questions central to this study, but ones which should be postponed for the moment as an adequate answer can only be supplied by first exploring both the formal and informal structures and mechanisms at play in a Polish election, as well as having a brief look at the Sejm. It is in the Sejm that successful candidates sit as legislators, and the activity of the legislative body adds perhaps another dimension of significance to the Polish electoral process.

The Polish Sejm

Among legislatures in Soviet-type systems, the Polish Sejm is rather unique. The general spirit of independence

³³⁵ Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland", Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics, ed. by Austin Ranney (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), p.239.

which swept Poland in 1956 had a profound impact on the conduct of this institution, transforming it from a docile chamber of prearranged unanimity into an active legislating body where debate and criticism are common, abstentions and negative votes are registered, and government bills are sometimes (though rarely) defeated.³³⁶ The widening of the Sejm's scope of political activity seems to have been spearheaded by none other than members of the P.U.W.P. parliamentary leadership. The P.U.W.P. deputy caucus leader, Professor J. Hochfeld, began the process by publicly attacking the Prime Minister, Josef Cyrankiewicz, during the September 1956 session of the Sejm for refusing to answer questions on the Poznan riots.³³⁷ In the spring of the following year Hochfeld put forward a proposal which would in essence free the parliamentary caucus from the authority of the extra-parliamentary party leadership.³³⁸ The fact that the proposal was defeated attests to the continued dominance of the P.U.W.P. leadership over its parliamentary wing; yet the mere fact that such a proposal was put forward is an illustration of some of the tendencies toward an active role for the Sejm which have continued into the present.

The Sejm is referred to in Poland as a "working institution". It is the task of the deputies, who in most cases

³³⁶ See Dziewanowski, op.cit., pp.270-271; and Zbigniew Pelszynski, "Poland 1957", Elections Abroad, ed. D. E. Butler, (London:Macmillan and Co.,Ltd, 1959), pp.125,126.

³³⁷ Pelczynski, loc.cit.

³³⁸ Bromke, Poland's Politics:" op.cit., p.167.

retain their normal occupations in addition to their legislative duties, not only to pass bills but to see to their execution.³³⁹ An indication of the Sejm's enlarged legislative role is provided by the figures in Table 15.

TABLE 15.-- Sessions, Laws and Decrees in the Sejm, 1952-1961

	1952-56	1957-61
Plenary sessions	10	59
Laws	8	174
Council of State Decrees	160	24

Source: Stehle, op.cit., p.178.

The trend away from decrees and toward increasing legislative activity is largely the result of the work of committees in the Sejm, which after 1956, were increased in number (from eleven to nineteen) and granted a more prominent role in the legislative process. Committee work comes close to a full time operation; meetings are convened both during session of the Sejm and in the interim between sessions. This feature, along with the existence of a small core of "professional" deputies (usually one or two for each committee), tends to explain why the Sejm differs so markedly from legislatures in other Soviet-type system. Through committee meetings on a continual basis, the Sejm is enabled to do more than simply ratify decrees and bills coming from the Council of State. Committees amend and reject

³³⁹ Rozmarynm, op.cit., p.21.

bills, have a hand in controlling bureaucratic inefficiency, and in a limited sense, act as a sort of surrogate for an institutionalized opposition.³⁴⁰ It is also of importance to note that as well as debating particular pieces of legislation, committees in the Sejm convene "thematic" meetings which take general topics and may call in specialists or experts as a source of information.³⁴¹ Discussion appears to be frank, if not heated, and at times tends to dissolve party bonds. P.U.W.P. deputies have been known on occasion to ignore the party whip when certain matters of fundamental importance to their constituency are under review.³⁴² Although autonomous action on the part of the parliamentary party, or some of its members, is the exception rather than the rule, and directives transmitted by the extra-parliamentary apparatus to the deputies in the Sejm are the major determinants of legislative behavior,³⁴³ the activity of the Sejm nonetheless adds another measure of significance to Polish elections. The actual election of candidates is thus by no means a matter of political indifference.

The Electoral Process

Elections to the Sejm, held every four years, are announced by the Council of State (the Sejm's collective

³⁴⁰ On the role of committees, see Vincent C. Chrypinski, "Poland's Parliamentary Committees", East Europe, XIV (No.1, January, 1965), pp.17-24.

³⁴¹ Rozmaryn, op.cit., p.51.

³⁴² Stehle, op.cit., pp.178,179.

³⁴² Chrypinski, op.cit., p.18.

executive body) which appoints a Central Control Commission entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing the election and coordinating the work of the various district commissions. In each electoral district, these commissions in conjunction with the organs of local government, prepare the lists of eligible voters, formalize the nomination of candidates, supervise the polling and tabulate and announce the results of the balloting.³⁴⁴ Since the electorate is presented with a single list of candidates, the selection of the candidates themselves is of paramount importance.

Nominations

Nominations are usually the result of a three-step procedure. Each party or political group meets in closed session to select hopefuls for candidacy on the National Unity Front's joint-list. The next step involves meetings of "mediation commissions" at the district level which coordinate the names and rankings of those selected as candidates. Finally, the lists are submitted to the National Unity Front's provincial committees for approval and final ratification.³⁴⁵ The nominating procedure for the 1957 elections, however, was a departure from this pattern. Candidates were put forward by social organizations and, in many cases, by spontaneous conferences at work

³⁴⁴ Rozmaryn, op.cit., pp.128-129.

³⁴⁵ See Starr, Poland, 1944-1962, op.cit., p.62.

places. Since the district electoral commissions accept only those nominees put forward by the National Unity Front's committees at the corresponding level, those committees were subject to a considerable degree of pressure "from below".³⁴⁶ Popular sentiments then became a pronounced feature of candidate selection which, although subsequently curtailed by restrictions on the right to nominate, have remained as part of the nomination process.

As Gilison observes in regard to Soviet elections, in order to insure favorable returns on election day, nominations must to some degree anticipate the attitudes of the electorate and candidates must "conform to public approbation."³⁴⁷ In Poland, as in the Soviet Union, this tends to be the case, Rozmaryn neatly summarizes how this "conformity to public approbation" transpires in Poland:

. . . [An] extensive social campaign, during which the candidates are proposed and discussed directly by the people, should precede the stage where lists of candidates are nominated by the organizations entitled to do so. This method of proposing candidates at the various meetings of the population resembles the "primaries" known in a number of countries The final decision as to proposing candidates belongs, nevertheless, to the organization entitled to present slates.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ Pelczynski, op.cit., pp.142-146.

³⁴⁷ Gilison, op.cit., p.817.

³⁴⁸ Rozmaryn, op.cit., p.132.

The nomination stage is therefore the first point at which Wiatr's "consent" and "communication", mentioned above, comes into play. The utility of the nomination process in this respect has perhaps declined since the 1957 election, as the relatively open selection of nominees in the first step of the process has given way to the closed party meeting.

Popular Consent: Measured or Manufactured ?

A second aspect of "consent" and "communication" involves what might be called the degree of accuracy permitted by the electoral system for the translation of popular attitudes into votes. From a structural point of view, the high-water mark seems to have been reached, as was the case with nominations, in the 1957 election. For the first time in Poland, the voter was given a degree of choice among candidates, as the electoral law (passed in the Sejm on October 24, 1956) specified that "the number of candidates on the list should exceed the number of deputies eligible in a given constituency by no more than two-thirds."³⁴⁹ This meant that in addition to the usual "seat-candidates"

³⁴⁹ Quoted in Kazimierz Zamorski, "Features of the Polish Electoral System", Radio Free Europe research report (Poland/10, May 19, 1969), p.2. It is perhaps of interest to note that "two-thirds" was a compromise figure arrived at by bargaining between the P.U.W.P. (which proposed a 50 per cent ratio) and the minor parties (who advocated a ratio of 100 per cent); see Pelczynski, op.cit., p.131.

appearing on the ballot (i.e., a number of candidates in correspondence to the number of seats allotted to the constituency), the ballot would also contain a two-thirds margin or "surplus-candidates."

The significance of this group, the surplus-candidates, is a function of the importance of candidate ranking on the ballot. Heading the joint-list are what might be called "party-preferred" candidates; they are the seat-candidates whose number is in correspondence to the number of seats for a given constituency. In order to vote for a surplus-candidate, the voter is required to "scratch" the name of one or more of the seat-candidates. If he does not do so and simply returns the ballot unmarked, it is assumed that he has voted for the seat-candidates, and by implication, against the names at the bottom. The normal pattern of ranking on the ballot places national or regional leaders of the Front on the top third of the list, followed by notables from various organizations in the Front or prominent non-party men who occupy the second third and at the bottom, lesser known individuals who might be popular locally and are "chosen to 'balance the ticket' in terms of party or interest representation".³⁵⁰

Along with the relatively open nominations process and the addition of a two-thirds margin of surplus-candidates, the consent-communication function of the 1957 election was also structurally improved by increasing the number of electoral districts from 67 to 116, and decreasing thereby the number of candidates per constituency. In this way, the

³⁵⁰ Pelczynski, op.cit., pp.147 -148.

voter's knowledge of the candidates in his area would be improved, as his attention is focused on a smaller number of names and he would be more readily acquainted with a limited number of candidates.

These advantages (nominations, choice on the ballot and constituency size) were, however, offset to some extent by certain situational variables or informal influences present at the time of the election. It will be recalled that in January of 1957, Poland, with the reinstatement of Gomulka as Party leader, seemed to be consolidating the gains of the "Polish October". The situation was still far from stable and the Hungarian catastrophe was fresh in the minds of the populace. Using the spectre of Soviet intervention, a massive campaign was launched to persuade voters to: (1) go to the polls, and (2) refrain from scratching the names of party-preferred candidates. In the newspapers, over the radio, at rallies and speeches, and even from the pulpit, the appeal went out from the P.U.W.P. and U.P.P. leadership; from the Front of National Unity and the Central Council of Trade Unions;³⁵¹ from the Central Coordinating Committee³⁵² and the Catholic Church.³⁵³ Over Radio Warsaw on the very eve of the election, Gomulka made his famous eleventh hour appeal against scratching, warning that "deletions of our Party's candidates . . . is synonymous with

³⁵¹ Ibid., pp.159-160.

³⁵² Rozmaryn, op.cit., p.143.

³⁵³ Korbonski, op.cit., p.281.

obliterating Poland from the map of Europe."³⁵⁴ Some indication of the effect of this campaign can be inferred from a poll conducted by the newspaper Sztandar Mlodych in Warsaw on January 16, 1957.

285 people [were] interviewed in the street and asked (a) how many of them were going to vote and (b) whether they intended to cross out or not. 95% declared that they would vote; 54% were going to vote for the whole list; 30% intended to cross out and 16% were undecided. The results of the poll are not implausible, all the more so as almost the same percentages (95.38%) actually voted in Warsaw as the Sztandar Mlodych's poll indicated. As 96% of Warsaw voters followed Gomulka's advice, this would indicate that 42% of them ³⁵⁵made up or changed their minds in the last few days.

Although pressure coming from official channels in subsequent elections in no way compares with the scope and intensity of the 1957 campaign, changes were made in the structural sphere which would seem to impair the consent-communication function of Polish elections. First, the electoral law was revised on three counts. The margin of surplus-candidates was reduced from two-thirds to one-half; the provision on secret voting was excluded (although secret voting was provided for at the polls and the stipulation on the number of candidates was changed from

³⁵⁴Quoted in Staar, Poland, 1944-1962, op.cit., p.60.

³⁵⁵Pelczynski, op.cit., N.1, p.166.

"should exceed" to "may exceed".³⁵⁶ This last emendation (changing "should" to "may") in practice brought the ratio of surplus-candidates to 34 per cent, rather than the legally prescribed maximum of 50 per cent.

Second, constituencies were reorganized and their number reduced from 116 to 80. Zamorski points out that the reorganization was designed as a sort of gerrymandering which would obtrude the expression of non-consent in those areas which in 1957 had evinced a relatively high negative vote for the Front. To illustrate his point, he uses the example of Krackow Voievodship (which in 1957 delivered one of the lowest percentages of votes for the joint-list) and Katowice Voievodship (noted for its support of the Front candidates in 1957). The number of constituencies in the former was reduced from eleven to six, while the number in the latter fell less dramatically, from twelve to nine. Table 16 perhaps demonstrates the effects of redistricting upon the percentage of votes for the seat-candidates. The reorganization of constituencies, then, was of no small importance in insuring a favorable voting result for the Front, and in particular for the P.U.W.P. The fact that in 1957, a P.U.W.P. seat-candidate was actually defeated in Nowy Sacz (one of a minority of constituencies electing at that time no more than three candidates) suggests that seat-candidates run a greater risk of defeat where their number is relatively small, for cross-outs are in such cases concentrated on two or more candidates instead of dispersed over six or seven.

³⁵⁶Stehle, op.cit., p.183.

TABLE 16.-- Reduction of Marginal Candidates in two Voievodships: 1957,1961 and 1965

<u>Krackow Voievodship</u>			
<u>Electoral Districts</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1965</u>
Bochnia	83.73		
Chrzanow	80.58	94.96	95.60
Krackow City	94.31	94.34	95.13
Krackow District	90.83	94.59	95.13
Myslenice	85.16		
Nowy Sacz	73.46	91.30	91.95
Nowy Targ	75.14		
Olkusz	83.86		
Oswiecim	87.54	92.59	93.37
Tarnow	84.29	91.91	91.61
Zynio	74.25		
Voievodship average	83.01	93.28	93.80

<u>Katowice Voievodship</u>			
<u>Electoral Districts</u>	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1965</u>
Bielsko Biala	88.30	96.61	97.13
Bytom	97.37	98.72	99.06
Chorzow	96.24	98.63	99.08
Czestochowa	95.36	96.89	97.26
Dabrowa Gornicza		98.63	
Gliwice	88.87	97.58	97.83
Katowice	95.94	98.67	98.66
Rybnik	84.17	97.07	97.90
Sosnowiec	98.16	99.47	99.40
Tarnowskie Gory	95.32		
Tychy	93.10		
Zabrze	93.93		
Zawiercie	98.16		
Voievodship average	93.74	98.02	98.33

Source: Zamorski, "Features of the Polish Electoral System", op.cit., p.4.

A final measure introduced by the Front, which had the effect more of insuring a P.U.W.P. majority in the Sejm than minimizing the expression of dissent per se, was a strategic increase in the number of P.U.W.P. seat-candidates for the 1961 election. Whereas in 1957, P.U.W.P. seat-candidates numbered 239, in subsequent elections this figure was changed to 255. The size of this increase does not appear to be accidental as approximately this same number of P.U.W.P. seat-candidates (16) were close to being defeated in 1957.³⁵⁷

The propensity of seat-candidates to be elected (as mentioned above, only one, in Nowy Sacz in 1957, has been defeated) raises an interesting question: Why is the electorate so inclined to register support for the officially endorsed candidates ? From private conversation with Polish voters, John N. Hazard notes three reasons.³⁵⁸ First, there appears to be an inertia on the part of many voters to continue the practice which was customary in Stalinist times (when all candidates were seat-candidates) of simply dropping the ballot into the box without marking it. Second, the preferred-candidates receive the bulk of publicity in the press and the voter receives little, if any, information regarding those candidates whose names are at the bottom of the list. Finally, there seems to be an element of fear with respect to official discrimination against the voter

³⁵⁷ Zamorski, "Features of the Polish Electoral System", op.cit., p.4.

³⁵⁸ John N. Hazard, Communists and Their Law, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p.23.

and his family, due to an act of nonconformity. Although the voter may mark his ballot in secret by taking it behind the curtain of the voting booth, there seems to be a certain stigma attached to this. A display of loyalty would call for the voter to simply, and openly, return his ballot unmarked, in which case it is assumed that he has designated his preference for the seat-candidates.³⁵⁹

If there is any validity in making inference from elections at the local level about the attitudes toward, and the interest taken in, the elections to the Sejm, the second factor mentioned by Hazard, information, seems to assume rather large proportions. Gostkowski found that although voters in local elections are aware of the functions and spheres of activity of the local governmental organs (the People's Councils), and the vast majority have "vital needs and grievances in the area of council activity", they nevertheless tend to be both remarkably ignorant, or disinterested, or both vis-a-vis the elections to these bodies. From his sample of voters in Lodz, Gostkowski reports that:³⁶⁰

- (1) Several days after the press published the list of candidates complete with their biographical sketches
(a) only 52 per cent knew that the list had been published, (b) only 34 per cent of these knew who had established the list, (c) 56 per cent knew that there

³⁵⁹ This element of fear is corroborated by a conversation between the present writer and a Polish intellectual who remarked: "Yes, I took my ballot behind the curtain, but I still could not help feeling afraid."

³⁶⁰ Gostkowski, op.cit., pp.373-375.

were more candidates than available seats, (d) only 44 per cent knew that if the ballot was returned unmarked, then the voter has endorsed the first names on the list.

(2) A total of 85 per cent of the respondents declared themselves incapable of saying anything about the candidates.

On the basis of his overall results, Gostkowski concludes that "People who have a radically negative attitude toward the national council [People's Council] do not therefore become active political opponents. Their negativism is expressed in most cases less by hostile interest in public life than by a lack of any interest, by political apathy."³⁶¹

When apathy gives way to interest in the campaign and the electoral process, it is often the case that voters feel the elections to be somewhat meaningless. An example might be the sentiments reflected in the letters from listeners broadcast by Radio Warsaw during the 1965 campaign:

"I must say that when elections approach, I always wonder whether they don't too much resemble a plebiscite. There is only a single list, and consequently no possibility of choosing."

"Who has more authority, the party or parliament?"

"Can the parliament pass a law in opposition to the party line?"

³⁶¹ Ibid., p. 379.

"Why is there only one election list?"

"Wouldn't it be cheaper just to let the same deputies stay in the Sejm, because the elections won't change anything anyway?"³⁶²

To sum it up: the electoral system is a rather crude instrument for conveying consent and communications to the ruling party. Moreover, its utility seems to have diminished over the years due not only to the P.U.W.P.'s proclivity for juggling the rules, but perhaps also because of a lack of confidence in the structure of elections reflected in the attitudes of the electorate. If this is indeed the case, then the sheer futility of negative voting would constitute another deterrent to the expression of dissent.³⁶³

Voting Patterns: The Mobilization of Whom?

The Hypotheses

Our discussion of Communism as a modernizing system has called attention to the difficulties arising out of the attempt to promote and sustain economic development under

³⁶² Quoted in Jerzy Ptakowski, "Parliamentary Elections in Poland", East Europe, XIV (No.6, August, 1965), p.16.

³⁶³ Gilson makes this same argument with reference to the expression of dissent in Soviet elections, op.cit., p.816.

the direction of a command political center. It appears that success in the economic sphere is not only retarded at a certain stage, but also that certain strains occur within society, owing to a relative neglect of social and political development. What is more, these strains constitute intra-systemic pressures for a restoration of balance among the economic, social and political sectors.³⁶⁴ In modernizing Poland, we might expect such developmental pressures to spring primarily from the occupants of "modern" roles and to be concentrated in the more "developed" regions of the country.

Wiatr, however, takes a contrary position. Rather than a relation between economic development and social pressure, he affirms an affinity between development and political mobilization. Taking membership in the P.U.W.P. as an indicator of the latter, Wiatr concludes that: "(1) The level of economic development positively correlates with the ratio of P.U.W.P. membership among the adult population, (2) the ratio of economic development positively correlates with the ratio of P.U.W.P. members among the

³⁶⁴ This idea of a restoration of balance can be subsumed in the conceptual model of "homeostatic equilibrium" as presented by Morton A. Kaplan. In the case of Communist systems, in which society is politicized (or, what is the same thing, where there is a low level of subsystem autonomy), the type of homeostatic equilibrium would more closely resemble what Kaplan calls "ultrastable" as opposed to "multistable", equilibrium. See his essay, "Systems Theory" in Contemporary Political Analysis, ed. James C. Charlesworth (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp.153-155.

labor force employed in the nationalized economy."³⁶⁵ Since P.U.W.P. membership, however, involves only a relatively small proportion of the adult population it might be interesting to test Wiatr's conclusion against our proposition by using another measure for political mobilization, election returns. As noted above, voting in the officially prescribed manner (i.e., for the seat-candidates on the joint-list) and the simple act of voting itself, are indicators of political mobilization. Thus we might hypothesize that:

- (1) Over time, the more developed areas of Poland will reveal a tendency toward non-participation in elections.

- (2) In developed areas, there will be a tendency away from endorsement of the party-preferred candidates, or conversely, toward the expression of electoral dissent.

The testing of the second hypothesis presents some problems. There are at least three methods for casting a dissenting ballot in Poland:

- (1) Crossing out the names of the party-preferred candidates.

- (2) Crossing out all of the names on the ballot.

- (3) Casting an invalid ballot, i.e., substitution by the voter of a piece of paper, whatever its contents for the official form.

³⁶⁵Wiatr, "Political Parties, Interest Representation and Economic Development," op.cit., p.1244.

While data on these last two forms of dissent are published in Poland, the same is not true for the first method. Although a "selective" vote against the seat-candidate is tantamount to a vote against those endorsed by the Front, it is nonetheless officially interpreted as a vote for the joint-list. This means that in a constituency where, for example, there are six seat-candidates and three surplus-candidates, the voter who scratches off the first eight names on the ballot and leaves the ninth has willy-nilly cast a vote for the joint-list. This lack of data on negative selective votes will most probably influence the findings on the second hypothesis.

Testing the Hypotheses

By selecting a number of indicators of socioeconomic development and political mobilization (electoral variables) we can test the hypotheses via the statistical techniques of step-wise multiple regression and Pearson product-moment correlation. The elections under consideration are those of 1957, 1961 and 1965.³⁶⁶ The variables are listed in Table 17.

A word on the choice of these variables. The dependent variables, voter turnout and what is referred to here as the "degree of electoral consent", give an indication of

³⁶⁶ The variables used here are taken from a data set compiled by the Polish sociologist, Krzysztof Ostrowski, for the Data Confrontation Seminar on the Use of Ecological Data in Comparative, Cross-National Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 31-April 18, 1969. The data set is entitled "Poland, 1950-1965".

TABLE 17.-- Ecological and Electoral Variables for Three Elections: 1957,1961 and 1965.

<u>Dependent Variables</u> <u>1957 Election</u>	<u>Independent Variables</u> <u>Computed 1960</u>
(A) Voter turnout (number of votes/number of eligible voters)	1. Population living in urban areas 2. Number of persons who have completed one to four years of general secondary education.
(B) Degree of electoral consent (Number of votes for joint-list/eligible voters)	3. Number of persons who have completed three years of vocational secondary education. 4. Number of persons who have completed five years of university education.
<u>1961 Election</u>	5. Number of persons who have completed one-to four years of university education
(C) Voter turnout (number of voters/number of eligible voters)	6. Number of cinema seats
(D) Degree of electoral consent (number of votes for joint-list/eligible voters)	7. Number of radios
	8. Number of televisions
	9. Number of libraries
	10. Population economically active in schools and culture
	11. Population economically active active in health services
	12. Turnover in shops
	13. Number of tractors
	14. Number of members in agricultural circles
<u>1965 Election</u>	<u>Computed in 1965</u>
(E) Voter turnout (number of votes/number of eligible voters)	15. Population living in urban areas
	16. Number of cinema seats
	17. Number of radios
	18. Number of television
	19. Number of books in public libraries
	20. Turnover in shops
	21. Value of industrial production

TABLE 17. Continued

<u>Dependent Variables</u> <u>1965 Election</u>	<u>Independent Variables</u> <u>Computed 1965</u>
(F) Degree of electoral consent (number of votes for joint-list/eligible voters)	22. Number of tractors 23. Number of members of agricultural circles 24. Income of agricultural circles 25. Total investments in communal services and housing, 1961-1965

the extent of political mobilization at election time. The latter is the total percentage of votes for the joint-list excluding negative votes, invalid ballots and non-voting, but including selective cross outs. As such it is an imperfect measure of electoral consent. It will be noticed that the ecological variables computed in 1960 serve as the independent variables for both the 1957 and 1961 elections. Since the value of each of these reflects a situation post-dating by three years the 1957 election, relations between dependent and independent variables for this election will be somewhat obscured.

The independent variables were selected as complementary indicators of modernization. We expect that as socio-economic development proceeds, such things as urbanization, education, economic productivity, development or mass media communications and growth in society's professional strata will accompany the modernization process. These factors form a syndrome, and as independent variables taken singly

their relationship with the dependent variables will be indeterminant. Since our concern is more with the process of modernization itself, rather than any particular indicator subsumed by the concept, this should not constitute a serious impediment to testing the hypotheses.³⁶⁷

As is obvious from Table 17, the independent variables computed in 1960 do not always correspond to those for 1965. Some, such as "value of industrial production", appear only for 1965 while others, such as those relating to education are only present in 1960. This is so because of the limitations of the data set.

³⁶⁷ The indeterminant character of the relationships between the dependent and independent variables involves the problem of "multicollinearity", a concise description of which can be found in Edward R. Tufte's article "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science" in The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970), pp.446,447. The fact that the independent variables are not standardized here on a per capita basis avoids the pitfalls of ratio correlations which Tufte outlines in this same article (p.443). Nevertheless, a certain amount of precision is lost due to the usage of numbers rather than, say, percentages; since the size of the population in the various constituencies varies in each election. Random effects are not of much help in this regard as the N for each election is relatively small (N=105 for the 1957 election and 72 for the 1961 and 1965 elections). We should therefore, be cautious in interpreting the results of the statistical tests.

Finally, a few indicators specifically related to the agricultural sector were included: "number of tractors", "number of members of agricultural circles" and "income of agricultural circles".³⁶⁸ Relationships, if any, between these and the electoral variables should reflect to some degree the influences of development in the countryside upon political mobilization as measured by the dependent variables.

For the 1957 election,³⁶⁹ the results of which are tentative at best due to the time lag between dependent and independent variables referred to above, two variables were weakly correlated with the voter turnout: number of tractors (0.28) and number of cinema seats (0.28). Each was significant at the .001 level, and together they accounted for 15 per cent of the variance. On the second dependent variable, degree of electoral consent, number of cinema seats (0.15), number of persons with three years vocational education (-0.11) and number of persons living in urban areas (-0.13) were all weakly correlated. The partial F-test for the first

³⁶⁸ Agricultural circles in Poland are state-sponsored cooperatives composed of independent farmers. Their ostensible purpose is to demonstrate the superiority of a cooperative mode of production and to induce modernization in the countryside through the introduction of machinery, which is owned by the circles. See Korbonski, op.cit., pp.288-298.

³⁶⁹ The data set included results from 105 of the 116 electoral districts. Nowy Sacz which registered a turnout of 73 per cent according to Stehle, op.cit., p.188, was apparently excluded from the data set, as the lowest score on this variable was 80.6 per cent. If this one case represents a pattern (i.e., the systematic exclusion of districts where political mobilization was relatively low) then

of these revealed that it was not significant at the .05 level, while the latter two were significant at the .001 and .01 level respectively. The three variables taken together explained 10 per cent of the variance.

Very little is discernible from these results. A relatively small proportion of the total variance is explained in each case and the correlations, although highly significant in each instance, are nevertheless weak ones. Perhaps the relationship between number of tractors and voter turnout is of some importance. It would suggest that the more developed agricultural areas, in which farmers either owned or had access to mechanized equipment, tended to support the regime by turning out to vote. Since the election followed in the aftermath of the P.U.W.P.'s Eighth Plenum (October, 1956) which gave the green light to the dissolution of the collective farms, this is hardly surprising. It is also interesting to note that the indicator for urbanization and one of the indicators for education are negatively (albeit weakly) correlated with degree of electoral consent. This would tend to add support to our second hypothesis.

The results of the 1961 election³⁷⁰ are perhaps a bit more meaningful as the values for the dependent and

the results of this analysis are prejudiced by the data and should reflect a bias in favor of support for the Front.

³⁷⁰ For both the 1961 and 1965 elections, data were available for 72 of the 80 electoral districts.

independent variables are better synchronized. Data were available for seventy-two of the eighty electoral districts. The simple correlation matrix for the relevant variables in this election appears in Appendix A.

As expected, the simple correlation matrix shows that all the indices of socioeconomic development are positively correlated, and in most instances, highly so. The single exception to this pattern is variable number 9 (the number of books in public libraries) which correlates either weakly or negatively with the other socioeconomic indicators.

In regression with dependent variable C (voter turnout) the independent variables listed in Table 18 proved to be the most important. These variables account for 24 per cent of the total variance.

TABLE 18.-- Selected Independent Variables in Regression with Voter Turnout: 1961

<u>Independent variables</u>	<u>Correlation coefficient</u>	<u>Confidence (Partial level F-test)</u>
14. Number of members in agricultural circles	-0.26	.001
13. Number of tractors	0.13	.001
11. Population economically active in health service	-0.02	----
2. Number of persons with one to four years general secondary education	0.13	.001
10. Population economically active in schools and culture	-0.08	.01

There appears to be no clear relationship here between socioeconomic development and political mobilization as measured by voter turnout. While one of the indicators for education (variable 2) is correlated positively (0.13) with the dependent variable and is significant at the .001 level, the two indicators for professional strata (variables 10 and 11) evince a weak negative correlation. The negative correlation (0.26) between turnout and number of members in agricultural circles which is highly significant (.001) seems to be somewhat of an anomaly. Agricultural circles are purportedly an organizational form designed to bring the peasantry, alienated by the years of forced collectivization, into the folds of socialist construction. One might therefore expect a positive relationship between membership in these organizations and voter turnout, yet the contrary seems to be the case here. On the basis of this evidence it is possible to assume that the circles, in a political sense, had not fulfilled their functions and that the peasantry remained, to some extent, disenchanted with the Front and its policies.

The multiple regression for dependent variable D (degree of electoral consent) revealed a similar, but slightly stronger, negative relationship between the number of members in agricultural circles and electoral consent (-0.13). This relationship is significant at the .05 level. The four variables which assumed the most importance in explaining the variance in degree of electoral consent (17 per cent of the variance) are presented in Table 19.

TABLE 19.-- Selected Independent Variables in Regression with Degree of Electoral Consent: 1961.

<u>Independent variables</u>	<u>Correlation coefficient</u>	<u>Confidence (Partial level F-test)</u>
14. Number of members in agricultural circles	-0.31	.05
6. Number of cinema seats	0.27	---
11. Population economically active in health services	0.07	.01
2. Number of persons with one to four years general secondary education	0.25	---

The 1965 election gives a somewhat more decisive picture of the relationship between socioeconomic development and political mobilization. The simple correlation matrix for the relevant variables appears in Appendix B. As in the case with the previous period (1960), the indicators of modernization correlate positively with one another in 1965. In predicting voter turnout, they tend to have a negative influence as illustrated in Table 20. The variables in this table account for 34 per cent of the variance in turnout.

The implication of these figures vis-a-vis the first hypothesis are rather striking. Although the correlations are weak, they do represent a negative relationship between

TABLE 20.-- Selected Independent Variables in Regression with Voter Turnout: 1965

<u>Independent variable</u>	<u>Correlation coefficient</u>	<u>Confidence (Partial level F-test)</u>
23. Number of members in agricultural circles	0.40	.001
24. Income of agricultural circles	-0.01	.001
17. Number of radios	-0.27	.01
15. Population living in urban areas	-0.28	.01
18. Number of televisions	-0.30	---
20. Turnover in shops	-0.25	---
21. Value of industrial production	-0.31	---
25. Total investments, 1961-1965	-0.23	.05
26. Investments in communal services and housing, 1961-1965	-0.18	.05
16. Number of cinema seats	-0.13	.001

socioeconomic development and the mobilization of the electorate. The fact that the number of members of agricultural circles correlates positively (0.40) with voter turnout, whereas in 1961 the relationship was negative (-0.26), perhaps indicates that the regime is making some headway in

the countryside. The change in the relationship between this variable and turnout over the two elections may well have been conditioned by the regime's promise to abolish the compulsory deliveries of agricultural produce in 1965.³⁷¹ Should this be so, then elections in this instance seem to be fulfilling the consent-communication function mentioned above.

In regression with variable F (degree of electoral consent), the variables in Table 21 explain 29 per cent of the variance.

TABLE 21.-- Selected Independent Variables in Regression with Degree of Electoral Consent: 1965

<u>Independent variables</u>	<u>Correlation coefficient</u>	<u>Confidence (Partial level F-test)</u>
23. Number of members in agricultural circles	0.27	.001
24. Income of agricultural circles	0.03	.01
16. Number of cinema seats	0.02	.001
25. Total Investments, 1961-1965	-0.11	.05
26. Investments in housing and communal services, 1961-1965	-0.01	.05
17. Number of radios	-0.13	.001
18. Number of televisions	-0.10	.05

³⁷¹ In fact, the promise was not kept; but the decision to prolong the deliveries was made after the 1965 election. See Marek Celt, "Another Round: Party and Peasant in Poland", East Europe, XVII (No.2, February, 1968), p.6.

TABLE 21. Continued

<u>Independent variable</u>	<u>Correlation coefficient</u>	<u>Confidence level</u>
20. Turnover in shops	-0.08	---
22. Number of tractors	-0.04	---
15. Population living in urban areas	-0.10	---
21. Value of industrial production	-0.13	---

The correlations presented in this table are perhaps not strong enough to support any generalizations. Attention might be called, however, to the negative relationship between two of the indicators of mass media communications (variables 17 and 18) and total investments on the one hand, and degree of electoral consent on the other.

Conclusions

Although no definite pattern is discernible over the three electoral periods, the outcome of the tests for the 1965 election seems to support the first hypothesis.²⁷² Negative relationships between the indicators of socioeconomic development and voter turnout suggest that political mobilization tends to decline where the process of modernization is

²⁷² See above, p.197.

most advanced. On the basis of the outcome of the tests for all three elections, Wiatr's conclusion that socioeconomic development and political mobilization are correlated appears to be untenable when the latter is measured by voter turnout.

The results of the tests for the second hypothesis are less decisive. The only significant relationships between the modernization indices and degree of electoral consent were negative but extremely weak. This may well be due to the limitations of the measure for electoral consent itself, as selective negative votes are not accounted for. This method of vote tabulation operates so as to conceal much of the electoral dissent registered against the preferred candidates. The constituency of Tomaszow Mazowiecki (No.53) serves as an illustration of this point. The electoral commission there published the results of the 1957 election as a complete endorsement of the joint-list. A total of 172,863 valid ballots were cast, 100 per cent of which were for the candidates of the Front of National Unity. However, when selective negative voting is examined, the outcome looks a bit differently; as the three surplus-candidates in this district garnered a relatively sizable proportion of the total vote (Table 22.). Since negative selective voting has tended to replace other manifestation of electoral dissent,³⁷³ it would be most interesting, were it not impossible, to compare this phenomenon with the level of socioeconomic development.

³⁷³Zamorski, "Features of the Polish Electoral System", op.cit., p.15.

TABLE 22.-- Selective Negative Voting in One Polish Constituency: 1957

<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Number of votes</u>	<u>Percentage of vote</u>
1. Korzycki, Antoni	150,381	86.99
2. Tuchowski, Roman	148,046	85.64
3. Klejnik, Setfan	156,424	90.49
4. Marczak, Stanislaw	156,348	90.45
5. Dabrowski, Witold	159,110	92.04
6. Wojciechowski, Jan	22,087	12.78
7. Glowacki, Jan	17,897	10.35
8. Wiaczek, Henryk	<u>17,897</u>	<u>10.35</u>
Total potential votes	867,150	100.00
Votes for seat candidates	<u>770,309</u>	<u>88.81</u>
Selective Negative Votes	96,841	11.19

Source: Zamorski, "Features of the Polish Electoral System", op.cit., p.11. Since each voter has in effect five votes as there are five seats for this constituency, the "total potential votes" are arrived at by multiplying the number of valid votes (172,863) by the multiple-vote of each voter (5).

In terms of the officially published statistics, the Front of National Unity seems to be making sustained progress among the electorate, as evinced by the percentage of valid votes for the joint-list, presented in Table 23.

TABLE 23.-- Percentage of Valid Votes for the Joint-List in Four Elections

	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>
Percentage of valid votes for the joint-list	98.40	98.34	98.81	99.00

Source: Figures for the 1957, 1961 and 1965 elections from Zamorski, "Features of the Polish Electoral System", op. cit., p.14; the percentage for 1969 is given in East Europe, XVIII (No.7, July, 1969), p.52.

Moreover, within the Front, the P.U.W.P. repeatedly wins the majority of seats in the Sejm (Table 24). Although its

TABLE 24.-- Party Representation in the Sejm: 1957-1969 Elections

Elections:	<u>1957</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>
Number of seats	459	459	460	460
P.U.W.P.	239	255	255	255
U.P.P.	119	117	117	117
D.P.	39	39	39	39
Nonparty (including Catholic groups)	62	49	49	49

Source: Data for 1957, 1961 and 1965 taken from Zamorski, "Features of the Polish Electoral System", op. cit., p.3; those for 1969 from East Europe, XVIII (No.7, July 1969), p.53.

parliamentary majorities are impressive on the surface, they are more a function of seat allocation in the nominating and candidate-ranking processes than a product of

electoral endorsement. For example, in the 1957 election, the P.U.W.P. candidates whose names were placed first on the ballot suffered the greatest number of deletions among top-ranking nominees (Table 25). Among the seat-candidates

TABLE 25.-- Negative Votes against Candidates Ranked First on the 1957 Joint-list

	Number of candidates ranked first on ballot	Number of candidates polling highest percentage of votes in district
P.U.W.P.	87 (75%)	24 (21%)
U.P.P.	21 (18%)	45 (39%)
D.P.	6 (5%)	7 (6%)
Nonparty (including Catholic groups)	2 (2%)	40 (34%)

Source: Pelczynski, op.cit., p.172.

in that election, the nonparty and Catholic groups fared best with 94.3 per cent of the valid votes, followed by the D.P. (90.8 per cent) and U.P.P. (88.2 per cent). The ruling party's seat candidates had the poorest showing with 87.9 per cent of the valid votes.³⁷⁴ In subsequent elections, this tendency on the part of the electorate to endorse nonparty candidates and to delete "the names of the least-liked bureaucrats and party apparatchiks" has developed into a trend.³⁷⁵

³⁷⁴ Data from Wiatr, "Elections and Voting Behavior in Poland", op.cit., p.247.

³⁷⁵ Ptakowski, op.cit., p.171.

In conclusion, what can be said of the legitimacy, mobilization and consent-communication functions of Polish elections ? With reference to the last of these, it appears to have been operational to some degree in regard to the peasantry and the policies of the regime as illustrated by the statistical tests performed on the 1961 and 1965 election returns. Private farmers, with the promise of the abolition of compulsory deliveries, seemed more favorably inclined toward signifying their support for the government by turning out to vote and voting in the officially prescribed manner. However, as we noted in the discussion of the electoral system, the structure of elections in Poland does not lend itself readily to the disclosures of dissent. Redistricting, the lack of information on marginal or surplus-candidates, the opprobrium attached to taking the ballot behind the curtain, and the ultimate futility of casting a negative vote detract severely from both the opportunity to register dissent and the accuracy with which dissent is measured. Certainly the favorable trend (from the point of view of the Front) in electoral endorsement of the joint-list (see Table 23) in no way reflects the long-smoldering animosity toward and alienation from the regime, which we noted in the preceding chapter with particular reference to the December 1970 uprising.

Regarding the legitimacy and mobilization functions of the elections, two trends seem to deserve comment. First, the increasing use of the negative selective vote as a means for the expression of opposition, to some degree represents a growing acceptance of the political system on

the part of some segments of the population. Selectively crossing out the names of seat-candidates who are perceived by the voter to be undesirable can perhaps be interpreted as an act less hostile to the regime than the deletion of all of the Front's candidates. While selective voting is still an expression of opposition, it is opposition within more circumscribed limits. It perhaps implicitly sanctions the legitimacy of the Front, for the act of casting a selective negative vote accepts as a given the established framework of the electoral process, and disapproval is confined within the institutionalized structure provided for the voter who wishes to disconfirm a few candidates rather than reject in toto the Front itself.

Second, the apparent apathy among voters in Poland (one student of Polish affairs makes the claim that in 1961, only 55 per cent of eligible voters in Warsaw bothered to register³⁷⁶) and the results of the tests performed on the first hypothesis suggest that the legitimacy and mobilization functions of elections are becoming eroded over time. Paradoxically, a system whose expressed goal is modernity appears to be experiencing its greatest difficulty in mobilizing the electorate of the modern sector.

³⁷⁶ Richard F. Staar, The Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, (revised ed.; Stanford: The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1971), p.132.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The modernization of Poland in the postwar era has pointed up the necessity of political development. The ruling party in the system, the P.U.W.P., consolidated its hegemonic position through the rigid application of the Stalinist control model, and sought to induce revolutionary social and economic changes by politicizing society and making it responsive, thereby, to a command political center. In the short-run, this politicization spurred socioeconomic development by bringing idle resources into the economy, creating an industrial infrastructure and promoting opportunities for employment as well as upward social mobility. For the ruling party, certain political assets are noticeable in this respect, as the capabilities of the system were expanded and the concrete achievements of the regime tended to reinforce its claim to legitimacy. In the long-run, however, the organizational mold through which these changes were carried out has become progressively less suited to dealing with the problems arising in the course of modernization and, particularly at later stages of development, has come to constitute a bulwark against further social and economic progress.

As roles and structures proliferate and become more

specialized in the modernizing process, a parallel need emerges in society to insure that the functions of these are coordinated and that conflicts among them are resolved. A linkage mechanism, capable of handling two-way communication flows, is essential in this regard. The primary linkage mechanism in Poland is, of course, the party system. During the Stalinist period, the party system evinced a low level of differentiation among its units, and the minor parties acted as transmission belts for the directives of the P.U.W.P. Communication among the parties was impeded, as was communication between the population and the parties, and between the party leadership and the rank and file. The communications breakdown had the effect of reducing the amount of information which the decision-making elite could bring to bear on policy matters. The upshot appears to have been the pursuit of ill-designed policies and the intensification of sociopolitical conflicts which culminated in the "Polish October". Thereafter, a modicum of autonomy for the minor parties has been introduced and their role in the decision-making process, even if purely advisory, has been enlarged and made operant through Coordinating Committees which exist at all levels of the party and governmental hierarchies.

This structural change in the party system, however, was by no means qualitative. That is, the fundamental principles of the system (P.U.W.P. hegemony and interparty "cooperation") have remained unimpaired. As such, policy alternatives reside within each party (more specifically, within the ruling party) in the form of factions, rather

than among the various parties, as is common in competitive party systems. Since the official ideology of the system calls for the maintenance of monolithic party unity, factional activity tends to take the form of "crypto-politics" within the sphere of administration. In this way, social conflicts are incorporated to some degree within the political framework, but on an informal basis. Since there are no formal procedures for resolving these, factional groupings tend to exploit social disturbances as a lever against their respective opponents. Under these circumstances, political stability is invariably a short-term proposition.

Social conflicts in Poland are largely traceable to the manner in which modernization was undertaken after the War. The growing complexity of the economy, brought about by rapid industrialization, has severely taxed the capacities of the central decision-making apparatus. Attempts at reforming the economy in order to promote further development through increased efficiency and the introduction of technical innovations have met with only marginal success, primarily because of the apparent congruence between the command economy and the command political system. Effective reforms, it seems, would involve a radical change in the structure of political relationships. This the ruling party has been either unable or unwilling to attempt.

Along with the relative stagnation in the economic sphere, the aspirations of various strata have tended to outdistance the capabilities of the system. Compounding this difficulty has been the gap between the official norms of the system (egalitarianism, classlessness, etc.)

and the realities of social stratification growing out of the exigencies of an industrial economy. Since stratification lines are blurred, however, the social system is highly prone to conflict. Micro level institutions such as workers' councils and trade unions, ostensibly designed to handle some of these conflicts, have atrophied as access channels, and the articulation of demands for large segments of the population has oscillated between latent behavioral mood cues and anomic outbursts of violence. The electoral process has to some degree provided an avenue for communications and "consent", yet electoral returns, in a situation in which elections decide neither who governs nor how, can be just as easily ignored as heeded. As a device for propagating the legitimacy of the system and mobilizing political support, elections have, at least superficially, played a role. Nevertheless, they do not appear to be effective outlets for political participation and have largely failed to institutionalize the participatory pressures stemming from the more modern sectors in society.

Modernization in Poland has tended to increase the importance of expertise in the decision-making process, and the qualifications of decision-makers, in terms of both education and career backgrounds, has risen correspondingly. However, the politicization of social and economic life remains the hallmark of the system, and transforms social and economic grievances into system-wide political problems. In the absence of specialized, autonomous institutions which are capable of absorbing

and resolving social conflicts, the ability of the political elite, regardless of its qualifications, to sustain economic development and to insure stability becomes a question which has already been answered by the course of contemporary Polish history.

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